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Essays On Economic Uncertainty And Macro-Finance
Abstract
This dissertation studies topics in macro-finance with a focus on economic uncertainty.
The first chapter (Government Debt and Risk Premia) studies the implications of government debt for asset
prices. I document a set of new facts that government debt is related to risk premia in various asset markets.
First, the debt-to-GDP ratio positively predicts excess stock returns. The forecast power is compelling, and it
outperforms many popular predictors. Second, higher debt-to-GDP ratio is correlated with higher credit risk
premia in both corporate bond excess returns and yield spreads. Third, higher debt-to-GDP ratio is associated
with lower real risk-free rate. Fourth, higher debt-to-GDP ratio predicts lower average returns on government
debt. Expected return variation contributes to a sizable amount of the volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Fifth, debt-to-GDP ratio positively comoves with fiscal policy uncertainty. Fiscal uncertainty also has direct
effects on the asset prices consistent with the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio. I rationalize these empirical findings
in a general equilibrium model featuring recursive preferences, endogenous growth, and time-varying fiscal
uncertainty. In the model, the tax risk premium is sizable and its time variation is driven by fiscal uncertainty.
Furthermore, the model generates an endogenous positive relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio and
fiscal uncertainty: fiscal uncertainty increases debt valuation through discount rate channel whereas higher
debt conversely raises uncertainty in future fiscal consolidations.
In the second chapter (Volatility Risk Pass-Through), we estimate and explain the international transmission
of output volatility shocks to both currencies and international quantity dynamics. We produce novel
empirical evidence on the relevance of output volatility (vol) shocks for both currency and international
quantity dynamics. Focusing on G-17 countries, we document several facts: (1) consumption and output vols
are imperfectly correlated within countries; (2) across countries, consumption vol is more correlated than
output vol; (3) the pass-through of relative output vol shocks onto relative consumption vol is moderate,
especially if the uncertainty shocks originate from small countries; and (4) consumption differentials vol and
exchange rate vol are disconnected, in contrast to the perfect correlation implied by a model of perfect risk-
sharing with time-additive preferences. We rationalize these findings in a frictionless model with multiple
goods and recursive preferences featuring a novel-and-rich risk-sharing of vol shocks.
The third chapter (Volatility, Intermediaries, and Exchange Rates) studies how financial market volatility
drives exchange rates through the risk management practice of financial intermediaries. We build a model in
which the major participants in the international financial market are levered intermediaries subject to Value-
at-Risk constraints. Higher portfolio volatility translates into tighter funding conditions and increased
marginal value of wealth. Thus, foreign currency is expected to appreciate. Our model can resolve the Backus-
Smith puzzle, the forward premium puzzle, and the exchange rate volatility puzzle quantitatively. Our
empirical test verifies two implications of the model that both financial market volatility and funding
condition measurement have predictive power on exchange rates.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY AND MACRO-FINANCE
Yang Liu
Amir Yaron
This dissertation studies topics in macro-finance with a focus on economic uncertainty.
The first chapter (Government Debt and Risk Premia) studies the implications of govern-
ment debt for asset prices. I document a set of new facts that government debt is related
to risk premia in various asset markets. First, the debt-to-GDP ratio positively predicts
excess stock returns. The forecast power is compelling, and it outperforms many popular
predictors. Second, higher debt-to-GDP ratio is correlated with higher credit risk premia
in both corporate bond excess returns and yield spreads. Third, higher debt-to-GDP ratio
is associated with lower real risk-free rate. Fourth, higher debt-to-GDP ratio predicts lower
average returns on government debt. Expected return variation contributes to a sizable
amount of the volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Fifth, debt-to-GDP ratio positively
comoves with fiscal policy uncertainty. Fiscal uncertainty also has direct effects on the
asset prices consistent with the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio. I rationalize these empirical
findings in a general equilibrium model featuring recursive preferences, endogenous growth,
and time-varying fiscal uncertainty. In the model, the tax risk premium is sizable and its
time variation is driven by fiscal uncertainty. Furthermore, the model generates an endo-
genous positive relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal uncertainty: fiscal
uncertainty increases debt valuation through discount rate channel whereas higher debt
conversely raises uncertainty in future fiscal consolidations.
In the second chapter (Volatility Risk Pass-Through), we estimate and explain the interna-
tional transmission of output volatility shocks to both currencies and international quantity
dynamics. We produce novel empirical evidence on the relevance of output volatility (vol)
iv
shocks for both currency and international quantity dynamics. Focusing on G-17 countries,
we document several facts: (1) consumption and output vols are imperfectly correlated
within countries; (2) across countries, consumption vol is more correlated than output vol;
(3) the pass-through of relative output vol shocks onto relative consumption vol is moderate,
especially if the uncertainty shocks originate from small countries; and (4) consumption dif-
ferentials vol and exchange rate vol are disconnected, in contrast to the perfect correlation
implied by a model of perfect risk-sharing with time-additive preferences. We rationalize
these findings in a frictionless model with multiple goods and recursive preferences featuring
a novel-and-rich risk-sharing of vol shocks.
The third chapter (Volatility, Intermediaries, and Exchange Rates) studies how financial
market volatility drives exchange rates through the risk management practice of financial
intermediaries. We build a model in which the major participants in the international
financial market are levered intermediaries subject to Value-at-Risk constraints. Higher
portfolio volatility translates into tighter funding conditions and increased marginal value
of wealth. Thus, foreign currency is expected to appreciate. Our model can resolve the
Backus-Smith puzzle, the forward premium puzzle, and the exchange rate volatility puzzle
quantitatively. Our empirical test verifies two implications of the model that both financial
market volatility and funding condition measurement have predictive power on exchange
rates.
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CHAPTER 1 : Government Debt and Risk Premia
1.1. Introduction
The government debt is of great importance to the economy, policymaking, and financial
markets. This paper documents a set of new facts about the effects of government debt on
asset prices in the United States. High debt-to-GDP ratios are related to high equity risk
premia, high credit risk premia, low risk-free rates, low expected returns on government
debt, and high fiscal policy uncertainty. I rationalize these facts in a general equilibrium
model featuring a fiscal uncertainty channel that links government debt and asset prices.
The importance of government debt is manifested in equity, credit and treasury markets.
First, high debt-to-GDP ratio corresponds to high equity premium. The debt-to-GDP ratio
positively predicts excess stock returns at horizons from one quarter to five years. The ratio
contains useful information beyond a large number of existing predictors, thus improving
the predictive power. In a univariate predictive regression using debt-to-GDP ratio, the
out-of-sample R2 is 10% at an annual horizon and reaches 30% at a five-year horizon. In
comparison, the out-of-sample R2 of many popular predictors are marginally positive. A
strategy that times the market using debt-to-GDP ratio can generate an excess return of
14.71% per annum with a Sharpe ratio of 0.66, while a buy and hold strategy of the market
portfolio yields a Sharpe ratio of 0.3.
In credit markets, I observe a similar pattern that high debt-to-GDP ratios are related
to high credit risk premia. One measure of credit risk premia is the expected excess re-
turn on corporate bonds. The debt-to-GDP ratio positively predicts excess returns on
investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds. The magnitude is close to the stock re-
turn predictability. Another measure of credit risk premium is a yield spread. I document
that government debt raises the credit premium component of yield spreads.
The first two findings show that high debt-to-GDP ratio implies high cost of capital for
1
firms. Regarding the cost of capital for government, however, high debt-to-GDP ratios
are associated with low real risk-free rates and low expected returns on government debt.
Both 1-month and 3-month real risk-free rates are negatively related to the debt-to-GDP
ratio, controlling for expected growth and inflation. Furthermore, I examine the discount
rate of the government. Since the government does not only issue short-term debt, the
government discount rate or effective borrowing cost is the average return across terms to
maturity on all the Treasury securities. In the default-free case, the government budget
constraint implies that a high debt-to-GDP ratio can stem from three channels: (i) high
expected future primary surplus to pay off the debt, (ii) high expected future growth to
stabilize the ratio, and (iii) low expected future returns on government debt. The previous
studies mainly focus on the first two channels. Here I document that the third discount
rate channel is empirically important:1 the debt-to-GDP ratio negatively predicts returns
on government debt. I use a present value decomposition in a vector autoregression to
quantify the relative contribution of these three components. The variation of expected
returns accounts for 25% of the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Why does government debt have such significant effects on asset prices? Major existing
channels of government debt such as liquidity, safety, and crowding out are silent or incon-
sistent with these facts. I propose a new channel—fiscal uncertainty—that can rationalize
the empirical findings jointly. I propose a broad-based measure of fiscal policy uncertainty
by utilizing 169 macro variables and estimating a dynamic factor model with stochastic
volatility. In the data-rich environment, fiscal policy consists of 37 variables regarding va-
rious types of tax, spending and transfer. Fiscal uncertainty is measured as the common
component of the conditional forecast error volatility of these fiscal policy instruments.
Empirically, fiscal uncertainty fluctuates over time and positively comoves with the debt-
to-GDP ratio with a correlation of 0.5. Therefore, government debt encodes the risks in
fiscal policy that drive the variation of risk premia. I present direct evidence that fiscal un-
1This discount rate channel is addressed differently in several papers. Hall and Sargent (2011) show
variations in realized returns affect the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio. Berndt et al. (2012) find that part
of a fiscal spending shock is financed with decreases in the discount rate.
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certainty affects asset prices in equity, credit, and treasury markets in the same directions
and has similar magnitudes as the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Within a general equilibrium model, I quantify the effects of government debt and fiscal
uncertainty on asset prices. The key ingredients of the model include recursive preferences,
endogenous growth through innovation, and fluctuations in the volatility of distortionary
corporate income tax. Tax hikes depress innovation and economic growth so that persistent
tax changes are a source of endogenous long-run risks. Stock prices drop with tax hikes
because of the tax payment and the lower cash flow growth. For fear of the joint decrease
of growth prospects and stock prices, agents demand a large equity premium for tax risks.
This risk compensation is even larger when the “quantity” of risk increases in times of
high fiscal uncertainty. Hence, time variation in equity premium is driven by fiscal uncer-
tainty. In contrast, non-defaultable government bonds rally in times of high tax, because
lower expected growth induces the agents to purchase safe bonds. Thus, government bonds
hedge against tax risks for investors and have negative risk premia. In time of high fiscal
uncertainty, the hedging motive drives down the government bond premium. Moreover,
uncertainty increases the precautionary saving motive and lowers the risk-free rate.
The model generates a positive comovement between the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal un-
certainty through two mechanisms. Uncertainty lowers both risk-free rate and bond risk
premium and thus the expected return on government debt. The declining expected return
leads to the rise of the bond price. Therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio increases with uncer-
tainty through the discount rate channel. Conversely, debt generates uncertainty in future
fiscal policy. The government implements fiscal consolidations from time to time to reduce
deficits and debt accumulation. The consolidation policy is uncertain and anticipated to
be more active when debt is high. As a result, high debt-to-GDP ratio brings more uncer-
tainty in fiscal consolidations. The two mechanisms reinforce each other. In equilibrium,
the debt-to-GDP ratio reveals fiscal uncertainty and has implications for asset prices that
are consistent with the empirical findings. Calibrated to fiscal policy data, the model quan-
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titatively explains many features of macroeconomics dynamics and asset markets such as
equity premium and risk-free rate, as well as the novel facts regarding the government debt.
Relation to Literature. There is a long-lasting debate on the effects of government
debt on interest rate (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999; Engen and Hubbard, 2005; Laubach,
2009). Few papers consider the importance of risk premia across different interest-bearing
instruments. Distinguishing between real risk-free rate, return on equity, corporate bonds,
and government debt, I show that high government debt is associated with high cost of
capital for firms and low cost of capital for government. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) find that high government debt is related to lower spreads between assets
with different liquidity and safety attributes.2 My evidence of the effect of government debt
on credit risk premia is complementary to their evidence of liquidity premia. I document
differential effects that government debt enhances credit risk premia in corporate bond
market and diminishes liquidity premia in money market. Croce et al. (2016) show that
debt-to-GDP ratio predicts the spreads between innovation-sorted stock portfolios in the
time series and cross section, while I focus on the aggregate asset markets. Greenwood and
Vayanos (2014) document that the maturity structure of government debt affects nominal
bond risk premia and term spreads.
I contribute to the voluminous literature of stock return predictability by analyzing debt-
to-GDP ratio as a predictor. The results have little bias from the high persistence of
the debt-to-GDP ratio (Campbell and Yogo, 2006; Stambaugh, 1999). The out-of-sample
predictive power is compelling (Welch and Goyal, 2008). Debt-to-GDP ratio outperforms
the popular predictors regarding out-of-sample mean squared error.3
A long theoretical literature links government debt to macroeconomic dynamics. Ricardian
2Graham et al. (2014) document a similar negative relationship between debt-to-GDP ratio and Baa-
Aaa spread. They also find that government debt has large impacts on corporate financing and investment
policies.
3Some of the major predictors are the dividend-price ratio (Campbell and Shiller, 1988), book-to-market
ratio (Kothari and Shanken, 1997), term spread (Fama and French, 1989), short rate (Hodrick, 1992; Ang
and Bekaert, 2007), investment rate (Cochrane, 1991), the consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson,
2001), output gap (Cooper and Priestley, 2009), and government investment rate (Belo and Yu, 2013).
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Equivalence states that government debt has no effect in a frictionless standard representative-
agent model (Barro, 1974). However, in the presence of liquidity and safety needs, govern-
ment debt plays a special role and has significant effects on macroeconomic quantities and
asset prices (Bansal and Coleman, 1996; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Gor-
ton and Ordonez, 2013; Drechsler et al., 2014; Greenwood et al., 2015). The impact of
government debt is also large in heterogeneous agent incomplete market models (Gomes
et al., 2013). These theories are either silent on the new empirical findings or have counter-
factual implications that high government debt is related to low equity premium and high
risk-free rate. I contribute to the understanding of government debt by proposing a new
fiscal policy uncertainty channel which operates through the government discount rate and
also affects other risk premia. Because debt-to-GDP ratio encodes the variation of fiscal un-
certainty, it explains risk premium variation, which complements the existing explanations
of time-varying risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), time-varying consumption
volatility (Bansal and Yaron, 2004), and time-varying risk of disasters (Wachter, 2013).
My analysis of fiscal uncertainty also relates to the recent literature examining the role of
economic uncertainty both in the data and models (Bloom, 2009a; Bansal et al., 2014a;
Jurado et al., 2015b, among others). Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013) and Baker et al. (2015)
study the asset pricing and macroeconomic impacts of general economic policy uncertainty.
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015) and Born and Pfeifer (2014) show the importance of fiscal
uncertainty on economic activities. I propose a new broad-based measure of fiscal policy
uncertainty and illustrate its importance for asset prices.
More broadly, this article belongs to the growing literature studying asset prices in a pro-
duction economy (Jermann, 1998; Croce, 2014). Similar to Kung and Schmid (2015) and
Kung (2015), I endogenize the long run risks (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) in a expanding
variety endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990).4 The long run risks are purely driven
by productivity shocks in Kung and Schmid (2015), whereas part of the long run risks
4Comin and Gertler (2006) study business cycle and long-run dynamics in a unified endogenous growth
model.
5
rise from tax policy in my model. Croce et al. (2012) demonstrate a sizable tax risk pre-
mium in a model with capital structure choice where tax rate drives the technology growth
exogenously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 documents the empirical
findings. Section 1.3 lays out the model. Section 1.4 presents the economic mechanism and
the quantitative implications of the model. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2. Empirical Evidence
In this section, I document several new facts relating government debt-to-GDP ratio. First,
I show that debt-to-GDP ratio positively predicts market equity risk premia both in sample
and out of sample. This results is robust to a large set of controls, sub-sample analysis,
different definitions of government debt, international data, and persistent predictor issues.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to discover this relationship. I also
show the connection between government debt and credit risk premia. Next, I document
that high government debt is associated with low risk-free rate and low expected return on
government debt. I propose a present-value decomposition to illustrate the importance of
variation of government discount rate in driving debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, as the economic
force that I proposed underlines the rise in risk premia due to increased government debt is
fiscal policy uncertainty, I use two empirical measures of fiscal uncertainty and show that
they are positively correlated with government debt-to-GDP ratio.
1.2.1. Data Description
Government debt is defined as the market value of the federal government debt held by the
public. The market value of government debt is constructed by summing up the market
value of all the credit market instruments across maturities (Treasury bonds, Treasury
notes, Treasury bills, TIPS, etc). Government debt data are from Dallas Fed, Flow of
Funds and, George Hall (Hall and Sargent, 2011). Figure 1.1 demonstrates the time series
plot of the debt-to-GDP ratio. The ratio doubled from 20% to 40% during the Great
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Depression and jumped to 100% around the second world war. It declined gradually in the
peacetime expansion until the early 1970s. Congress increased its control on the government
budget process after the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
leading to deficits and rising debt. In the 1980s, President Reagan’s tax cuts and military
buildup further increased the debt. The fiscal balance returned to a surplus in the term of
President Clinton, due to tax increases, military spending decreases, and an economic boom.
Finally, the Great Recession, combined with Bush tax cuts, caused expanding government
expenditure and declining revenue. In 2014, the ratio reached its post-war peak. One
crucial feature is that the debt-to-GDP ratio is driven mainly by military and political
issues and fiscal policy reforms. While the debt-to-GDP ratio rises in NBER recessions, it
does not tend to decline in normal times. In fact, the business cycle only accounts for a
small proportion of its variance.
The asset price data are obtained from CRSP, Barclay and Fred. The average return on
government debt is from George Hall. The stock return predictors are from Amit Goyal’s
website. The data on macroeconomic and fiscal variables are from NIPA and FRED-QD
database (McCracken and Ng, 2016). The detailed explanations of the data are in the
appendix.
1.2.2. Equity Premium
After studying the time series property of the debt-to-GDP ratio, I show that it strongly
predicts future excess stock returns in sample and out of sample.
In-sample Tests Table 1.1 reports the results from OLS regressions of future excess stock
returns on log debt-to-GDP ratio. Excess stock return is the log market return subtracting
the log risk-free rate. Long-horizon excess returns are the cumulative summation of the
one-period excess returns. In the sample from 1926 to 2014, higher debt-to-GDP ratio
forecasts higher stock returns in the future. The forecasting power becomes stronger at
longer horizons as R2 rises from 11% at the annual horizon to 38% at the five-year horizon.
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As in the previous findings, returns are more predictable at longer horizons, since the high-
frequency noises are canceled out, and the slow-moving expected return is reflected more
clearly in the data. The coefficients across all the horizons are statistically significant at
99%. In Figure 1.2, I plot the 5-year ahead ex-post and expected excess return. The
expected excess return is the fitted value of the predictive regressions. It is evident that
higher debt-to-GDP ratio implies higher subsequent returns. The expected excess return
rises from the 1930s to the 1950s, declines from the 1950s to the 1970s, and rises again from
the 1970s to the 1990s and during the Great Recession.
Beyond the statistical significance, the economic impact of debt-to-GDP ratio on the ex-
pected excess return is substantial. A one percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP ratio
indicates a 38 basis-point increase in expected excess return per annum.5 Taking the Great
Recession as an example, we observe a rapid increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 30% to
60%. This swing implies that the expected return is 11.4% higher than its pre-crisis level.
It is acknowledged that excess return predictability is equivalent to time-varying equity
premium in a standard rational pricing model.6 Thus, the rise of debt-to-GDP ratio indi-
cates that investors require a high premium to compensate equity risks. The classic equity
premium puzzle emphasizes the difficulty in rationalizing the 6% average equity premium
given the lower risk in the consumption profile. It is now more puzzling in that the equity
premium is largely time-varying, from 2% in 2007 to 13% in 2014.
From an asset management point of view, this large time variation of expected return
is valuable for investors. Consider a mean-variance investor who solves a static portfolio
choice problem between aggregate stock and risk-free rate. As is shown in Campbell and
Thompson (2008), observing the predictor increases the expected excess return by a factor
of (S2 +R2)/((1−R2)S2), where S is the Sharpe ratio of the market return. In the sample
5The debt-to-GDP ratio enters the regressions in log units. Given debt-to-GDP ratio has a mean of 0.40,
a 1% increase is equivalent to a 0.40 percentage point increase of debt-to-GDP ratio.
6Equity premium is defined as the expected excess return of the stock market. If it can be predicted by
some variable x, then in a simple regression case Et[rm,t+1 − rf,t] = β0 + x′tβ. As a result, equity premium
comoves with the predictor xt.
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1926-2014, the equity premium is 6.03% and the Shape ratio is 0.3. A strategy that times
the market using debt-to-GDP ratio can generate an excess return of 14.71% per annum
and a Sharpe ratio of 0.66.7
It is believed that debt-to-GDP ratio could be driven by several apparent factors: recessions,
wars, and political parties. I show that debt-to-GDP is a new predictor instead of a proxy
for business cycle, wars, and parties. First, in economic downturns, low GDP and counter-
cyclical surplus raise the debt-to-GDP ratio and meanwhile the counter-cyclical expected
return is high. To alleviate this concern, I show that the results are similar if a recession
dummy is included in the regression. The debt-to-GDP ratio is acyclical in Figure 1.1.
The average ratio is 40% in normal time and 37% in recessions. In the recent decade, even
though the Great Recession ends in 2010, the ratio keeps rising afterwards. This reassures
that government debt cycle and business cycle are distinct phenomena. Excluding the
dramatic increase of the ratio after the recession from 2007 to 2014 doesn’t alter the results.
Second, the evident link between debt and wars leads to the conjecture that the forecasting
power of the debt-to-GDP ratio is related to wars. I include a war-time dummy in the
regression. The insignificance of the coefficients across horizons and time periods shows
that the forecasting power remains in peacetime and wartime. Third, different political
stance might simply determine the tightness of government debt policy. The high stock
return under Democratic presidents are documented by Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003)
and Pastor and Veronesi (2017). However, debt-to-GDP still contributes to the explanatory
power as before after I include a dummy of president’s party.
Beyond the debt-to-GDP ratio, I have identified many other return predictors. Price-
dividend ratio is arguably the most popular predictor that is both theoretically grounded
and empirically successful. Controlling for price-dividend ratio, both the coefficients and
significance of debt-to-GDP ratio are unchanged. As is seen in Figure 1.2, debt-to-GDP
has distinct movements from the price-dividend ratio. Moreover, I consider a large set of
7The higher expected return is partially from taking on greater risk. The portfolio volatility increases by
1/(1−R2) on average. Therefore, the portfolio Sharpe ratio increases by a factor of (S2 +R2)/S2.
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alternative predictors: price-earning ratio (pe), dividend-earning ratio (de), stock return
volatility (svar), book-to-market ratio (bm), net equity expansion (ntis), Treasury bill rate
(tbl), long-term yield (lty), long-term return (ltr), term spread (tms), default yield spread
(dfy), inflation (infl), investment-capital ratio (ik), consumption-wealth ratio (cay), GDP
gap (gap), and government investment-capital ratio (gik). From the set of predictors, I
extract the first three principal components that capture 97% of the variation. This par-
simonious model is less subject to the concern of in-sample overfitting.8 Conditioning on
a large information set, the debt-to-GDP ratio still contributes to the prediction at a 99%
significant level. The point estimates remain similar. The principal components do not
drive out the explanatory power of debt-to-GDP ratio, suggesting that the ratio contains
extra information.
To assess the stability of the results further, I run the same regressions on quarterly fre-
quency post-war data. The results are reported in Table 1.2. Even at a short horizon of
one quarter, the debt-to-GDP ratio significantly predicts excess return.9 Moreover, the re-
gression coefficients are highly significant and very close to the pre-war coefficients, and the
R2 are similar at the annual horizon and the five-year horizon. The significance is robust
with several control variables that were mentioned before.
Out-of-sample Tests The literature documents considerable in-sample predictability,
but out-of-sample performance is usually unsatisfactory (Welch and Goyal, 2008). The
poor out-of-sample predictive power raises the concern of data snooping. Debt-to-GDP
ratio has strong out-of-sample predictive power. I use out-of-sample R2 to evaluate the
predictive accuracy.
R2os = 1−
MSE1
MSE0
MSE0 and MSE1 are the mean square error using historical mean and the predictive model.
In Table 1.3, the R2os of univariate regression using debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.10 at the annual
8I explore each of the predictors in the out-of-sample tests.
9The predictability results hold at the one-month horizon as well.
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horizon and 0.29 at the five-year horizon, indicating that debt-to-GDP generates smaller
MSE than the historical mean. The test for equal predictive accuracy (Clark and West
2007) shows that MSE1 is statistically significantly smaller than MSE0.
Debt-to-GDP ratio outperforms many predictors regarding out-of-sample predictive power.
I consider the set of predictors used in the in-sample tests. Debt-to-GDP ratio has the
largest R2os among all the predictors. In fact, most predictors have negative R
2
os, showing
that they are not better than the historical mean. Furthermore, including debt-to-GDP
ratio in a bi-variate regression with existing predictors yields positive R2os. The p-values of
the equal-predictability test show that debt-to-GDP ratio significantly improves the perfor-
mance of available predictors. This test can also be interpreted as an encompassing test.
Table 1.4 reports the results in the post-war sample. Several variables have better perfor-
mance than the historical mean in this period, including price-dividend ratio, price-earning
ratio, investment-capital ratio, consumption-wealth ratio, GDP gap, and government inves-
tment/capital ratio. The last two predictors are documented after the critic of Welch and
Goyal (2008). Particularly, they are related to debt-to-GDP ratio. The result shows that
debt-to-GDP still has the largest R2os. The improvement is significant at all horizons.
Overlapping Observations When we do long-term prediction, the common practice is
to predict cumulative return using overlapping observations and to adjust standard errors
accordingly. Given many critics on the construction of standard errors, I try to use a
different specification by predicting single-period excess return in period t+ h.
rm,t+h − rf,t+h−1 = β0 + bytβ1 + xtβ + ut+h
This approach ensures that the error term ut+h is not serially correlated by construction.
Figure 1.3 shows β1(h) and R
2(h) across 40 quarters using quarterly sample. As a result,
debt-to-GDP ratio can predict one-period excess return 15 quarters ahead at a 95% sig-
nificance. This analysis not only shows the robustness of the benchmark results, but also
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illustrate the term structure of predictability. Both downward slopping coefficients and R-
squared imply that it is easier to predict returns in the near future than returns in the far
future. We get zero R-squared when trying to predict excess returns in 10 years.
Persistence One key concern is the high persistence of the predictor. The debt-to-GDP
ratio has a persistence of 0.957 at annual frequency. The stationarity of debt-to-GDP ratio
is examined thoroughly in the literature, and there is no convincing evidence of a unit
root (Bohn, 2005). If the debt-to-GDP ratio is nonstationary, with probability one it will
implausibly diverge to infinity.
The high persistence of the predictor leads to potential invalidity of the inference in two
ways. First, if the innovation to the predictor and innovation to the return are correlated,
there is a small-sample bias (Stambaugh, 1999). Second, the high degree of persistence
results in a nonstandard asymptotic distribution. I use the efficient test by Campbell and
Yogo (2006) to address both problems. They propose a Bonferroni test that corrects for
the endogeneity and provides an accurate approximation to the finite-sample distribution
of test statistics under flexible degrees of persistence (stationary, local-to-unity, and unit
root). In Table 1.5, the test results confirm that the conventional t-test in Table 1.1 is valid.
The 95% confidence interval does not include zero at all horizons and sample periods. The
main reason is that the correlation between innovations of debt-to-GDP ratio and return
ρue is close to zero, while the correlations are very high in a variety of valuation ratios.
Components of Government Debt In the benchmark case, the government debt is
defined as the market value of net debt held by the public. There are other definitions and
components of debt that have different economic interpretations. The gross level includes
debt held by the government accounts that does not represent what the government owes.10
A portion of the debt is non-marketable and cannot be traded in secondary markets. Given
quantitative easing and the rapid growth of foreign investors, the debt held by the Federal
10These accounts include the Social Security Trust Fund, federal employee retirement funds, the Unem-
ployment Trust Fund, etc.
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Reserve System and foreigners are of interest on their own. Moreover, the commonly repor-
ted value is the par value not marked to market. In comparison, the benchmark definition
is a more accurate measure in that net debt is more relevant than gross debt to measure
the indebtedness of the government and market value reflects up-to-date information in
yields changes. Nevertheless, I entertain all the definitions in the following analysis. The
correlations of different debt-to-GDP ratios are around 0.9. Table 1.6 reports the results.
The difference between various definitions is small in that all the coefficients are around
0.15, and R2 around 10% at the annual horizon. Results are similar at other horizons.
Therefore, the different definitions and decomposition of the government debt share the
same forecasting power. As we see, the choice of benchmark is innocuous. In the last row,
I define debt-to-GDP ratio as the ratio of net debt and potential GDP that capture the
ideal level of trend GDP without business cycles, measured by Congress Budget Office.
The predictability results remain in this setting. In fact, the denominator plays the role of
normalization.11
International Evidence I verify the forecasting power using data from other countries.
I use the debt-to-GDP ratio of each country to predict the excess return on the country’s
MSCI Index over 3-month treasury bill rate. The finding in the US market also shows up
in Canada and UK in Table 1.7. The coefficients are statistically significant, and the mag-
nitude is around 0.2, close to 0.15 in the US. Nonetheless, this empirical relationship is not
expected to hold in a wide range of countries, because several country-specific mechanisms:
default, inflation, denomination, etc. Specifically, one mechanism is that default probability
increases with debt-to-GDP ratio, thus affecting the economic dynamics and asset prices
on all the markets. This sovereign default premium should be of first order in most coun-
tries. Even treasury bonds of France and Italy have significant yield spreads over Germany
treasury bonds. Furthermore, the interactions of monetary and fiscal policy often inflate
away the effective government liability in some countries. In the US, we do not observe
11Debt-to-Consumption ratio and Debt-to-Industrial-Production ratio yield similar results. Therefore, the
forecasting information is in debt and price instead of the various denominators. Similarly, the price-dividend
ratio and price-earning ratio have similar forecasting power.
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high inflation after high debt. In fact, debt-to-GDP ratio even negatively predicts future
inflation. Also, in many countries, a large portion of government debt is denominated in
foreign currencies and held by foreign investors. All these channels complicate the cross-
country analysis of government debt and risk premia. In this paper, I focus on the countries
that are similar to the US conditions that has little default and inflation risks and issues
in domestic currency. I left the interesting mechanisms of default, inflation and foreign ex-
posure for future research. Besides the supportive evidence of UK and Canada, I also find
insignificance in Germany and Japan. The two countries are different econometrically and
economically. In Germany and Japan, the debt-to-GDP ratios have a clear upward trend
in the sample. It is clear that a trend does not serve the role of a predictor. This trending
debt ratio could be due to small sample problem, monetary union for Germany, and zero
lower bound for Japan.
Dividend Predictability In Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition, price-dividend
ratio reflects the expected variation in future excess return and cash flow. This identity
justifies why price-dividend ratio is the most widely acknowledged predictor.
pdt ≈ Et[Σj=0κj1∆dt+1+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash flow
−Σj=1κj1rt+1+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount rate
]
If one variable has predictive power beyond price dividend ratio, then expected return
changes but the price-dividend ratio does not reflects it. From the identity, there are two
possibilities that price-dividend ratio fails to capture the expected return news. First, the
change of dividend growth in the first term offsets the change in the second term. Second,
the expected returns in different time move in the opposite directions. The second term
remains unchanged because the variation in rt+j offset the variation in rt+i. This dynamics
is not common in economics and financial data, and it is not the case for debt-to-GDP ratio
as can be seen from Figure 1.3. The predictability of debt-to-GDP ratio falls into the first
case. In Table 1.8, the ratio predicts dividend growth significantly with R2 as large as 30%
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in a five year horizon. The results are similar after I controlling for price-dividend ratio.
1.2.3. Credit Premium and Liquidity Premium
As shown in Section 1.2.2, debt-to-GDP ratio contains important information about risks in
the equity market and positively predicts excess stock returns. Corporate bonds are another
important asset class that reflect the risk premium for firms. Given the commonality of
risk premia fluctuations, we expect to see similar results also in the credit market: the
debt-to-GDP ratio (i) positively predicts excess returns on corporate bonds; (ii) positively
relates to corporate bond yield spreads.
Excess returns and yield spreads between corporate and treasury bonds can capture the
difference in several factors such as credit risk premium, liquidity premium, collateral pre-
mium, inflation premium, etc. A large literature argues that government debt plays a key
role in liquidity and safety provision (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012). In this
line of thought, investors value liquidity because of market frictions. Assets that provide
liquidity attributes at different levels should have different premia. Time-varying liquidity
premium depends on the outstanding amount of highly liquid assets such as government
debt. Therefore, high government debt lubricates the economy and decreases the liquidity
premium. These theories imply that the debt-to-GDP ratio (i) negatively predicts excess
returns on equity;12 (ii) negatively predicts excess returns on corporate bonds; (iii) negati-
vely relates to corporate bond yield spreads. These implications of the liquidity channel are
in sharp contrast to those of the risk channel.13 Next, I test the two channels in the data.
1.2.3.1. Stock Excess Return
In stock return predictability, I address the liquidity and safety channel of government debt
by controlling yield spreads that account for the time-varying liquidity premium. These
12Bansal and Coleman (1996) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) argue that part of the
equity premium is liquidity premium. This liquidity premium channel can partially solve the equity premium
puzzle.
13He and Xiong (2012) model that the interactions between liquidity and credit risk. Debt market illi-
quidity increases in not only liquidity premium but also credit risk. This mechanism amplifies the liquidity
channel. The three implications have the same signs but larger magnitudes.
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variables include spread between Moody’s AAA bond and 30-year Treasury bond yield
(ats) (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012) and spread between general collateral
repo rate14 and 3-month treasury bill (liqs) (Nagel, 2014). The results are in Table 1.2.
The liquidity premium does not conceal the strong forecasting power of debt-to-GDP ratio.
The sign is negative for ats, in contrast to the hypothesis that liquidity premium drives the
excess return. Therefore, the time variation in equity premium cannot be explained only
through the liquidity channel.
1.2.3.2. Bond Excess Return
In bond return predictability, Table 1.9 shows that debt-to-GDP ratio positively predicts
excess returns on corporate bonds, similar to the predictability of stock returns. In a
one-year horizon, the coefficients are 0.09 and 0.12 for excess returns on investment-grade
and high-yield bond portfolios, similar to the magnitude of coefficient of stock returns
(0.15). Controlling for price-dividend ratio and market realized volatility does not weaken
the effect of government debt. This predictability implies that debt-to-GDP ratio contains
information about credit risk premium.
1.2.3.3. Yield Spreads
Next, I consider a broad range of yield spreads that measure credit risk premia. We expect
to see a positive relationship between debt-to-GDP ratio and yield spread if government
debt increases the credit risk premia. Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) construct a spread
index (GZ spread) from individual corporate bonds traded in the secondary market. They
carefully match the duration and maturity between each corporate bond and treasury bond.
Their bond also covers the entire maturity spectrum from 1 year to 30 years. In contrast,
the standard Moody’s seasoned bond yield focuses on bonds that have remaining maturities
from 20 to 30 years and unknown duration. In Table 1.10, debt-to-GDP ratio is positively
related to GZ spread. The result is significant at 99% confidence level, controlling for
14The general collateral repo rate is available from 1991. As in Nagel (2014), I use the banker’s acceptance
rate before 1991.
16
the realized volatility and term spread. Realized volatility partially measures the default
probability. The term spread controls for the effect of any potential maturity mismatch in
the yield spreads on the left-hand side. This relationship is not significant for the spreads
between Moody’s Aaa, Aa, A, Baa bond yield and 30-year treasury bond yield. Since
both debt-to-GDP ratio and spreads are persistent, I specify the regression model in first
difference to further explore the dynamic interactions. Both credit risk and liquidity risk
channels have the same implications for regressions in levels and first differences. GZ spread
and spreads from Moody’s all show a positive and significant relationship, supporting the
credit risk channel.
In a longer sample from 1919 to 2008, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) find that
Aaa-Treasury spread is negatively related to the debt-to-GDP ratio in a level regression.
As seen in Table 1.10, the result is not significant in the sample of 1973-2014 when GZ
spread is available. One reason could be sub-sample stability.15 Another possible reason is
that credit risk premium and liquidity premium offset each other. In fact, different yield
spreads capture the two sources of premium with different weights. On one hand, Longstaff
et al. (2005) document that the majority of long-term bond spreads are due to credit
risks. On the other hand, some spreads in money market capture mostly liquidity premium
and a priori have few default risks. These include spreads between general collateral repo
rate, certificate of deposits rate, AA commercial paper rate, federal funds rate and T-bill
rate (Drechsler et al., 2014; Nagel, 2014). Therefore, we could roughly categorize yield
spreads into two groups: credit spreads (GZ, Aaa-Treasury, Aa-Treasury, A-Treasury, Baa-
Treasury) are mainly in corporate bond market and liquidity spreads (Repo-Bill, CD-Bill,
Paper-Bill, FFR-Bill) are in money market. These two categories are not only economically
motivated but also empirically grounded. After a factor analysis, I find that each group of
spreads has a single factor structure. The first principal component of the spreads within
each group explains more than 80% of the variations. However, the two common factors
15Yield spreads in the early sample have larger measurement error. Given the data availability, it is not
possible to match maturity and duration of government and corporate bonds as in Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek
(2012).
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have a low correlation of 0.15. The factor analysis shows that the time-varying liquidity
premium and credit premium are different phenomena.
I verify the liquidity channel in the group of liquidity spreads in Table 1.10. Higher debt-
to-GDP ratio is associated with lower spreads that have more weight on liquidity premium.
The results are significant both in the level and first difference specifications.
1.2.3.4. A VAR Analysis of Yield Spreads
I further study the dynamics relationship between debt-to-GDP ratio and yield spreads by
analyzing the impulse response functions and variance decomposition in a vector autore-
gression framework. I estimate a five-variable VAR
Zt = ΦZt−1 + ut
Zt = [∆gdpt, svart, by
book
t , byt, spreadt]
The VAR includes GDP growth, stock market volatility, book-value debt-to-GDP ratio,
market-value debt-to-GDP ratio and a yield spread. I use an identification strategy that
recursively orders the variables as above. The third “book shock” increases the book value of
debt but is orthogonal to output and market volatility contemporaneously. I interpret this
shock as an exogenous net issuance of government bond that is non-discretionary and not
based on the economic and financial conditions. The fourth “market shock” is a shock to the
market value of government debt, holding book value constant. In Section 1.4.3, I interpret
these two shock through the lens of the model. Though the two shocks capture different
mechanisms, both of them link government debt to uncertainty and raise risk premia. In
comparison, if liquidity channel dominates, these two shocks decrease risk premia.
I estimate the impulse response of yield spreads to the two debt-to-GDP shocks. I switch
different spread into the VAR to keep the parsimony of the system. Figure 1.4 shows the
impulse response of the spreads in corporate bond market where credit risks are important.
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Both book and market shock increase Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) spread and Moody’s
spreads. The effects are statistically significant, especially in the market shock. Figure
1.5 shows the impulse response of the spreads in money market where credit risks are less
important (Repo-Bill, CD-Bill, Paper-Bill, FFR-Bill). The effect of both shocks are negative
and significant on all the spreads. These results confirm the analysis in Section 1.2.3.3 that
government debt has differential effects on different markets.
Next, I measure the importance of the effects by variance decomposition. Table 1.11 presents
how much of the forecast error variance of the yield spreads can be attributed to the book
shock and the market shock. The debt-to-GDP ratio shocks explain 9% of the one-year
forecast error variance of GZ spread, 7% of the Aaa-Treasury spread, 15% of the Baa-
Aaa spread and around 20% of yield spreads in money market. Therefore, the effect of
government debt is quantitatively important to the dynamics of the yield spreads in both
corporate bond and money markets.
Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that both channels of credit and liquidity risk are
present. High debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with high credit risk premia and low liquidity
risk premia. Debt-to-GDP ratio increases yield spreads that mainly capture credit risk and
decreases yield spreads that mainly capture liquidity risk.
1.2.4. Real risk-free rate
Government debt could have impacts on the interest rate. This is a long-standing empirical
question with little consensus in the literature. In contrast to major previous work, I focus
on the short-term real rate. This choice avoids two issues that: (i) the long-term infla-
tion expectation is hard to measure, and (ii) long-term inflation premium is quantitatively
important (Ang et al., 2008). To measure the short-term inflation expectation, I use the
four-quarter moving average of past inflation and Livingston survey. These two measures
are acknowledged to have superior out-of-sample forecasting power. The real risk-free rate
is the nominal risk-free rate subtracting the inflation expectation. To control for expected
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growth, expected inflation, and time-varying risk aversion, I include in the regression the
current and lagged consumption growth and inflation and price-dividend ratio. Table 1.12
shows that debt-to-GDP ratio is significantly negatively related to real risk-free rate. The
results hold for both pre-war and post-war samples.
1.2.5. Return on Government Debt
After studying the short-term real risk-free rate, I explore the effect of government debt on
its aggregate return. The return is defined as the average return across terms to maturity on
all the Treasury securities.16 This return measures the effective borrowing cost or discount
rate of the government. Unless the government only issues one-period debt, the return differs
from the risk-free rate. In the government budget constraint, the evolution of government
debt Bt depends on the government receipts Tt+1, total outlay net of interest Gt+1, and the
holding period return on government debt Rb,t+1.
Bt+1 + Tt+1 −Gt+1 = BtRb,t+1 (1.1)
Similar to Campbell and Shiller (1988), dividing Equation (1.1) by GDP, log-linearizing,
iterating forward, and taking expectation, we obtain the following present value decompo-
sition.
byt ≈ Et[Σj=0κj1(κ2τyt+j − κ3gyt+j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus
+ Σj=0κ
j
1∆yt+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
real growth
−Σj=0κj1rb,t+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount rate
] + κ0 (1.2)
where κ are some constants.17 The terminal term converges to zero under the assumption
of no default. This condition has a intuitive interpretation. A high debt-to-GDP ratio
16Define Q
(n)
t the price and b
(n)
t the amount of n-period discount bond. A coupon bond can be effectively
decomposed into discount bonds. The holding period return R
(n)
b,t = Q
(n−1)
t /Q
(n)
t−1. The total market value
of debt Bt = ΣnQ
(n)
t b
(n)
t is the summation of all the outstanding debt. The return on government bond is
the average return weighted by the bond value Rb,t = Σn
Q
(n)
t−1b
(n)
t−1
Bt−1 R
(n−1)
b,t .
17Define byt = log(Bt/Yt), τyt = log(Tt/Yt), gyt = log(Gt/Yt). Dividing Equation (1.1) by GDP and
log-linearizing,
κ0 + κ1byt+1 + κ2τyt+1 − κ3gyt+1 = byt + rb,t+1 −∆yt+1
where κ1 =
B
B+T−G , κ2 =
T
B+T−G , κ3 =
G
B+T−G .
Interating forward,
byt = Σj=0κ
j
1(κ2τyt+j − κ3gyt+j) + Σj=0κj1∆yt+j − Σj=0κj1rb,t+j + κ0 + limj→∞κj1byt+j
The term limj→∞κ
j
1byt+j = 0 because of the no-Ponzi condition and the assumption of no default.
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is rationalized by three channels: (i) high expected future primary surplus to pay off the
debt, (ii) high expected future growth to stabilize the ratio, and (iii) low discount rates.
The early studies mainly focus on the surplus channel. I find that the often-neglected
discount rate channel is empirically important. In predictive regressions in Panel A of
Table 1.13, higher debt-to-GDP ratio predicts lower return on government debt from 1 year
to 20 years. Moreover, a variance decomposition illustrates the importance of discount rate
channel. Take the covariance between Equation (1.2) and byt on both sides, the variance of
debt-to-GDP ratio can be attributed to the three sources.
var(byt) =cov(Et[Σj=0κ
j
1(κ2τyt+j − κ3gyt+j)], byt) + cov(Et[Σj=0κj1∆yt+j ], byt)
−cov(Et[Σj=0κj1rb,t+j ], byt)
I estimate a vector autoregression model with five variables [byt, gyt, τyt, ∆yt, rb,t]
′ to
decompose the variance. Panel B of Table 1.13 shows that higher debt-to-GDP ratio pre-
cedes higher surplus, higher growth, and lower return. The variance of debt-to-GDP ratio
corresponds to variations of all three sources. The discount rate channel accounts for 0.25
of the total variance. The importance is close to the growth channel and half of the surplus
channel.18
1.2.6. Fiscal Uncertainty
Why does government debt have such significant effects on asset prices? I propose a new
channel–fiscal uncertainty–that can rationalize the facts jointly. In this section, I establish
the evidence that government debt and fiscal uncertainty positively comove with each other.
Furthermore, fiscal uncertainty drives asset prices in equity, credit, and treasury markets.
Throughout history, there exist many periods when people had little consensus about future
fiscal policy. In Congress and the White House, policymakers had heated debates on issues
such as military expenditures, tax reforms, entitlement, debt limit, and consolidations. In
18Cochrane (2011) documents that the importance of the discount rate channel is pervasive in a variety
of asset markets.
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other periods, fiscal policy was relatively stable, and households and firms reacted accor-
dingly with more confidence. Fiscal policy uncertainty measures how precisely the agents
can predict future fiscal policy.
High debt level results in debt-ceiling crises and large fiscal uncertainty. After 1939, Con-
gress use an aggregate debt limit to restrict federal borrowing. If the debt limit binds, the
government and Congress have to negotiate reforms on expenditure and tax in short period
to avoid the cost of government shut down. These negotiations lead to large fiscal policy
uncertainty. It is generally believed that the debt limit does not impose constraints on
deficits or surpluses after 1939 (Hall and Sargent, 2015). However, there are a few excepti-
ons. The first debt-ceiling crises is in 1953 (Garbade, 2016). The request of the Eisenhower
administration to increase the limit was initially declined. After three temporary increases
in 1954, 1955, and 1956, the limit reverted to its 1953 level. Another famous case is the go-
vernment shutdown in 1995–1996. Recently, we have witnessed the fiscal cliff and multiple
debt-ceiling crises. In every crisis, Congress was reluctant to increase the limit unless some
balanced-budget amendments were added. The fiscal turmoil raised deep concerns about
fiscal policy. Evidently, these crises took place when the government was highly indebted.
When the debt-to-GDP ratio is low, the government has more room for its budget with few
concerns of a binding debt limit. Therefore, debt-to-GDP ratio determines the probability
of a debt-ceiling crisis and encodes fiscal policy uncertainty.
More formally, it is ideal to have some empirical measures of unobserved fiscal uncertainty to
examine its effects. I propose a new measure of fiscal uncertainty that utilizes the dynamic
factor model in a data-rich environment. This method follows Jurado et al. (2015b), who
measure macroeconomic and financial uncertainty. Formally, the h-period ahead uncertainty
Ui(h) of a variable yi,t is defined as its conditional volatility.
Ui(h) =
√
Et[(yj,t+h − Et[yj,t+h])2]
One main challenge is to correctly compute the conditional mean by including all the va-
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riables in the information set. Especially, since the government announces many of policy
changes before implementation, accounting for such expected news as forecasting error will
lead to a biased uncertainty measure. I collect 169 macroeconomics variables and fit them
into a factor model (Equation 1.3-1.4) to capture the conditional mean dynamics of each va-
riable. These variables are related to national income, industrial production, employment,
inventories, orders and sales, prices, earning and productivity, and money and credit. De-
tails of the data set are in the appendix. To filter out the conditional volatility, I specify the
model with stochastic volatility (Equation 1.5) in both factor shocks (σFj,t) and idiosyncratic
shocks (σyj,t) . I estimated the model by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method.
yj,t+1 = φ
y
j (L)yj,t + γ
F
j (L)Ft + σ
y
j,tε
y
j,t+1 (1.3)
Fj,t+1 = Φ
FFj,t + σ
F
j,tv
F
j,t+1 (1.4)
log(σij,t+1) = α
i
j + β
i
jlog(σ
i
j,t) + σ
i
jη
i
t+1, η
i
j,t+1 ∼ N(0, 1), i = {y, F} (1.5)
Another challenge is to determine what variables reveal the uncertainty on fiscal policy.
The policy-making process is not separate in fiscal instruments. Therefore, I consider fiscal
policy uncertainty as the first principal component of the uncertainty of 37 variables related
to fiscal policies, ranging from different taxes to government consumption and investment.
The second measure of fiscal uncertainty is the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU)
in Baker et al. (2015). These indices combine the newspaper coverage of policy-related
economic uncertainty, the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future
years, and disagreement among economic forecasters. The indices begin in year 1985 and
span 11 specific policies such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, and health care policy.
Taking the two measures of fiscal uncertainty, I study whether they are related to the
debt-to-GDP ratio. Figure 1.6 reports that when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, the fiscal
uncertainty is high. In Table 1.14, the correlation is 0.5 between 3-year fiscal uncertainty
and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Furthermore, fiscal uncertainty is distinct from a broad measure
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of macroeconomic uncertainty. The macro uncertainty is the common component of the 132
variables excluding fiscal-related variables, similar to the measure in Jurado et al. (2015b).
The correlation between macro uncertainty and the debt-to-GDP ratio is less than 0.1. In
a more recent sample from 1985 to 2014, the debt-to-GDP ratio is still positively related
to the fiscal uncertainty measures but not to macro uncertainty. The results are the same
as the uncertainty measures from the very different narrative approach. The correlation
between debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal uncertainty in EPU indices is 0.36. This positive
relationship is observed in a variety of fiscal-related policies, such as taxes, government
spending, health care, and entitlement. On the contrary, debt-to-GDP ratio not is related
to the non-fiscal policies, such as monetary, national security, and trade policy. Therefore,
the results robustly show that debt-to-GDP largely captures the fiscal uncertainty.
If this risk channel exists, the fiscal uncertainty should have a direct impact on asset prices.
In Table 1.15, I demonstrate that fiscal uncertainty affects the asset price in the same way
as the debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal uncertainty positively predicts excess returns on stocks
and corporate bonds. The R2 is around 25% at the five-year horizon. This amount of
predictability is large given the difficulty of measuring uncertainty. Fiscal uncertainty is
positively related to GZ spread and negatively related to real risk-free rate and return on
government debt. The results hold in both the broad-based measure and the EPU measure.
In sum, the evidence shows that high debt-to-GDP ratio is related to high equity risk pre-
mium, high credit risk premium, low risk-free rate, and low expected return on government
debt. Furthermore, debt-to-GDP ratio positively reflects fiscal policy uncertainty. Fiscal
uncertainty also has direct effects on the asset prices consistent with the effects of debt-to-
GDP ratio.
1.3. Model
In this section, I propose a general equilibrium model to understand why fiscal uncertainty
affects risk premia and why the debt-to-GDP ratio is positively correlated with fiscal uncer-
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tainty.Building on a standard expanding variety endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990),
I study the implications of recursive preferences as in Kung and Schmid (2015). Besides,
I augment the model with fiscal policy. The model quantifies the importance of the fiscal
uncertainty channel and matches the novel facts.
1.3.1. Preference
The discrete-time economy is populated by measure one of representative agent with Epstein-
Zin recursive preferences. These preferences break the link between relative risk aversion
(γ) and intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) (ψ) in CRRA preferences. δ is the
time discount factor. θ ≡ 1−γ1−/ψ . Agents maximize the utility function
Ut = [(1− δ)C
1−γ
θ
t + δ(Et[U
1−γ
t+1 ])
1
θ ]
θ
1−γ
subject to the budget constraint,
Ct + V
D
t st +Bt = (V
D
t +Dt)st−1 +Bt−1Rb,t + wtLt(1− τl,t)
where V Dt and Dt are the stock price and dividend. Rb,t is the return on government debt.
The households supply labor inelastically and receive wage bill subject to income tax. As
shown in Epstein and Zin (1989), the stochastic discount factor is given by,
Mt+1 = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)
− 1
ψ (
U1−γt+1
Et[U
1−γ
t+1 ]
)
)
ψ−γ
1−γ
The agents’ marginal utility depends not only on the current consumption but also the
continuation utility.
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1.3.2. Final good producer
Final goods are produced using capital Kt, labor Lt, and intermediate inputs Xi,t, according
to the following production function.
Yt = (Kt
α(AtLt)
1−α)1−ξ
[
(
∫ Nt
0
Xνi,tdi)
1
ν
]ξ
where Nt is the number of varieties that the final good producer purchases from the in-
termediate good producers. ν affects the substitution between different inputs. At is the
exogenous technology process and follows AR(1) process.
log(At+1) = (1− ρ)log(A) + ρlog(At) + σat+1
The firm owns capital and makes investment decisions subject to investment adjustment
cost.
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Φ( It
Kt
)Kt
The corporate income tax is levied at rate τc,t on the revenue Yt net cost of labor wtLt and
inputs
∫ Nt
0 Pi,tXi,tdi . For tractability, I doesn’t include taxes on distributions. The tax
here can be viewed as both corporate income tax and individual income tax in the US tax
code. The managers also take into account the tax burden on dividends of the shareholders.
The free cash flow equals the net profit subtracting investment.
Dt = (1− τc,t)
[
Yt − wtLt −
∫ Nt
0
Pi,tXi,tdi
]
− It
The firm maximizes equity value.
Vt(Kt) = maxIt,Kt+1,Lt,Xi,tDt + Et[Mt+1Vt+1(Kt+1)]
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1.3.3. Intermediate good producer
Intermediate good producers use a specific patent to build one unit of intermediate good
using one unit of the final good. Thanks to the patent, they have monopoly power and
set the price of the intermediate good to maximize profits. They face a downward-sloping
demand curve implied by the cost minimization of the final goods producer. The optimality
conditions are standard that Pi,t =
1
ν . In equilibrium, the profits depend on the demand
elasticity
Πi,t = (
1
ν
− 1)Xi,t
These firms also have to pay the corporate income tax. Each patent has finite expected
lifespan determined by the depreciation rate φ. The value of the intermediate firm equals
its discounted profit.
V Ii,t = (1− τc,t)Πi,t + (1− φ)Et[Mt+1V Ii,t+1]
1.3.4. Innovation
Agents use final goods to conduct R&D. Si,t is the R&D expenditure. The stock of intangible
capital or patents is accumulated through R&D and depreciates every period as follows:
Nt+1 = Si,t + (1− φ)Nt
Free entry to innovation pins down the optimality condition of R&D. One unit of R&D
expenditure yields one unit of intermediate firm that has value Vi,t.
Et[Mt+1V
I
i,t+1] = 1
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1.3.5. The government
The government levies tax, arranges spending, and borrows from the households. As in
most positive studies, I do not model the policymaking behavior of the fiscal authority.
Instead, tax rate and government spending are assumed exogenously to match the observed
data. Both spending and tax follow AR(1) processes.
log(
Gt+1
Yt+1
) ≡ gyt+1 = µgy(1− ρg) + ρggyt + σg,0στ,tug,t+1
τ c,t+1 = µτc(1− ρτ ) + ρττ c,t + στ,0στ,tuτ,t+1 + uc,t+1
I introduce the time-varying volatility of the tax and spending shock στ,t, modeled as an
AR(1) process (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015).
log(στ,t+1) = ντ log(στ,t) + στ,wwτ,t+1 (1.6)
A positive volatility shock wτ,t+1 leads to a higher conditional volatility of tax rate and
fiscal uncertainty. For example, the tax cut expiration and presidential debate are shocks
that raise the uncertainty.
The second source of fiscal uncertainty comes from the fiscal consolidations.
uc,t+1 =
Bt
Yt
φτ,t+1, φτ,t+1 = φ¯τ (1− ρφτ ) + ρφτ,t + σ2φτuφτ,t
In response to high debt-to-GDP ratio, the government tends to increase tax (φ¯τ > 0).
D’Erasmo et al. (2016) systematically document that primary balance responds to the
outstanding debt. However, when and how the government will consolidate is uncertain.
We do not expect a fixed parameter φτ which means the tax rate moves one-for-one with the
debt ratio. In fact, we sometimes witnessed large fiscal consolidations at low debt level and
no consolidations at high debt levels. The time variation of φτ,t captures this uncertainty in
consolidation. This specification is similar to Bi et al. (2013) that assumes that probability
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of a fiscal consolidation is rising in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In their specification, uc,t+1 is
zero if the debt is lower than a random threshold and is positive for four quarters if debt
exceeds the threshold.
Two economic channels support the importance of the uncertainty in consolidation. On
one hand, this uncertainty comes from the politics of policymaking. The government favors
expansionary fiscal policies if supporters benefit more from high spending and transfer,
low tax and high debt. Depending on the political stance, political cost of consolidation,
and the patience (time discount factor) of the policymakers, the government sometimes is
strict with the debt-to-GDP ratio and always discusses reducing the debt while sometimes
is lenient with the debt-to-GDP ratio and allows it to grow. Song et al. (2012) build a
political economy model to endogenize the debt policy in respond to the fundamentals
and demographics. On the other hand, the uncertainty is associated with tax smoothing.
When debt-to-GDP ratio is close to its debt limit defined as maximum possible discounted
surplus, the tax rate is close to the peak of the Laffer Curve with a flatter slope. Thus,
government cannot easily issue debt to smooth the spending and output shocks. The tax
rate is more responsive to shocks and has larger volatility. Even though the government
behavior is exogenous in the model, I formalize this idea of dynamic tax smoothing in a
Pareto problem in the appendix.
Since there is no distortion on labor, the labor tax rate is set to be fixed. Given the tax
rates, the total tax receipts equal the tax revenue from three sources of income.
Tt = τc,t
[
Yt − wtLt −
∫ Nt
0
Pi,tXi,tdi
]
+ τc,t
∫ Nt
0
(
1
ν
− 1)Xi,tdi+ τl,twtLt
The government can issue a full menu of default-free zero-coupon debt across maturities.
Define Q
(n)
t the price and b
(n)
t the amount of n-period discount bond. The total market
value of debt Bt = ΣnQ
(n)
t b
(n)
t is the summation of all the outstanding debt. For tractability,
the government actively manages the maturity structure to achieve a fixed geometrically-
decaying maturity. b
(n)
t = φ
n−1
b bt. φb < 1 determines the maturity structure. The quantity
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of debt depends on a single factor bt. The government financing policy is specified as
exogenous. Each period, it issues b
(n)
t amount of bonds given the market price.
bt+1 = ρbt + ub,t+1 (1.7)
The law of motion of debt is,
Bt = Bt−1Rb,t +Gt − Tt + Trt
where Rb,t =
ΣnQ
(n)
t−1b
(n)
t−1R
(n−1)
t
Bt−1 is the total return on government debt including matured
principal and capital gains. Trt is the lump-sum transfer that guarantees the holding of the
government budget constraint at each period, since spending, tax, and financing policy are
exogenous.19
1.3.6. Definition of Equilibrium
I focus on the symmetric equilibrium that all the intermediate good producers make identical
decisions. Pi,t = Pt, Πi,t = Πt, Xi,t = Xt, Vi,t = Vt. A competitive equilibrium is allocations
{Ct, Yt, It, St, Xt, Dt, Lt, Ut, Vt, Mt, Gt, Tt, Bt}∞t=0, prices {Pt, Wt, Rf,t, Rb,t, Rm,t}∞t=0,
exogenous technology {At}∞t=0, fiscal policy {gyt, τyt, bt, στ,t, φτ,t}∞t=0, law of motion
{Kt+1, Nt+1}∞t=0 and initial value {K0, N0} such that
1. the state variables {Kt+1, Nt+1}∞t=0 satisty their law of motions.
2. households, final goods producers, and intermediate goods producer solve their problems.
3. goods, labor, stock, and treasury markets clear.
19If the government debt is state contingent, the return will adjust to guarantee the holding of the budget
constraint. This is not the case in the current structure of long-term debt.
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1.4. Model Implications
1.4.1. Equilibrium Growth
In equilibrium, the output has the familiar Cobb-Douglas form.
Yt = K
α
t (ZtLt)
1−α
TFP Zt is driven not only by the exogenous force At but also the intangible capital stock
Nt,
Zt = (ξν)
ξ
(1−ξ)(1−α)AtNt
The insight of the endogenous growth beyond standard exogenous growth model is that
the economic growth is determined in part by the growth of the intangible capital, which
in turn is determined by the discounted profit of intermediate good producers. Expecting
larger profits, innovators exert more effort in R&D, which results in more innovation and
faster economic growth.
Nt+1
Nt
= (1− φ) + Et
[
Σ∞i=1(1− φ)i−1Mt,t+i(1− τc,t+i)Πt+i
] η
1−η
It is apparent that fiscal policy plays a role in the innovation process. Part of the profits
are taken by the government in the form of corporate income tax. Figure 1.7 plots the
impulse response functions to a one-standard-deviation positive tax shock uτ,t. A tax hike
reduces future monopoly profits and innovation incentive, leading to lower intangible capital
value Vt and innovation growth ∆nt. This slowdown of innovation transforms into lower
consumption growth ∆ct. The increase of consumption on impact is due to the reduction
in investment.20 Through this tax mechanism, the model features an endogenous persistent
and predictable component in the growth rate as in the long-run risks model (Bansal and
Yaron, 2004). The negative growth effect of distortionary taxation is well-documented in
20The aggregate output doesn’t change given the fixed labor supply.
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the endogenous growth literature. Gemmell et al. (2011) find strong empirical support for
this mechanism. Djankov et al. (2010) further document the adverse effect of the corporate
tax on aggregate investment and entrepreneurial activity.
1.4.2. Asset Prices and Fiscal Uncertainty
Stocks and bonds are priced by the agents in the model. The aggregate equity market value
is the sum of value of final and intermediate goods producers. The aggregate dividend also
comes from the two sectors.
V At = Vt +
∫ Nt
0
Vi,tdi
DAt = Dt +
∫ Nt
0
Πi,tdi− St
The risk premium on an asset is related to the covariance between its return Ri,t+1 and
stochastic discount factor Mt+1. The risk premium is the sum of risk premia of all the
shocks. In the beta representation, the premium of each shock depends on the price of risk
λ, risk exposure β, and the quantity of risk. Focusing on the tax risk premium,
Et[Ri,t+1 −Rf,t] = Covt[Mt+1, Ri,t+1]
Et[Mt+1]
≈ λτβτ,iV art(τc,t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax risk premium
+other premia (1.8)
High marginal utility after tax hikes is a standard property in macroeconomic models. In
Figure 1.7, the stochastic discount factor increases after the positive tax shock. The negative
price of risk λτ does not rely on endogenous growth or the Epstein-Zin preferences. Related
to the risk premium puzzle, the key issue is to have a large price of risk in the model to
match asset price facts. In our economy, the agents have Epstein-Zin preferences so that
they are sensitive to the persistent shifts in growth rate. Furthermore, tax rates are also
highly persistent. As a result, tax variation is a large source of risk for investors and is
manifested in asset prices. The price of risk is negative and sizable.
Upon tax hikes, stock prices fall as in Figure 1.7, because of two reasons: (i) higher tax
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payment, and (ii) lower cash flow growth in the future.21 Thus, stocks have negative tax
risk exposure βτ,m < 0. Because stocks perform poorly in bad times of high tax, investors
require positive excess returns on average. Thus, tax risk premium is positive and large.
When fiscal uncertainty increases and “quantity” of risk is larger, investors require higher
compensation for this risk and equity premium increases. Hence, time variation in equity
premium is driven by the fiscal uncertainty.
The implication is different for government bonds. Facing high tax and low expected growth,
agents have high marginal rate of substitution. Meanwhile, bond yield decreases with growth
rate and the government bonds rally, so that government debt is a hedge against tax risks
for investors and has a negative risk premium. βτ,b > 0. In time of high fiscal uncertainty,
the high hedging motive drives down the bond risk premium. Furthermore, risk-free rate is
affect by uncertainty. When uncertainty is high, agents have a precautionary saving motive
that lowers the risk-free rate.
1.4.3. Debt-to-GDP ratio and Fiscal Uncertainty
After analyzing the determination of risk premium and how it is affected by fiscal uncer-
tainty, I relate fiscal uncertainty to debt-to-GDP ratio. From Equation (1.2), the debt-
to-GDP ratio varies from the variation of expected future primary surplus, growth, and
discount. The importance of the discount rate channel has been documented in the empi-
rical section.
In the model, the positive comovement between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the fiscal uncer-
tainty is generated endogenously through two channels. As is stated in the last subsection,
fiscal uncertainty decreases both risk-free rate and risk premium on debt. In total, fiscal
uncertainty reduces the expected return on debt and raises debt valuation through the dis-
count rate channel. An exogenous fiscal uncertainty shock will raise the fiscal uncertainty
and debt-to-GDP ratio.
21As documented in Sialm (2009), stock valuation declines with tax burden.
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The second channel is due to the uncertain fiscal consolidations. The several reasons for
uncertain fiscal consolidation have been discussed in Section 1.3.5. Having this feature,
the conditional volatility of the tax rate comes from regular tax shocks and consolidation
shocks.
vart(τc,t+1) = σ
2
τ,0σ
2
τ,t + (
Bt
Yt
)2σ2φτ
A volatility shock increases the fiscal uncertainty, lowers expected return on government
debt and raises the market value of debt. Conversely, an increase in the government debt
raises the second term, the consolidation uncertainty. The two channels reinforce each ot-
her. Consequently, debt-to-GDP ratio positively reflected the fiscal uncertainty. In Section
1.2.3.4, I present evidence of both channels. In the VAR system, the book shock is ub, the
shock to the amount of bonds, in Equation (1.7). This shock raises debt-to-GDP ratio and
thus uncertainty of fiscal consolidations, leading to higher risk premia. The market shock
is wτ , the shock to the exogenous stochastic volatility on the tax rate, in Equation (1.6).
This shock lowers the return on debt, raises debt-to-GDP ratio through the discount rate
channel, and increases quantity of risk and thus risk premia.
1.4.4. Calibration
The uncertainty channel qualitatively explains the facts. Next, the model is calibrated to
evaluate the quantitative importance. I report the benchmark calibration in Table 1.16. The
model is calibrated in quarterly frequency. Panel A refers to the preference and technology
parameters. In line with the estimated value in Schorfheide et al. (2014), the risk aversion is
set to 10 and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 2 so that agents have preferences
for early resolution of uncertainty. The time discount factor is chosen to match the real
risk-free rate. The calibration values of the technology parameters are in line with the class
of endogenous growth models (Kung and Schmid, 2015). Capital share is set to 0.33 and the
intermediate inputs share is 0.5. Through the balanced growth path, these parameters imply
a markup of 1.6, consistent with the evidence in micro data. The depreciation of physical
capital is 0.025. The depreciation of R&D capital is 0.075, matching the recent estimate in
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Li and Hall (2016). The capital adjustment cost function Φ( IK ) = [
a1,k
1−1/ξk (
I
K )
1−1/ξk + a2,k].
ξk is the same as Kung and Schmid (2015), and a1,k, a2,k is set such that Φ = I/K and
Φ′ = 0 at the steady state. The mean of the productivity is chosen to match the mean
of the growth. The persistent and volatility of productivity shocks are set to match the
consumption volatility. This is less persistent and volatile than the productivity in Kung
and Schmid (2015), since a crucial source of endogenous long-run risk is taxation that is
not in their model.
The lower panel includes parameters of fiscal processes. Most of the values are from direct
data estimates. Federal corporate income tax is 36% on average. Tax rate has a persistence
of 0.99, in the confidence interval [0.91, 0.99] of the effective tax rate. The statutory tax rate
in the data tends to be more persistent. The calibration is conservative in that the volatility
of tax rate is set to be 0.03, less than half of the volatility of the data counterpart. The
persistence of the fiscal volatility follows the persistence of the broad-based fiscal uncertainty
measure. The volatility of the volatility shock is in the estimated range of Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2015). Labor tax is set to be 10% to match the total tax receipt over
GDP. Spending-to-GDP ratio has a mean of 0.17. Spending includes federal and state and
local government and excludes transfers. For simplicity, state and local government has
no debt and levy lump sum transfer to cover their spending needs. The average maturity
is set to be 7 years, consistent with Greenwood and Vayanos (2014). The volatility and
persistence of bond quantity inherit the persistence of debt-to-GDP ratio.
In the benchmark case, I focus on the effect of the tax volatility shock. Therefore, all the
parameters about fiscal consolidation and government spending shock are set to be zero in
panel C. In the extended model, I set the mean and volatility of the fiscal consolidation to
be 0.001 and 0.0025, in line with the estimated value in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015).
The persistence is set to be 0.92, so the consolidation intensity has a half-life of 2 years,
which is half of a president term. The consolidation shock is negatively correlated with the
productivity shock. The correlation is 0.5 so that half of the consolidations are attributed
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to tax base concerns. To allow for the effect of government spending shock, I choose the
volatility and persistence of the spending process as in the data.
1.4.5. Quantitative Results
I solve the model by third-order perturbation to account for the effects of time-varying
volatility. A pruning method is applied to ensure the stablity of sample paths (Andreasen
et al., 2013). Table 1.17 shows the unconditional moments of the key financial variables.
The reported model moments are the mean, 5% and 95% quantile of the short-sample
simulation. The moments implied by the model are largely consistent with the data. The
mean (standard deviation) of consumption growth is 1.80% (2.70%) in the data and 1.80%
(2.62%) in the model. The output growth is less volatile than the data mainly because the
model abstracts away from the labor supply margin that allows immediate adjustment of
output. In the model, the stock return is measured as the total return on tangible and
intangible capital and levered by a factor of 2. The model generates a large equity premium
(5.19%). The model undershoots the volatility of excess return as the production economy
does not generate volatile enough endogenous cash flow. In the model, the log price-dividend
ratio has a very similar mean (3.63) and volatility (0.43) as the data. Furthermore, the
model matches the small and stable risk-free rates. In the data, the return on government
return is larger and more volatile than the risk-free rate. It is commonly acknowledged that
long-term bonds compensate for expected inflation and also inflation premium. Ang et al.
(2008) show that the inflation premium for a five-year bond is 1.14% on average. Since
the real model is silent on the inflation premium, I add this premium on the model-implied
return. Model-implied government debt return has similar mean and volatility as the data.
Finally, the debt-to-GDP ratio has a mean of 0.52 and volatility of 0.08, similar to the
data. Even though I only consider the corporate income tax, the overall tax-to-GDP ratio
is close to the data. This guarantees that the model does not imply a counterfactual high
and volatility tax burden on the economy as a whole.
I evaluate the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio in the model in Table 1.18. In a univariate
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predictive regression, the benchmark model matches the stock return predictability in the
data. The positive coefficients, ranging from 0.03 in 1 quarter to 0.65 in five years, close to
the coefficients in the data. The 90% interval of R2 of the model covers the data estimates.
Because of the short sample, the distribution of the R2 is variable. Moreover, the model
generates observed evidence that debt-to-GDP ratio is negatively related to real risk-free
rate and bond return. Both the coefficient and the R2 are similar to the data counter-
parts. Especially, the long-run bond return regression implies that higher debt-to-GDP
ratio predicts lower discount rate on debt. In other words, the expected return variation
contributes to the debt-to-GDP variation to a large extent. This verifies the importance
of the discount rate channel. Next, I investigate the impact on stock return itself instead
of excess return. The model implies comparable magnitude to the data. Thus, the model
successfully matches not only the extent of excess return predictability but also the amount
of predictability of stock return and risk-free rate separately.
Finally, I directly test the implications of fiscal uncertainty in the data and the model in
Panel B. The model implies a positive correlation of 0.43 between debt-to-GDP ratio and
fiscal uncertainty. The fiscal uncertainty is measured as the conditional volatility of the tax
rate vart(τc,t+1). This shows that the discount rate channel itself will endogenize a positive
comovement of debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal uncertainty. Consistent with Equation (1.8),
fiscal uncertainty increases the equity premium, and decreases the risk-free rate and bond
returns. The magnitude of the channel is close to both the broad-based measure and the
measure in Economic Policy Uncertainty Index.
The benchmark model only has the exogenous fiscal volatility channel. In Table 1.19, I
entertain the other potential channel: fiscal consolidations. The parameters of the fiscal
consolidations are set as in Table 1.16. First, introducing the uncertain fiscal consolidati-
ons will magnify the importance of the fiscal uncertainty. Debt-to-GDP ratio has stronger
impacts on stock return, risk-free rate, and government bond return in terms of both coef-
ficients and R2. The five-year R2 goes up from 14% to 23%. Second, I shut down the
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stochastic volatility (στ,w = 0). With only fiscal consolidations, the model does a good
job in matching the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio. The R2 on stock returns are two-third of
the ones with only stochastic volatility. The magnitude of risk-free rates and government
bond returns are close to the data. However, this channel implies a perfect correlation
between debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal uncertainty. By construction, the only reason fiscal
uncertainty fluctuates is that the strength of fiscal consolidations is related to debt-to-GDP
ratio. Third, the model abstracts away from both stochastic volatility and fiscal consoli-
dations. In this case, the risk premium is fixed and the predictability in the model is tiny.
The positive R2 are from small sample bias since R2 is restricted to be non-negative. There
is no movement in fiscal uncertainty and no relationship between uncertainty and debt. Fi-
nally, I introduce government spending shock. This shock does not change the asset pricing
implications and has a small quantitative impact in the third decimal place.
One implication of the model is the large and persistent effect of tax on the growth rate.
The size of this effect is both model dependent and empirically controversial. Gemmell
et al. (2011) is the recent contribution to this question and they argue for the existence of
significant effects. They document that 1% increase of Tax-to-GDP ratio reduces GDP by
5.8% in 10 years in the US and 3.2% in OECD countries. I also find a negative significant
impact of tax rate on 10-year output growth. In Table 1.20, the impact is 3.7%, consistent
with their estimates. The model matches the impact of the tax. The predictive R2 in
the data (model) are 0.13 (0.17) at the annual horizon and 0.21 (0.22) at the 10-year
horizon. The point estimates of coefficients in the data are within the 90% set of the model.
This result holds in consumption and TFP growth, too. Hence, the calibration does not
exaggerate this endogenous long-run risk channel.
As a result, the model quantitatively matches macroeconomics and asset prices moments.
More importantly, the model replicates the relationship between debt-to-GDP ratio, various
asset prices and fiscal uncertainty.
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1.5. Conclusion
This paper documents a set of novel facts that government debt is related to risk premia in
various asset markets. First, the debt-to-GDP ratio positively predicts excess stock returns.
The forecasting power is compelling, and it outperforms many popular predictors. Second,
higher debt-to-GDP ratio is correlated with higher credit risk premia in both corporate
bond excess returns and yield spreads. Third, higher debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with
lower real risk-free rate. Fourth, higher debt-to-GDP ratio predicts lower average returns
on government debt. Expected return variation contributes to a sizable amount of the
volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Fifth, debt-to-GDP ratio positively comoves with fiscal
policy uncertainty. Fiscal uncertainty also has direct effects on the asset prices consistent
with the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio.
I rationalize these empirical findings in a general equilibrium model featuring recursive pre-
ferences, endogenous growth, and time-varying fiscal uncertainty. In the model, the tax risk
premium is sizable and its time variation is driven by fiscal uncertainty. Furthermore, the
model endogenize a positive relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal uncer-
tainty: fiscal uncertainty increases debt valuation through discount rate channel whereas
higher debt conversely raises uncertainty because of future fiscal consolidations. Through
this channel, the government debt has asset pricing implications consistent with the facts.
However, major existing channels of government debt such as liquidity, safety, and crowding
out are silent or inconsistent with these facts. The empirical findings and theory shed new
light on how government debt is related to the cost of capital for firms and the government.
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Figure 1.1: Debt-to-GDP Ratio
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Figure 1.2: Debt-to-GDP Ratio and Expect Return
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Figure 1.3: Debt-to-GDP Ratio and Expect Return Term Structure
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Functions to a Debt Shock
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Response Functions to a Debt Shock
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Figure 1.6: Debt-to-GDP Ratio and Fiscal Uncertainty
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Figure 1.7: Impulse Response Functions to a Tax Shock
5 10 15 20
#10-4
-6
-4
-2
0
V      
5 10 15 20
#10-3
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
"n
5 10 15 20
#10-3
-5
0
5
10
"c
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
M      
5 10 15 20
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
r
m
    
5 10 15 20
#10-3
-5
0
5
10
15
rb    
46
Table 1.1: Predictability of Excess Stock Returns
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of future excess stock returns on log debt-to-GDP
ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1(rm,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + bytβ1 + xtβ + ut+h
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk free rate rf . Long-horizon
excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-period excess returns. by is the log debt-to-
GDP ratio. “recession” is a dummy that equals 1 when US is in recession reported by NBER. “war” is
a dummy that equals 1 when US is in war time. “party” is a dummy that equals 1 under Democratic
presidency. pd is the price-dividend ratio. PC are the first three principal components of a set of
predictors including price-dividend ratio, price-earning ratio, dividend-earning ratio, stock return
volatility, book-to-market ratio, net equity expansion, treasury bill rate, long-term yield, long-term
return, term spread, default yield spread and inflation. h is the predictive horizon. The t-statistics
are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The sample is from
1926 to 2014.
h by (t-stat) recession (t-stat) war (t-stat) party (t-stat) pd (t-stat) excl. 07-14 PC R2
1Y
0.15 (2.92) 0.11
0.15 (2.98) 0.02 (0.34) 0.11
0.15 (2.89) 0.00 (-0.08) 0.11
0.17 (3.07) -0.03 (-0.73) 0.11
0.14 (2.61) Y 0.10
0.15 (2.87) -0.07 (-1.54) 0.13
0.15 (2.98) Y 0.15
3Y
0.41 (3.41) 0.27
0.42 (3.29) 0.05 (0.62) 0.28
0.41 (3.37) 0.04 (0.55) 0.28
0.43 (3.52) -0.02 (-0.35) 0.27
0.40 (3.11) Y 0.26
0.40 (3.09) -0.20 (-2.60) 0.34
0.41 (3.31) Y 0.35
5Y
0.60 (4.46) 0.38
0.61 (4.43) 0.14 (1.38) 0.40
0.60 (4.42) 0.03 (0.29) 0.38
0.63 (4.58) -0.07 (-0.83) 0.38
0.57 (4.27) Y 0.38
0.57 (3.90) -0.32 (-4.28) 0.50
0.58 (4.08) Y 0.49
47
Table 1.2: Predictability of Excess Stock Returns
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of future excess stock returns on log debt-to-GDP
ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1(rm,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + bytβ1 + xtβ + ut+h
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . Long-horizon
excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-period excess returns. by is the log debt-
to-GDP ratio. war is a dummy that equals 1 when US is in recession reported by NBER. pd is the
price-dividend ratio. PC are the first three principal components of a set of predictors including
price-dividend ratio, price-earning ratio, dividend-earning ratio, stock return volatility, book-to-
market ratio, net equity expansion, treasury bill rate, long-term yield, long-term return, term spread,
default yield spread, inflation, investment-capital ratio, consumption-wealth ratio, GDP gap and
government investment-capital ratio. liqs is the spread between general collateral repo and 3-month
T-bill rate. ats is the spread between Moody’s AAA bond and 30-year Treasury bond yield. h is the
predictive horizon. The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors. The sample is from 1947:I to 2014:IV.
h by (t-stat) war (t-stat) pd (t-stat) PC liqs (t-stat) ats (t-stat) R2
1Q
0.04 (3.26) 0.04
0.04 (4.11) 0.00 (0.03) 0.04
0.04 (3.30) -0.02 (-2.30) 0.06
0.06 (3.94) Y 0.08
0.04 (2.99) 0.70 (0.35) 0.38 (0.30) 0.03
1Y
0.15 (3.78) 0.12
0.17 (4.38) 0.06 (0.70) 0.17
0.15 (3.75) -0.10 (-2.79) 0.20
0.21 (4.45) Y 0.22
0.17 (4.03) 4.60 (1.25) -0.44 (-0.13) 0.12
3Y
0.41 (6.59) 0.33
0.46 (6.74) 0.02 (0.16) 0.40
0.40 (5.94) -0.26 (-3.22) 0.49
0.50 (6.14) Y 0.48
0.35 (4.98) 6.74 (1.49) -13.87 (-2.30) 0.37
5Y
0.61 (5.11) 0.42
0.67 (5.76) 0.03 (0.24) 0.49
0.56 (5.92) -0.40 (-6.20) 0.66
0.61 (4.71) Y 0.59
0.57 (4.80) 12.14 (2.06) -12.10 (-1.80) 0.44
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Table 1.3: Out-of-sample Test
The table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 from OLS regressions of future excess stock returns
on log debt-to-GDP ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1(rm,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + bytβ1 + x′tβ + ut+h
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . Long-horizon
excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-period excess returns. by is the log debt-to-
GDP ratio. The other regressors are as follows: price-dividend ratio (pd), price-earning ratio (pe),
dividend-earning ratio (de), stock return volatility (svar), book-to-market ratio (bm), net equity
expoansion (ntis), treasury bill rate (tbl), long-term yield (lty), long-term return (ltr), term spread
(tms), default yield spread (dfy) and inflation (infl). The first column shows the regressor. The
out-of-sample period starts in 20 periods from the beginning of the sample. R2OS is from univariate
regressions and R2OS,by is from bi-variate regression with debt-to-GDP ratio and a regressor. Column
“p” shows p value of testing hypothesis H0 : MSE1 > MSE0 against H1 : MSE1 < MSE0. In the
row of “by”, MSE0 is the mean squared error from historical mean. MSE1 is the mean squared error
from predictive model with by. In other rows, MSE0 is the mean squared error from a predictor.
MSE1 is the mean squared error from predictive model with the predictor and by. The sample is
from 1926 to 2014.
R2OS R
2
OS,by p R
2
OS R
2
OS,by p R
2
OS R
2
OS,by p
1Y 3Y 5Y
by 0.10 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.29 0.00
pd 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.27 -0.08 0.00 -0.32 -0.14 0.00
dy -0.16 -0.02 0.00 -0.73 -0.38 0.00 -0.25 0.20 0.00
pe 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.30 0.00 -0.16 0.36 0.00
de -0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.20 0.10 0.00 -0.12 0.03 0.01
svar -0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.22 0.00 -0.20 0.06 0.00
bm -0.07 0.11 0.00 -0.55 0.06 0.00 -0.56 0.21 0.00
ntis -0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.27 0.11 0.00 -0.25 0.23 0.00
tbl -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.52 0.12 0.00 -1.00 0.06 0.00
lty -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.28 0.27 0.00 -1.24 0.35 0.00
ltr -0.07 0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.27 0.00 -0.16 0.21 0.00
tms -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.35 0.02 0.00 -0.31 0.12 0.00
dfy -0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.10 0.00 -0.19 0.10 0.00
infl -0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.25 0.00 -0.11 0.20 0.00
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Table 1.4: Out-of-sample Test
The table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 from OLS regressions of future excess stock returns
on log debt-to-GDP ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1(rm,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + bytβ1 + x′tβ + ut+h
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . Long-horizon
excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-period excess returns. by is the log debt-to-
GDP ratio. The other regressors are as follows: price-dividend ratio (pd), price-earning ratio (pe),
dividend-earning ratio (de), stock return volatility (svar), book-to-market ratio (bm), net equity
expoansion (ntis), treasury bill rate (tbl), long-term yield (lty), long-term return (ltr), term spread
(tms), default yield spread (dfy), inflation (infl), investment-capital ratio (ik), consumption-wealth
ratio (cay), GDP gap (gap), government investment-capital ratio (gik). The first column shows
the regressor. The out-of-sample period starts in 20 periods from the beginning of the sample.
R2OS is from univariate regressions and R
2
OS,by is from bi-variate regression with debt-to-GDP ratio
and a regressor. Column “p” shows p value of testing hypothesis H0 : MSE1 > MSE0 against
H1 : MSE1 < MSE0. In the row of “by”, MSE0 is the mean squared error from historical mean.
MSE1 is the mean squared error from predictive model with by. In other rows, MSE0 is the mean
squared error from a predictor. MSE1 is the mean squared error from predictive model with the
predictor and by. The sample is from 1947:I to 2014:IV.
R2OS R
2
OS,by p R
2
OS R
2
OS,by p R
2
OS R
2
OS,by p R
2
OS R
2
OS,by p
1Q 1Y 3Y 5Y
by 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.27 0.00 0.34 0.01
pd -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.10 0.55 0.00
dy 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.55 0.00
pe -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.31 0.00 -0.12 0.43 0.01
de -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.13 0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.22 0.01
svar -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.16 0.23 0.00 -0.23 0.27 0.01
bm -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.27 0.24 0.00 -0.49 0.48 0.02
ntis -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.18 0.18 0.00 -0.31 0.28 0.01
tbl -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.31 0.05 0.03 -0.79 0.29 0.04
lty -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.14 -0.11 0.00 -0.45 0.18 0.01 -1.24 0.22 0.04
ltr -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.26 0.00 -0.14 0.35 0.01
tms -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 0.16 -0.10 0.24 0.00 -0.31 0.34 0.01
dfy -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.28 0.03 0.00 -0.46 0.41 0.00
infl 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.26 0.00 -0.17 0.36 0.01
ik 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.01 0.07 0.40 0.02
cay 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.01 0.15 0.28 0.04
gap 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00
gik -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.26 0.00 -0.05 0.30 0.00
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Table 1.5: Bonferroni Test of Predictability
The table reports the Bonferroni test of predictability in Campebll and Yogo (2006).
rm,t+1 − rf,t = α+ βbyt + ut+1
byt+1 = µ+ ρbyt + et+1
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . by is the log
debt to GDP ratio. h is the predictive horizon. The log debt-to-GDP ratio is modeled as an
autoregressive process. The table shows the point estimate β and 95% confidence interval based on
the Bonferroni-Q test. ρue = corr(ut+1, et+1).
Period h β 95% CI ρue
1929-2014
1Y 0.15 [0.06, 0.24] 0.03
2Y 0.30 [0.09, 0.49] -0.12
3Y 0.37 [0.12, 0.63] 0.08
1947-2014
1Q 0.04 [0.02, 0.06] -0.01
1Y 0.16 [0.06, 0.26] 0.06
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Table 1.6: Predictability of Excess Stock Returns
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of future excess stock returns on log debt-to-GDP
ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1(rm,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + bytβ1 + pdtβ2 + ut+h
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . Long-horizon
excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-period excess returns. by is the log debt-
to-GDP ratio. The predictive horizon is indicated in the name of the panel. The first column
show the component of debt used to construct the debt-to-GDP ratio. The t-statistics are based
on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The sample is from 1947:I to
2014:IV.
Component of Debt by (t-stat) R2 by (t-stat) R2
1Q 1Y
Net Debt 0.04 (2.89) 0.03 0.14 (3.38) 0.10
Gross Debt 0.03 (2.29) 0.02 0.12 (2.74) 0.06
Marketable Debt 0.04 (2.77) 0.03 0.15 (3.39) 0.09
Net Debt Book Value 0.04 (2.85) 0.03 0.15 (3.40) 0.10
Gross Debt Book Value 0.03 (2.26) 0.02 0.13 (2.83) 0.07
Marketable Debt Book Value 0.04 (2.75) 0.03 0.16 (3.45) 0.10
Net Debt exclud. Fed Holding 0.03 (2.53) 0.03 0.13 (2.97) 0.09
Net Debt exclud. Foreign Holding 0.04 (2.89) 0.03 0.14 (2.87) 0.09
Net Debt/Potential GDP 0.04 (2.94) 0.03 0.15 (3.53) 0.11
3Y 5Y
Net Debt 0.37 (5.70) 0.30 0.55 (4.57) 0.39
Gross Debt 0.33 (3.81) 0.19 0.50 (2.87) 0.25
Marketable Debt 0.40 (5.28) 0.25 0.60 (3.67) 0.31
Net Debt Book Value 0.40 (5.78) 0.31 0.59 (4.96) 0.40
Gross Debt Book Value 0.37 (4.01) 0.20 0.56 (3.14) 0.27
Marketable Debt Book Value 0.45 (5.44) 0.27 0.67 (4.01) 0.34
Net Debt exclud. Fed Holding 0.33 (4.35) 0.24 0.43 (3.34) 0.28
Net Debt exclud. Foreign Holding 0.35 (4.52) 0.25 0.42 (4.20) 0.26
Net Debt/Potential GDP 0.38 (4.81) 0.26 0.55 (3.68) 0.34
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Table 1.7: Predictability of Excess Stock Returns
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of future excess stock returns on log debt-to-GDP
ratio.
Σhi=1(rm,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + bytβ1 + ut+h
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . Long-horizon
excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-period excess returns. byt is the log debt-
to-GDP ratio. h is the predictive horizon. The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The sample from 1980 to 2013.
Gross Debt Net Debt
h by (t-stat) R2 by (t-stat) R2
Canada
1Y 0.26 (1.97) 0.10 0.10 (1.46) 0.07
3Y 0.43 (2.92) 0.14 0.17 (2.37) 0.10
UK
1Y 0.15 (1.83) 0.06 0.17 (1.97) 0.09
3Y 0.35 (1.94) 0.06 0.36 (2.15) 0.08
Table 1.8: Predictability of Dividend Growth
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of future dividend growth on log debt-to-GDP
ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1∆dt+i = β0 + bytβ1 + xtβ + ut+h
∆d is the dividend growth rate. Long-horizon dividend growth are the cumulative summation of
the one-period growth rate. by is the log debt-to-GDP ratio. pd is the price-dividend ratio. h is the
predictive horizon. The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors. The sample is from 1926 to 2014.
h by (t-stat) pd (t-stat) R2
1Y 0.05 (1.97) 0.04
3Y 0.18 (2.71) 0.16
5Y 0.27 (3.98) 0.30
10Y 0.30 (4.94) 0.34
1Y 0.05 (2.03) 0.07 (2.21) 0.12
3Y 0.18 (2.90) 0.10 (1.52) 0.21
5Y 0.28 (4.16) 0.10 (1.50) 0.35
10Y 0.31 (4.30) 0.09 (1.29) 0.37
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Table 1.9: Predictability of Corporate Bond Excess Return
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of future excess corporate bond returns on log
debt-to-GDP ratio and other control variables.
Σhi=1(rcorp,t+i − rf,t+i−1) = β0 + β1byt + β2pdt + β3svart + ut+h
Excess corporate bond return is the log Barclay’s corporate bond portfolio return rcorp subtracting
the log risk free rate rf . Longer horizon excess returns are the cumulative summation of the one-
period excess returns. byt is the log debt-to-GDP ratio. by is the log debt to GDP ratio. pd is
the log price-dividend ratio. svar is the stock return realized volatility. h is the predictive horizon.
The corporate bond portfolio is indicated in the name of the panel. The t-statistics are based on
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The sample is from 1973:I to
2014:IV for investment-grade bond and from 1983:I to 2014:IV for high-yield bond.
h by (t-stat) pd (t-stat) svar (t-stat) R2
Investment Grade
1q 0.03 (3.08) -0.01 (-1.72) 0.01 (2.06) 0.06
1y 0.09 (2.73) -0.04 (-1.42) 0.02 (2.62) 0.13
2y 0.12 (2.29) -0.04 (-0.91) 0.06 (3.85) 0.20
High Yield
1q 0.04 (3.16) -0.03 (-2.36) 0.01 (1.40) 0.10
1y 0.12 (2.59) -0.11 (-2.75) 0.04 (1.80) 0.24
2y 0.13 (1.55) -0.18 (-2.07) 0.07 (2.03) 0.28
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Table 1.10: Yield Spreads and Debt-to-GDP ratio
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of yield spreads on log debt-to-GDP ratio and
other control variables.
spreadt = β0 + β1byt + β3svart + β3tmst + ut
∆spreadt = β0 + β1∆byt + β3∆svart + β3∆tmst + ut
The spreads include: Gilchrist and Zakrajˆsek (2012) spread index (GZ spread), the spreads between
Moody’s Aaa, Aa, A, Baa bond yield and 30-year treasury bond yield, the spread between general
collateral repo rate (Repo), Certificate of Deposits rate (CD) , AA commercial paper (Paper) rate,
federal funds rate (FFR) and treasury bill rate. by is the log debt-to-GDP ratio. svar is the stock
return realized volatility. tms is the spread between 10-year treasury bond and 3-month T-bill.
Panel A shows the regression in level and Panel B shows the regression in first difference. The
t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
h by (t-stat) R2 by (t-stat) svar (t-stat) tms (t-stat) R2
A. Level
GZ spread 0.83 (1.80) 0.10 0.72 (3.92) 0.85 (3.59) 7.97 (1.14) 0.59
Aaa-Treasury 0.16 (1.25) 0.03 0.24 (1.75) 0.28 (5.72) -3.73 (-1.26) 0.41
Aa-Treasury -0.03 (-0.15) 0.00 -0.02 (-0.09) 0.34 (5.44) -0.35 (-0.10) 0.39
A-Treasury -0.21 (-0.70) 0.02 -0.25 (-1.02) 0.40 (4.99) 3.41 (0.69) 0.35
Baa-Treasury -0.19 (-0.52) 0.01 -0.28 (-1.02) 0.52 (3.90) 6.04 (1.04) 0.38
Baa-Aaa -0.36 (-1.22) 0.08 -0.52 (-2.17) 0.23 (2.14) 9.79 (2.17) 0.29
Repo-Bill -0.83 (-3.84) 0.31 -0.59 (-3.04) 0.10 (1.44) -13.80 (-3.29) 0.42
CD-Bill -0.87 (-3.69) 0.18 -0.81 (-3.11) 0.29 (2.98) -2.52 (-0.35) 0.28
Paper-Bill -1.10 (-3.78) 0.29 -0.71 (-2.73) 0.09 (1.47) -22.45 (-3.59) 0.43
FFR-Bill -0.79 (-3.86) 0.26 -0.59 (-3.11) 0.11 (1.62) -11.24 (-2.55) 0.35
B. First Difference
GZ spread 3.00 (1.73) 0.06 2.18 (1.51) 0.32 (2.81) -5.77 (-2.22) 0.33
Aaa-Treasury 1.55 (2.56) 0.04 1.15 (2.18) 0.18 (5.37) -10.83 (-3.31) 0.35
Aa-Treasury 2.06 (2.82) 0.06 1.60 (2.26) 0.20 (4.75) -9.06 (-2.25) 0.33
A-Treasury 2.56 (2.56) 0.07 2.00 (2.09) 0.23 (4.27) -7.83 (-2.16) 0.30
Baa-Treasury 3.65 (2.58) 0.09 2.98 (2.18) 0.27 (3.65) -7.90 (-1.45) 0.28
Baa-Aaa 2.10 (2.20) 0.08 1.83 (1.90) 0.10 (1.75) 2.91 (1.11) 0.14
Repo-Bill -3.43 (-2.85) 0.07 -3.71 (-2.92) 0.13 (2.21) -9.31 (-1.02) 0.15
CD-Bill 1.21 (0.52) 0.00 0.10 (0.05) 0.31 (4.01) 35.23 (2.19) 0.20
Paper-Bill -1.58 (-1.13) 0.01 -1.50 (-0.80) 0.02 (0.17) -17.72 (-1.18) 0.08
FFR-Bill -3.43 (-2.55) 0.06 -3.75 (-2.69) 0.14 (1.77) -6.86 (-0.74) 0.12
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Table 1.11: Variance Decomposition
The table reports variance decomposition of a VAR that includes GDP growth, stock market volati-
lity, book-value debt-to-GDP ratio, market-value debt-to-GDP ratio and a yield spread. The spreads
include: Gilchrist and Zakrajˆsek (2012) spread index (GZ spread), the spreads between Moody’s
Aaa, Aa, A, Baa bond yield and 30-year treasury bond yield, the spread between general collateral
repo rate (Repo), Certificate of Deposits rate (CD) , AA commercial paper (Paper) rate, federal
funds rate (FFR) and treasury bill rate. h shows the horizon of the forecast error decomposition.
The reported values are in percentage point.
book shock market shock
h 1 4 12 20 1 4 12 20
GZ spread 0.81 0.84 0.78 0.74 8.83 8.20 6.85 6.50
Aaa-Treasury 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.10 8.34 6.63 6.38 6.49
Aa-Treasury 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.28 11.65 8.15 8.52 8.99
A-Treasury 0.75 0.62 0.66 1.12 13.01 8.01 11.79 13.33
Baa-Treasury 4.13 3.27 2.85 3.20 10.81 6.14 11.00 12.53
Baa-Aaa 14.41 10.88 8.83 9.98 5.53 3.91 14.63 16.96
Repo-Bill 9.60 9.20 9.15 10.08 2.55 14.67 23.16 23.09
CD-Bill 0.02 0.47 1.50 2.37 10.28 18.94 27.78 28.07
Paper-Bill 5.97 6.08 6.52 7.36 0.74 8.61 16.00 16.12
FFR-Bill 7.36 7.68 7.95 8.82 0.57 9.52 18.55 18.82
Table 1.12: Risk-free Rate and Debt-to-GDP Ratio
The table reports estimates from OLS regressions of real risk-free rate on log debt-to-GDP ratio and
other control variables.
rf,t = β0 + β1byt + β2∆ct + β3∆ct−1 + β4pit + β5pit−1 + β6pdt + ut
The real risk-free rate is the nominal risk-free rate minus the four-quarter moving average of past
inflation. The first column shows 3-month and 1-month real risk-free rate. “rf , survey” calculate
the real risk-free rate using Livingston survey on inflation. by is log debt-to-GDP ratio. ∆c is
consumption growth. pi is inflation. pd is price-dividend ratio. “rf , survey” is observed bi-annually.
The t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Period byt ∆ct ∆ct−1 pit pit−1 pdt R2
1947:I–2014:IV
rf , 3M -0.03 0.39 0.32 -0.76 -0.86 0.00 0.33
(-2.94) (2.29) (1.37) (-2.56) (-2.86) (-0.32)
rf , 1M -0.03 0.42 0.32 -0.78 -0.88 0.00 0.35
(-3.09) (2.60) (1.45) (-2.74) (-3.14) (-0.21)
rf , survey -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.22 -0.78 -0.01 0.24
(-2.45) (0.07) (-0.01) (-0.99) (-2.12) (-1.17)
1926–2014
rf , 3M -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.79 0.19 0.00 0.71
(-4.97) (0.12) (-0.71) (-8.09) (1.69) (0.21)
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Table 1.13: Government Debt Return and Debt-to-GDP Ratio
Panel A reports estimates from OLS regressions of government debt return on log debt-to-GDP
ratio.
Σhi=1rb,t+i = β0 + β1byt + u+h
The government debt return rb is the log average return across terms to maturity on all the govern-
ment debt outstanding subtracting the realized inflation. Longer horizon returns are the cumulative
summation of the one-period return. by is log debt-to-GDP ratio. The t-statistics are based on
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The sample is from 1929 to 2014.
Panel B reports the variance decomposition. Surplus is Et[Σj=0κ
j
1(κ2τyt+j − κ3gyt+j)]. Growth is
Et[Σj=0κ
j
1∆yt+j ]. Return is Et[Σj=0κ
j
1rb,t+j ]. The conditional expectation is computed from a first
order vector autoregression model with five variables [byt, gyt, τyt, ∆yt, rb,t]
′.
A. Predictive Regression
h byt (t-stat) R
2
1Y -0.04 (-2.29) 0.09
5Y -0.14 (-1.74) 0.15
10Y -0.24 (-2.00) 0.17
20Y -0.44 (-3.59) 0.28
B. Variance Decomposition
surplus growth discount rate
cov(byt, Et[.])/var(byt) 0.49 0.30 -0.25
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Table 1.14: Fiscal Uncertainty and Debt-to-GDP Ratio
This table reports the correlation between log debt-to-GDP ratio and measures of uncertainty. Panel
A shows the broad-based measure of fiscal and macro uncertainty. Panel B shows the Economic
Policy Uncertainty Index from Baker et al. (2015).
corr(by, uncertainty)
1947:I–2014:IV 1985:I:2014:IV
A. Broad-based Uncertainty Measure
1Y Fiscal Uncertainty 0.28 0.21
3Y Fiscal Uncertainty 0.50 0.29
5Y Fiscal Uncertainty 0.54 0.29
1Y Macro Uncertainty 0.06 0.15
3Y Macro Uncertainty 0.06 0.06
5Y Macro Uncertainty 0.06 -0.26
B. Economic Policy Uncertainty
Economic Policy Uncertainty 0.26
Monetary policy -0.18
Fiscal Policy 0.36
Taxes 0.33
Government spending 0.37
Health care 0.58
National security -0.14
Entitlement programs 0.45
Regulation 0.51
Financial Regulation 0.27
Trade policy -0.01
Sovereign debt, currency crises 0.31
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Table 1.15: Fiscal Uncertainty and Asset Prices
Panel A reports estimates from OLS regressions of asset prices on log debt-to-GDP ratio.
rt = β0 + β1Uncertaintyt + ut
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk-free rate rf . by is the log
debt-to-GDP ratio. Excess corporate bond return is the log Barclay’s corporate investment-grade
bond portfolio return rcorp subtracting the log risk free rate rf . GZ spread is the credit spread in
Gilchrist and Zakrajˆsek (2012). The real risk free rate rf is the nominal risk free rate minus the
four-month moving average of past inflation. The government debt return rb is the log average
return across terms to maturity on all the government debt outstanding subtracting the realized
inflation. Uncertainty is measured as the broad-based 3-year fiscal uncertainty or the fiscal policy
uncertainty in Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Baker et al. (2015).
Broad-based (t-stat) R2 EPU (t-stat) R2
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Y 0.021 (1.26) 0.02 0.048 (2.39) 0.08
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 3Y 0.073 (2.14) 0.07 0.153 (2.99) 0.25
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 5Y 0.168 (2.93) 0.21 0.188 (4.79) 0.24
rcorp,t+1 − rf,t, 1Y 0.025 (2.43) 0.07 0.018 (2.42) 0.09
GZ spread 0.007 (2.51) 0.43 0.003 (1.10) 0.06
rf,t -0.002 (-1.54) 0.09 -0.002 (-2.19) 0.10
rb,t+1 -0.002 (-0.41) 0.00 -0.012 (-1.99) 0.09
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Table 1.16: Calibration
The table reports the calibration of the model. Panel A contains the preferences and technology
paraemters. Panel B contains fiscal policy parameters. Panel C contains parameters in fiscal conso-
lidation and government spending policies.
.
Description Parameter Value
A. Preferences and Technology
Subject discount factor β 0.994
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 2
Relative risk aversion γ 10
Capital share α 0.33
Intermediate inputs share ξ 0.50
Depreciation rate of R&D capital φ 0.075
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025
Investment adjustment cost ξk 0.80
Exogenous productivity shock volatility σa 0.008
Exogenous productivity persistence ρ 0.97
B. Fiscal Policy
Corporatetax rate mean µτc 0.36
Corporate tax rate shock volatility στ.0/
√
1− ρτ 0.03
Corporate tax rate persistence ρτ 0.99
Fiscal uncertainty shock volatility στ,w 0.7
Fiscal uncertainty persistence ντ 0.995
G-Y ratio mean µgy 0.17
Labor tax rate mean µτl 0.10
Long-term debt maturity φb 0.99
Bond quantity persistence ρb 0.99
Bond quantity volatility σb 0.01
C. Fiscal Consolidation and Government Spending Policy
Fiscal consolidation φ¯τ 0.001
Fiscal consolidation volatility σ2φτ 0.006
Fiscal consolidation cyclicality corr(φτ,t+1, t+1) -0.5
G-Y ratio shock volatility σg,0/
√
1− ρg 0.01
G-Y ratio persistence ρg 0.99
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Table 1.17: Macroeconomic Dynamics and Asset Prices
The table reports the macroeconomic and asset price moments in the data and the model. The
reported model moments are the mean, 5% and 95% quantile of short-sample simulations. The
simulated sample period is 85 years.
Data Model 5% 95%
E[∆y] 1.80 1.80 -0.40 3.59
σ(∆y) 5.00 2.80 2.55 3.15
σ(∆c) 2.70 2.62 1.82 4.16
E[rm − rf ] 5.59 5.19 2.34 8.54
σ(rm) 20.04 7.32 5.81 10.12
E[rf ] 0.45 1.48 -0.46 2.98
σ(rf ) 3.75 1.42 0.90 2.28
E[rb] 1.48 0.75 -1.86 2.97
σ(rb) 5.31 4.54 3.69 5.96
E[pd] 3.39 3.63 3.01 4.16
σ(pd) 0.45 0.43 0.24 0.74
E[B/Y ] 0.40 0.52 0.41 0.63
σ(B/Y ) 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.12
E[T/Y ] 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.21
σ(T/Y ) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
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Table 1.18: Asset Prices, Debt-to-GDP and Fiscal Uncertainty
Panel A reports estimates from OLS regressions of asset prices on log debt-to-GDP ratio.
rt = β0 + β1byt + ut
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk free rate rf . by is the log
debt-to-GDP ratio. The real risk-free rate rf is the nominal risk-free rate minus the four-quarter
moving average of past inflation. The government debt return rb is the log average return across
terms to maturity on all the government debt outstanding subtracting the realized inflation. The
standard errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. Panel B reports estimates
from OLS regressions of asset prices on the broad-based 3-year fiscal uncertainty. Model is from
the benchmark calibration. The reported model moments are the mean, 5% and 95% quantile of β
and R2 in short-sample simulations. The simulated sample period is 85 years.
Data Model
β s.e. R2 β 5% 95% R2 5% 95%
A. Debt-to-GDP ratio
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Q 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Y 0.15 (0.05) 0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.10
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 3Y 0.41 (0.12) 0.27 0.22 -0.04 0.51 0.10 0.00 0.24
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 5Y 0.60 (0.13) 0.38 0.33 -0.08 0.80 0.14 0.00 0.35
rf,t -0.04 (0.02) 0.21 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.26 0.01 0.56
rb,t+1 -0.04 (0.02) 0.09 -0.09 -0.16 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.22
rb,t+1, 10Y -0.24 (0.12) 0.17 -0.61 -1.15 -0.09 0.33 0.03 0.68
rm,t+1, 1Y 0.11 (0.05) 0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.06
rm,t+1, 3Y 0.29 (0.12) 0.15 0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.06
rm,t+1, 5Y 0.43 (0.15) 0.22 0.15 -0.33 0.64 0.08 0.00 0.23
B. Fiscal Uncertainty
corr(by, uncertainty) 0.50 0.43 -0.15 0.86
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Y 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.18
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 5Y 0.17 (0.05) 0.21 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.30 0.03 0.59
rf,t -0.002 (0.001) 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.53
rb,t+1 -0.002 (0.01) 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.03 0.23
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Table 1.19: Mechanisms of Fiscal Uncertainty
Panel A reports estimates from OLS regressions of asset prices on log debt-to-GDP ratio.
rt = β0 + β1byt + ut
Excess stock return is the log market return rm subtracting the log risk free rate rf . by is the log
debt-to-GDP ratio. The real risk-free rate rf is the nominal risk-free rate minus the four-quarter
moving average of past inflation. The government debt return rb is the log average return across
terms to maturity on all the government debt outstanding subtracting the realized inflation. The
standard errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. Panel B reports estimates
from OLS regressions of asset prices on the broad-based 3-year fiscal uncertainty.
“Tax Vol” is the benchmark calibration that has stochastic volatility. “Vol and Cons” includes both
stochastic volatility and uncertain fiscal consolidations. “Cons.” has uncertain fiscal consolidations
but no stochastic volatility. “Spending” introduce spending shocks in the benchmark. “No Vol” has
no stochastic volatility and uncertain fiscal consolidations. The reported model moments are the
mean of β and R2 in short-sample simulations. The simulated sample period is 85 years.
Data Tax Vol Vol & Cons. Cons. Spending No Vol
β R2 β R2 β R2 β R2 β R2 β R2
A. Debt-to-GDP ratio
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Q 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Y 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 3Y 0.41 0.27 0.22 0.10 0.32 0.16 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.11 0.04 0.03
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 5Y 0.60 0.38 0.33 0.14 0.48 0.23 0.35 0.16 0.35 0.16 0.05 0.05
rf,t -0.04 0.21 -0.05 0.26 -0.07 0.44 -0.06 0.40 -0.06 0.40 -0.03 0.16
rb,t+1 -0.04 0.09 -0.09 0.10 -0.14 0.16 -0.12 0.14 -0.12 0.14 -0.04 0.04
rb,t+1, 10Y -0.24 0.17 -0.61 0.33 -1.00 0.54 -0.81 0.53 -0.81 0.53 -0.19 0.17
rm,t+1, 1Y 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
rm,t+1, 3Y 0.29 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
rm,t+1, 5Y 0.43 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.06
B. Fiscal Uncertainty
corr(byt, vart(τc,t+1)) 0.50 0.43 0.38 1.00 0.43 0.00
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 1Y 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08
rm,t+1 − rf,t, 5Y 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.26 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.30
rf,t -0.002 0.09 -0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.32 -0.01 0.19
rb,t+1 -0.002 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.11
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Table 1.20: Tax Impact on Growth
The table shows the OLS regressions of economic growth on log tax-to-GDP ratio.
Σhi=1∆yt+i = β0 + τytβ1 + ut+h
The growth ∆y is measured as real output, real private consumption or total factor productivity. τy
is the log tax-to-GDP ratio. Tax is the federal tax receipts. h is the predictive horizon. The standard
errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. The sample is from 1947:I to 2014:IV.
The reported model moments are the mean, 5% and 95% quantile of β and R2 in short-sample
simulations. The simulated sample period is 85 years.
Data Model
h β s.e. R2 β 5% 95% R2 5% 95%
1Y
output, -0.15 (0.04) 0.13 -0.29 -0.62 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.46
consumption -0.09 (0.03) 0.06 -0.41 -0.80 -0.04 0.24 0.01 0.55
TFP -0.12 (0.03) 0.16 -0.32 -0.74 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.33
10Y
output -0.66 (0.19) 0.21 -1.43 -4.81 1.85 0.19 0.00 0.55
consumption -0.35 (0.15) 0.09 -2.04 -5.19 1.19 0.26 0.00 0.67
TFP -0.32 (0.15) 0.13 -1.31 -5.42 2.96 0.15 0.00 0.47
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CHAPTER 2 : Volatility Risk Pass-Through
(with Riccardo Colacito, Mariano M. Croce, and Ivan Shaliastovich)
2.1. Introduction
The end of the Great Moderation period has highlighted once more the relevance of un-
certainty shocks as key determinants of economic activity. In this paper, we estimate and
explain the international transmission of output volatility shocks to both currencies and
international quantity dynamics. More precisely, focusing on a large cross section of major
industrialized countries, we identify news to the conditional volatility of output, consump-
tion, and real exchange rates.
From this investigation we document several novel empirical findings. First, consumption
and output volatilities are imperfectly correlated within countries. This implies that the gro-
wth rate of consumption in each country can experience changes in its conditional volatility
that go beyond the arrival of endowment volatility shocks. Second, consumption volatility
is more cross-country correlated than output volatility, suggesting that the output volatility
shocks of one country propagate to the consumption of other countries.
To formalize the international propagation of output volatility shocks, we construct an index
of volatility pass-through between two countries. Our index is equal to zero if a local output
volatility shock results exclusively in an increase of local consumption volatility, without
spilling over to the other country. Conversely, our index takes the value of one if a local
output volatility shock results in an equal adjustment of consumption volatility in both
countries.
We find that the pass-through of output volatility is sizeable, especially when the uncertainty
shocks originate from the smallest countries in our cross section. Specifically, when we
focus on G7 countries, the pass-through is on the order of 50%, regardless of the country in
which the output volatility shock materializes. When we also include the next 10 countries
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according to their share of world GDP (henceforth G17), we find that the pass-through from
bigger countries to smaller countries declines, whereas the pass-through of a volatility shock
originating from small countries to large ones becomes as great as 70%. That is, smaller
countries can better share volatility shocks compared to larger countries, by redistributing
a bigger fraction of their uncertainty shocks to their trading partners.
Our last empirical finding refers to the disconnect between the volatility of consumption
differentials and the volatility of exchange rates. We document that the correlation of
these volatilities is about 20% for the set of countries that we consider in our empirical
investigation. This extent of comovement constitutes an anomaly from the standpoint of
a frictionless model with time-additive preferences, since this setting prescribes an almost
perfect correlation. This is a novel observation that goes beyond the low correlation of the
levels of consumption differentials and exchange rates (the Kollmann (1991) and Backus
and Smith (1993a) puzzle).
In the second part of this manuscript, we show that our main findings are an anomaly in the
context of an equilibrium risk-sharing model with time-additive preferences. In contrast,
when agents have recursive preferences, news about both future growth rates and future
uncertainty are priced, and thus they can jointly affect trade and volatility dynamics in a
manner consistent with the data.
Specifically, we consider an economy with two countries, each populated by one agent with
Epstein and Zin (1991) preferences (henceforth EZ preferences). Each agent is endowed with
the stochastic supply of one country-specific good, whose dynamics are characterized by the
presence of time-varying volatility shocks. Preferences feature a bias for the consumption
of the domestic good. Trade occurs in frictionless goods markets and in financial markets
featuring a complete set of state- and date-contingent securities.
Preferences are calibrated so that our agents dislike volatility of their continuation utilities.
Since continuation utilities are a reflection of the entire future streams of consumption, we
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say that agents dislike long-run consumption variance. When news shocks hit the economy,
agents have an incentive to trade in order to reduce the uncertainty of their future utility.
Specifically, a country affected by a positive news shock will receive a smaller share of
resources and have lower volatility of continuation utility going forward, but it will also
have higher short-run consumption volatility.
When news pertains to future expected growth rates, the international reallocation of re-
sources results in an international exchange of both short-run and long-run consumption
volatility across countries. That is, variances are characterized by negative comovements.
We call this force the reallocation effect. News to output volatility, in contrast, produces a
positive comovement in consumption volatilities across all countries: changes in output vo-
latility spread in the cross section of countries, with the reallocation channel only partially
mitigating the effects of local shocks on local consumption volatility.
The recursive risk-sharing arrangement that we described above is the key driver of our
main results. Since agents dislike time variation in the volatility of their consumption, they
actively trade with each other in order to dampen the associated change in the volatility
of consumption following an output volatility shock. This reallocation results in a marked
degree of volatility pass-through, which brings our model closer to the data.
Because of the concavity of the utility function with respect to country size, the reallocation
channel is more pronounced for small countries than for large countries. As a result, our
model predicts that shocks to output volatility should come with a larger pass-through when
they affect small countries, consistent with the data. In a model with CRRA preferences,
however, this result is missing, as volatility shocks are not directly priced and the associated
risk-sharing motive is absent.
Furthermore, the model can account for the small extent of positive comovement between
the volatility of consumption differentials and the volatility of exchange rate fluctuations
thanks to two opposite forces. Volatility shocks tend to create a positive correlation between
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the two volatilities, as they increase the uncertainty of all the variables in the economy.
Long-run shocks, in contrast, generate a large negative comovement.
To better understand the role of long-run shocks, we note that they are responsible for
most of the fluctuations of the wealth distribution, that is, our reallocation channel. As
the wealth distribution becomes more unequal, our countries depend more on each other in
order to share risks. In equilibrium, they engage in more active trading, and their stochastic
discount factors become more correlated. By no arbitrage, the real exchange rate becomes
less volatile. Simultaneously, the reallocation effect makes the cross-country difference of
the consumption growth rates more volatile, as the pass-through of consumption volatility
is not symmetric across countries with different wealth shares.
In a model without shocks to output volatility (e.g., Colacito and Croce (2013a)), the vola-
tility of the exchange rate and that of the international differential of consumption growth
rates would be strongly negative because of the dominance of the reallocation channel. In
contrast, exogenous output volatility shocks increase the conditional volatility of all ma-
croeconomic aggregates and hence endogenously produce positive comovements. Under our
benchmark calibration, these opposite forces end up producing a positive but moderate
correlation between consumption differentials and exchange rate volatility, as in the data.
The international long-run risk literature has already documented the ability of long-lasting
consumption news shocks to account for several empirical regularities of international asset
prices (see, among others, Colacito (2008); Nakamura et al. (2012); Colacito and Croce
(2013a); and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)). We differ from this literature in at least
two dimensions. First, we provide novel evidence on the diffusion of fundamental output
volatility shocks to consumption and currencies. Second, we provide an equilibrium ex-
planation of our findings through the lens of a frictionless risk-sharing scheme in which
volatility shocks are priced.
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Related literature. Our manuscript contributes to a recently growing literature that
studies uncertainty shocks in an international setting. In an early contribution, Ramey
and Ramey (1995) show that countries with higher volatility of GDP have lower growth
in the future. Consistent with their cross-sectional evidence, we find that higher domestic
output volatility is associated with a decline in relative consumption in the future. We
develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of volatility risk sharing for
quantities and prices.
Fogli and Perri (2015) link macroeconomic volatility to trends in external imbalances in a
neoclassical international production economy. Novy and Taylor (2014) nest uncertainty
shocks in a model with endogenous production, international trade of intermediate inputs,
and inventory concerns. They find that uncertainty shocks explain a relevant share of the
cyclical behavior of trade and abstract away from asset pricing considerations. In contrast to
these approaches, we take output as given and link the diffusion of consumption uncertainty
to currency behavior.
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) study interest rate uncertainty shocks in the context of a
rich, small open economy model with time-additive preferences. We study the propagation
of uncertainty shocks in a general equilibrium exchange economy in which agents have
recursive preferences and volatility shocks are priced. By doing so, we set the stage for a
future class of macrofinance international business cycle models in which volatility shocks
drive both international quantities and asset prices.
More broadly, our analysis relates to the recent literature examining the role of uncertainty
both in the data and in economic models (see, among others, Jones et al. (2005); Justiniano
and Primiceri (2008); Bloom et al. (2007); Bloom (2009b); Bloom et al. (2016); Basu and
Bundick (2012); Jurado et al. (2015a); Kollmann (2016); and Gilchrist et al. (2014)).
Although our attention is focused on a frictionless risk-sharing setting with symmetric
countries, we regard the introduction of frictions and heterogeneity into our model as an
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important direction for future research in this area (see, e.g., Gabaix and Maggiori (2015a);
Ready et al. (2012); Backus et al. (2010); Maggiori (2011); and Lustig et al. (2011a)).
These frictions may be important in addressing the empirical link between uncertainty and
international capital flows documented by Gourio et al. (2014).
Our study is also related to the growing body of literature that has investigated the macroe-
conomic foundations of international financial markets’ fluctuations (see, inter alia, Pavlova
and Rigobon (2007), Pavlova and Rigobon (2010), Farhi and Gabaix (2008), Hassan (2013),
Stathopoulos (2012), Heyerdahl-Larsen (2015), Verdelhan (2010a), Mueller et al. (2015), and
Pavlova and Rigobon (2013) for an extensive review of the literature). We differ from these
papers by explicitly introducing time-varying uncertainty in macroeconomic fundamentals
and studying its effects on the optimal international risk-sharing arrangement.
Additionally, several papers have documented the relevance of higher-order moments in
sharpening our understanding of currency dynamics. Gavazzoni et al. (2013) argue that non-
Gaussian dynamics of the stochastic discount factors are needed to reconcile the riskiness
of currencies with the level of the interest rates. Berg and Mark (2016) show that the
cross-country high-minus-low conditional skewness of the unemployment gap is a measure
of global macroeconomic uncertainty and it constitutes a factor that is robustly priced
in currency excess returns. Zviadadze (2015) analyzes the relationship between shocks to
the stochastic variance of US consumption and the cross section of currency risk premia.
Relative to this literature, we document how volatility shocks spread in the cross section
of G-17 countries and propose a model that accounts for the way that volatility risk is
internationally shared. Farhi et al. (2015) and Chernov et al. (2014) study the role of crash
risk for currency risk premia. We regard the introduction of rare events as an important
generalization of this framework.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we describe our empirical strategy
and our novel findings concerning the cross section of volatilities of major industrialized
countries. Section 2.3 describes our model, whose results are presented in section 2.4.
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Section 2.5 concludes the paper. The appendix contains additional robustness checks and
the model’s extensions.
2.2. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we describe the econometric framework that we adopt to measure como-
vements in macroeconomic volatility within and across major industrialized countries. Fo-
cusing on the volatility of shocks to the growth rates of macroeconomic variables, we provide
novel empirical evidence on the extent to which shocks to the relative volatility of GDP are
transmitted to the relative volatility of consumption. We refer to this concept as the vo-
latility pass-through. Further, we provide evidence linking volatility comovements to trade
dynamics.
2.2.1. Data Description
Sources and sample. Our empirical analysis is based on the cross section of the follo-
wing 17 major industrialized countries, ranked by GDP size: the United States, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In this
study, we refer to the group of the first seven countries as G7 and to the expanded set of
countries as G17. We collect the national accounts, population, and CPI data for these
countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (henceforth
OECD) database. The exchange rates, quoted as the US dollar price of the foreign cur-
rency, are from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (henceforth FRED) database. The
macroeconomic data are seasonally adjusted, real, and per capita.
To be consistent with the endowment economy that we analyze in sections 2.3 and 2.4, we
abstract away from both investment and public expenditure and compute aggregate output
as the sum of consumption and net exports. Since our model is based on a frictionless
risk-sharing scheme, we follow the common practice of letting our quarterly dataset range
from 1971:q1 to 2013:q4, a period of substantial financial integration across all major indus-
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trialized countries (see, among others, Quinn (1997), Obstfeld (1998), Taylor (2002), and
Quinn and Voth (2008)).1
Cross-sectional similarities and differences. In table 2.1, we shows key moments
of our international data. For ease of exposition, we report cross-sectionally aggregated
moments, as opposed to country-level values. Specifically, we look at moments for both
G7 and G17 countries. For G7 countries, we report the simple average of our aggregates.
For G17 countries, we present both simple and GDP-weighted cross-sectional averages of
our moments. To assess the extent of cross-country heterogeneity, for each moment we also
report its 1st and 4th quintiles in the G17 group.
We highlight three relevant facts. First, the moments for the G7 group very much resemble
those that are typically encountered for the US. As an example, consumption growth has
a mean of about 2% per year and a volatility of about 1.75%. In the G17 aggregate, the
average growth rate declines, whereas the unconditional volatility of both output and con-
sumption increases. In both cases, however, changes are relatively modest. Both quarterly
consumption and output growth are almost serially uncorrelated.
Second, the average change in the net-export-to-output ratio is distributed nearly symmetri-
cally around zero. In the group of G17 countries, this moment ranges from −30% to +34%.
Since smaller countries have more volatile output than bigger countries, they also tend to
have more volatile net-export-to-output ratios. In our model, we abstract away from this
source of heterogeneity and focus on the volatility of net-export-to-output ratios relative to
output volatility. In the data this ratio is about 0.80 for both G7 and G17 countries.
Third, in both the G7 and G17 groups, consumption growth rates feature low international
correlations.2 Further, output and consumption growth rates are imperfectly correlated
1Due to data availability and quality issues, the data for Belgium, Norway, and Spain start in 1981;
for New Zealand in 1986; and for Portugal in 1991. Our Bayesian methods can easily be applied to an
unbalanced panel.
2The quantity anomaly in Backus et al. (1994) does not apply to our dataset, as our measured output
excludes both investment and government expenditure.
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Table 2.1: Data Summary Statistics
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for consumption growth, output growth, change in
net-export-to-output ratio, and consumption and output volatility. ‘G7 Avg.’ (‘G17 Avg.’) refers
to simple (both simple and GDP-weighted) averages of key moments for G7 (G17) countries. The
rightmost two columns show the first and fourth quintiles of the moments of interest in the G17
cross section. Macroeconomic variables are seasonally adjusted, real, and per capita. Means and
volatilities are annualized, in percentages. Quarterly observations are from the 1971:Q1–2013:Q4
sample.
G7 Avg. G17 Avg. G17 Quintile
Simple Simple Weighted 1st 4th
Mean 1.91 1.63 1.89 1.26 2.02
Std. Dev. 1.75 1.99 1.67 1.34 2.47
AR(1) 0.11 0.07 0.17 -0.16 0.31
Output growth:
Mean 1.94 1.71 1.93 1.43 2.00
Std. Dev. 2.21 2.97 2.02 2.01 4.43
AR(1) 0.00 -0.09 0.07 -0.26 0.09
∆Net Exports over Output:
Mean 0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.30 0.34
Std. Dev. 1.60 2.48 1.45 1.79 3.24
AR(1) 0.00 -0.09 0.07 -0.26 0.09
Within-Country Correlations:
Consump. and output growth 0.67 0.51 0.71 0.35 0.72
Consump. and output vol 0.54 0.47 0.65 0.26 0.80
Across-Country Correlations:
Consump. growth 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.13 0.33
Output growth 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.20
Consump. vol 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.35 0.66
Output vol 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.18 0.45
within countries. Both of these empirical facts are consistent with the predictions of our
recursive risk-sharing model.
In the next sections, we describe in detail our identification of the time-varying volatility
components and address their comovements within and across countries.
73
2.2.2. Volatility Measurement and Comovements
We extract the volatility of the series of interest, zt, by estimating the following specification:
zt = µ(1− ρ) + ρzt−1 + eσt(z)/2ηt,
σt(z) = µσ(1− ν) + νσt−1(z) + σwwt,
(2.1)
where σt(z) is a latent process equal to the logarithm of the variance of macroeconomic
shock to zt. The innovations ηt and wt are independent Gaussian shocks to the level and
the volatility of zt, respectively. The parameters ρ and ν govern the persistence of zt and
σt(zt), respectively, whereas µ and µσ represent the average level and volatility of zt and
σt(zt), respectively. The parameter σw captures the volatility of volatility.
Similar volatility specifications are employed in Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri
(2005) in the context of macroeconomic volatility, and in Cortet et al. (2009) for financial
volatility modeling. According to our specification, the variance of zt is guaranteed to take
on positive values. In untabulated tests we directly estimated volatility in levels, with very
similar results. For this reason, in the remainder of this manuscript we refer to σt as either
log-volatility or volatility interchangeably.
We estimate the system of equations (2.1) following the Bayesian methods in Kim et al.
(1998). For each country, we fit our volatility specification to aggregate consumption and
output growth separately. To check the robustness of our results, we also employ a specifi-
cation in which the volatility parameters are restricted to be common across countries and
are jointly estimated in our cross section of countries. For parsimony, a complete summary
of the estimation details is provided in the appendix.
Volatilities: aggregate time pattern. In figure 2.2.2, we show our fitted volatilities
aggregated across both G7 and G17 countries. For the G17 group, we also plot the first
and the fourth cross-sectional volatility quintiles. Consistent with the findings reported in
table 2.1, consumption volatility is systematically lower than output volatility. Further,
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our estimation procedure captures the well-documented Great Moderation phenomenon, as
both our estimated consumption and output volatilities slowly decline from the 1980s to the
mid-2000s. These findings are consistent with those documented by Lettau et al. (2008);
Stock and Watson (2002); and McConnell and Quiros (2000) for the United States and
support the plausibility of the results obtained so far.
Figure 2.1: Macroeconomic Volatilities
This figure shows estimates of macroeconomic volatilities of real consumption and output growth.
Volatilities, eσt/2, are estimated at a country level according to equation (2.1). The G7 line shows
the equally weighted cross-sectional average for G7 countries. “G17” reports the equally weighted
average across all the G17 countries. “Weighted” reports the GDP-weighted average across G17
countries. Dashed lines show the first and fourth quantiles of the volatilities in the G17 cross
section. Quarterly observations range from 1971:Q1 to 2013:Q4.
Consistent with the unconditional evidence in table 2.1, G17 countries have a larger average
volatility level relative to the G7 group. In both country groups, our conditional estimates
are subject to substantial and persistent fluctuations over time. More broadly, the time
pattern of the estimated aggregate volatilities shares similar characteristics across G7 and
G17 countries. These results suggest that our novel findings on international volatility
comovements are quite general, as they apply to a large international cross section.
Volatilities: comovements. Uncertainty shocks appear to be modestly correlated across
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countries for both consumption and output. In table 2.1, we formally quantify this statement
by reporting volatility correlations within and across countries. We find that the correlation
structure of the volatilities mimics that of the levels.
Specifically, the cross-country correlation of endowment volatilities is about 0.30, a number
close to the cross-country correlation of the levels of the growth rates. The cross-country
correlation of consumption volatility is slightly higher than that of output volatility, once
again consistent with that observed for the growth rates of the levels. Within each country,
in contrast, the volatilities of consumption and output comove strongly with each other.
Their correlation is 0.70, a figure similar to that of the consumption and output growth
rates.
In our next step, we adopt a VAR approach to (i) better characterize the joint dynamics of
both levels and volatilities, and (ii) quantify the pass-through of volatility shocks.
2.2.3. Volatility Risk Pass-Through
Relative volatility shocks. To evaluate the dynamic impact of shocks to relative vola-
tility (σt(∆yi)− σt(∆yUS)) across countries, we jointly estimate the following N countries
VAR(1):
Y˜t,i = µ˜Y,i + Φ˜Y˜t,i + Σ˜u˜t,i, i = 1, 2, ..., N (2.2)
where
Y˜i,t =

σt(∆yi)− σt(∆yUS)
∆yi −∆yUS
σt(∆ci)− σt(∆cUS)
∆ci −∆cUS
∆(NX/Y )i −∆(NX/Y )US

, (2.3)
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where ∆yi−∆yUS , σt(∆ci)−σt(∆cUS), ∆ci−∆cUS , and ∆(NX/Y )i−∆(NX/Y )US denote
the difference between country i and the US in growth rates of endowments; the volatilities
of consumption growth rates; the growth rates of consumption; and the net-export-to-
output ratios, respectively. We note that N is equal to 6 for G-7 countries and 16 for
G-17 countries. In our appendix, we show that our key results are robust both to different
specifications and estimation procedures, and to the choice of a global benchmark, rather
than considering just the US. Furthermore, our results are virtually unchanged when we
account for heterogenous exposure to a common global volatility process across countries.
Since we adopt the US as the baseline home country throughout our analysis, this spe-
cification allows us to focus on relative bilateral adjustments computed with respect to a
common benchmark. To sharpen the system’s identification, we assume that the fundamen-
tal persistence and volatility parameters Φ˜ and Σ˜ are common across countries, whereas
the intercepts µ˜Y,i are allowed to be country specific. Under these assumptions, we can
estimate the VAR parameters by pooling the demeaned data across countries. We estimate
the system of VAR equations as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.
Throughout this study, we take volatility shocks as primitive exogenous innovations. Con-
sistent with this approach, we identify impulse responses through a lower diagonal Cholesky
decomposition in which output volatility shocks are the most exogenous to the system, that
is, they are ranked first. Using our estimated VAR, we can then trace the relative response
of the macroeconomic variables to an increase in output volatility in the foreign country
relative to the US.
In figure 2.2.2, we show the estimated impulse responses for the G7 countries to a relative
volatility shock. In table 2.2.2, we report the contemporaneous responses of all the variables
in the system to this type of shock. These numbers correspond to the entries in the first
column of the matrix Σ˜ in equation (2.2). We perform this analysis for both the G7 and the
remaining G17 countries (hereafter, the bottom-10 G17). Our empirical evidence highlights
several important cross-sectional aspects of volatility shocks across countries.
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Figure 2.2: Macroeconomic Responses to a Relative Volatility Shock
This figure shows the estimates of the relative responses of the volatility and growth rate of output
(∆y), the volatility and growth rate of consumption (∆c), and the change of net-export-to-output
ratio (∆NX/Y ) to a one-standard-deviation increase in the volatility of output in the foreign country
relative to the US. Dashed (dotted) lines refer to the point estimates (95% credible interval) of the
VAR(1) specified in equation (2.3). Solid lines show the output from our model under the benchmark
quarterly calibration reported in table 2.3.1.
First, when country i experiences an increase in its output volatility relative to the US, both
its relative consumption and output growth rates fall. The estimated effects are large and
almost always statistically significant. For example, in our G7 specification, foreign output
growth falls by nearly half a percentage point relative to the US upon the realization of
a one-standard-deviation relative volatility shock. These findings complement the one-
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Table 2.2: Volatility Risk Pass-Through
Notes: Panel A shows the estimates of the contemporaneous responses (Σ˜1j) of the VAR(1)
specified in equations (2.2)–(2.3) with respect to a shock to relative output volatility. Responses of
output growth, consumption growth, and net-exports-to-output ratio are annualized, in
percentages. Volatility pass-through is defined as in equation (2.4). Panel B reports pass-through
measures based on the estimates of the VAR in equations (2.5)–(2.6) with respect to volatility
shocks affecting either the US or the remaining countries. We report 95% credible intervals in
brackets. Our quarterly data range from 1971:q1 to 2013:q4.
Panel A: Contemporaneous adjustments to relative volatility shocks
σ(∆y) ∆y σ(∆c) ∆c ∆(NX/Y ) Pass-through
US/G7 Countries:
0.21 -0.46 0.10 -0.20 -0.25 0.52
[0.20; 0.22] [-0.77; -0.17] [0.09; 0.11] [-0.44; 0.03] [-0.49; -0.02] [0.48; 0.56]
US/Bottom-10 G17 Countries:
0.21 -0.57 0.08 -0.16 -0.39 0.61
[0.21; 0.22] [-0.95; -0.19] [0.07; 0.09] [-0.41; 0.09] [-0.73; -0.06] [0.56; 0.65]
Panel B: Pass-through and size
Origin of Vol. Shock:
U.S. Foreign Country
US/G7 G17 Countries: 0.49 0.57
[0.43; 0.54] [0.51; 0.63]
US/Bottom-10 G17 Countries: 0.51 0.72
[0.45; 0.57] [0.66; 0.78]
country evidence in Bansal et al. (2014b) and Bloom (2009b) in showing that an increase
in domestic volatility decreases real economic activity. For the same country group, the fall
in the relative level of consumption growth is about 0.20%, that is, half of that of output.
This mitigation happens through net imports, as the country with the highest volatility
shock experiences a deterioration of its current account.
Second, upon the arrival of a relative increase in output volatility, the volatility of con-
sumption increases as well. We find it convenient to explore this effect in greater detail by
defining a volatility pass-through index as follows:
Pass-through := 1− ∂(σt(∆ci)− σt(∆cUS))
∂(σt(∆yi)− σt(∆yUS)) . (2.4)
Since our analysis is based on country pairs, this index is equal to zero if an increase in
79
output volatility in one country results in a one-for-one increase in its own consumption
volatility. If instead an output volatility shock results in an equally redistributed increase
in consumption volatility across the two countries, the volatility pass-through is one.
In an economy with time-additive preferences defined over one good, perfect risk-sharing
implies a pass-through of one, as consumption is equalized across all possible states and
hence σt(∆ci)−σt(∆cUS) = 0 ∀t. Vice versa, in an endowment economy in which countries
are subject to autarky, that is, they cannot trade, our index is equal to zero, as Ci,t = Yi,t
∀i, t and hence (σt(∆ci)− σt(∆cUS)) = (σt(∆yi)− σt(∆yUS)) ∀i, t.
Our estimates suggest that the volatility pass-through is about 50% for G7 countries, me-
aning that if country i receives a country-specific output volatility shock of one, its own
consumption volatility goes up by just 0.50.3 This index increases further to 60% when
we focus on smaller countries, suggesting that the international sharing of volatility shocks
is more relevant for this set of countries. In our theoretical investigation, we show that
replicating these results in a model with time-additive preferences is a challenge.
The literature on economic uncertainty has investigated the possibility that volatility shocks
may be endogenous, and proposed potential solutions to overcome this empirical issue (see
for example Baker et al. (2016)). While the results discussed in this section are based on an
identification strategy in which volatility shocks are assumed to be the exogenous to level
shocks, we note that this assumption is not necessary for the calculation of the volatility
pass-through index. Indeed the index can be computed for any identification scheme relying
on the milder assumption that output volatility shocks are exogenous only to consumption
volatility shocks. In the Appendix, we document the robustness of our results to some of
these alternative VAR specifications.
Country-specific volatility shocks. The specification of the VAR in equation (2.3) is
parsimonious, but it features three main shortfalls: (i) it does not provide information on
3According to our VAR specification in equations (2.2)–(2.3), we obtain Pass− through = 1− Σ˜3,1/Σ˜1,1.
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the size of country-level shocks; (ii) it is silent on the correlation of shocks across countries;
and (iii) it is unable to detect potentially different responses depending on whether volatility
shocks arise from big or small countries. The first two limitations are relevant for calibration
reasons. The third shortcoming limits our understanding of volatility shock risk-sharing in
the data.
To overcome these issues, we propose an extended VAR,
Yt,i = µY,i + ΦYt,i + Σut,i, (2.5)
in which we disentangle foreign and U.S. variables:
Y ′i,t =
[
σt(∆yi) σt(∆yUS) ∆yi ∆yUS σt(∆ci) σt(∆cUS)
]
. (2.6)
As before, the persistence and scale matrices are common across countries, whereas the
intercepts pick out country-specific differences in the means. For parsimony, we consider
the smallest set of variables required for both calibration reasons and for the assessment of
the volatility pass-through. As a result, we exclude both the change in net exports and the
consumption growth rates from this VAR.
The estimation results used to guide our calibration are discussed in the next section and
are reported in table 2.3.1. In panel B of table 2.2.2, we report the implied volatility
pass-through due to either a one-standard-deviation increase in US output volatility or a
one-standard-deviation in foreign output volatility for both the G7 and the bottom-10 G17
countries.4 The additional insight provided by this estimation is that the pass-through is
sensitive to the size distribution of the countries that we analyze.
4According to our VAR specification in equations (2.5)–(2.6), the pass-through for US-originated shocks
is Pass− throughUS = 1 − (Σ˜6,2 − Σ˜5,2)/Σ˜2,2. For non-US shocks, we adopt the same expression, but we
change the order of variables in our VAR as follows:
Y ′i,t =
[
σt(∆yUS) σt(∆yi) ∆yUS ∆yi σt(∆cUS) σt(∆c)
]
.
.
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Specifically, when we focus on the G7 group, all countries tend to have a similar size and
a pass-through in the common range (51%–54%), regardless of the origin of the volatility
shock. In contrast, when we focus on the US versus the bottom-10 G17 countries, i.e., a
cross section with more dispersion in size, the origin of the shock matters. We find that the
volatility pass-through is larger if the volatility shock originates from the smaller economies.
According to our estimates, the bottom-10 G17 countries have a pass-through of 72% when
they receive an adverse output volatility shock. When the US receives a volatility shock,
in contrast, the pass-through to these smaller countries is just 51%, a number comparable
to that estimated for the other G7 countries. All together, these results suggest a novel
empirical finding: after a spike in endowment uncertainty, small countries mitigate their
consumption volatility better than large countries.
The volatility disconnect puzzle. If agents have CRRA preferences and markets are
complete, the scaled difference of consumption growth rates should equal the rate of de-
preciation of the exchange rate between the two countries’ currencies:
γ · (∆ch,t+1 −∆cf,t+1) = ∆et+1. (2.7)
As a result, consumption growth rate differentials should be perfectly correlated with ex-
change rates. Starting with Backus and Smith (1993a), a vast literature has documented
the empirical failure of this prediction (hereafter, the Backus and Smith puzzle). In the top
part of table 2.2.2, we show that the Backus-Smith anomaly is present in our dataset as
well.
Given our focus on the dynamics of volatility, we push our analysis one step further and
study the implications for the conditional variance of consumption growth differentials and
the conditional variance of exchange rate movements. Specifically, if we apply the conditi-
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Table 2.3: Volatility Disconnect Puzzle
Notes: This table shows correlations between the level and conditional volatility of consumption
growth differentials (cdit ≡ ∆cUSt −∆cit) and exchange rate growth (∆ei|USDt ), respectively. In both
cases, the US is considered the benchmark home country. Cumulative growth rates are denoted by
‘̂’. ‘G7 Avg.’ (‘G17 Avg.’) refers to simple (both simple and GDP-weighted) averages of key
moments for G7 (G17) countries. The rightmost two columns show the first and fourth quintiles of
the moments of interest in the G17 cross-section. Consumption is seasonally adjusted, real, and
per capita. Volatility estimates are based on the specification reported in equation (2.1). Quarterly
observations are from the 1971:Q1–2013:Q4 sample.
G7 Avg. G17 Avg. G17 Quintile
Simple Simple Weighted 1st 4th
Levels Disconnect
corr(∆cdt+1,∆et+1) -0.14 -0.11 -0.13 -0.19 -0.04
corr(∆ĉdt+4,∆êt+4) -0.14 -0.17 -0.14 -0.29 -0.05
Volatility Disconnect
corr(σt(∆cdt+1), σt(∆et+1)) 0.20 0.21 0.20 -0.01 0.42
corr(σt(∆ĉdt+4), σt(∆êt+4)) 0.27 0.25 0.26 -0.02 0.52
onal variance operator to both sides of equation (2.7), we get
γ2 · V art (∆ch,t+1 −∆cf,t+1) = V art (∆et+1) . (2.8)
Equivalently, the correlation between the conditional variance of consumption differentials
and exchange rate movements should be equal to one.
As shown in the bottom portion of table 2.2.2, empirically this correlation is very modest.
We call this novel empirical fact the volatility disconnect puzzle. To the best of our know-
ledge, we are the first ones to both document the existence of this empirical anomaly and
address it in the context of a recursive risk-sharing equilibrium.5
To summarize, our evidence shows that output volatility shocks decrease relative output
and consumption across countries and increase consumption volatility. In relative terms,
the effects for the consumption growth rate are smaller than for output growth rates, and
the consumption volatility response is larger if output volatility shocks originate in a lar-
5In untabulated tests, we estimated a similar level of disconnect also with the volatility of output diffe-
rentials. These results are available upon request to the authors.
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ger country. Equivalently, the pass-through from large to small countries is smaller than
the pass-through from small to large countries. Furthermore, we find a strong disconnect
between currency volatility and consumption differentials volatility. This empirical finding
is an anomaly in the context of a frictionless risk-sharing model with CRRA preferences.
In the next section, we develop an economic model that can explain and quantitatively
replicate our volatility risk-sharing evidence.
2.3. Model
The economy consists of two countries, home (h) and foreign (f ), and two goods, X and Y .
Agents’ preferences are defined over consumption aggregates of the two goods as follows.
Consumption aggregate. Let xit and y
i
t denote the consumption of good X and good
Y in country i ∈ {h, f} at date t. Let α ∈ (0, 1). The consumption aggregates in the home
and foreign countries are
Cht =
(
xht
)α (
yht
)1−α
and Cft =
(
xft
)1−α (
yft
)α
, (2.9)
respectively. The parameter α captures the degree of bias of the consumption of each re-
presentative agent. In what follows we assume that the home country is endowed with good
X, while the foreign country is endowed with good Y . Following some of the international
macrofinance articles surveyed by Lewis (2011), we assume that α is larger than 0.5. This
allows us to build consumption home bias into the model.
Preferences. As in Epstein and Zin (1993), agents’ preferences are recursive but not time
separable:
U it =
[
(1− δ) · (Cit)1−1/ψ + δEt [(U it+1)1−γ] 1−1/ψ1−γ
] 1
1−1/ψ
, ∀i ∈ {h, f} . (2.10)
The coefficients γ and ψ measure the relative risk aversion (RRA) and the IES, respectively.
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In contrast to the constant RRA case, these preferences allow agents to be risk averse in
future utility as well as future consumption. The extent of such utility risk aversion depends
on the preference for early resolution of uncertainty, measured by γ − 1/ψ > 0. To better
highlight this feature of the preferences, we focus on the ordinally equivalent transformation
Vt =
U
1−1/ψ
t
1− 1/ψ
and approximate it with respect to θ ≡ γ−1/ψ1−1/ψ around θ0 = 1:
Vt = (1− δ) C
1−1/ψ
t
1− 1/ψ + δEt
[
V 1−θt+1
] 1
1−θ
(2.11)
≈ (1− δ) C
1−1/ψ
t
1− 1/ψ + δEt [Vt+1]−
δ
2
θ
Et [Vt+1]
V art [Vt+1] .
Note that the sign of
(
θ
Et[Vt+1]
)
depends on the sign of (γ − 1/ψ). When γ = 1/ψ, the agent
is utility-risk neutral and preferences collapse to the standard time-additive case. When
the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty, that is, when γ > 1/ψ, the coefficient θ is
positive: uncertainty about continuation utility reduces welfare and generates an incentive
to trade off future expected utility, Et [Vt+1], for future utility risk, V art [Vt+1].
This mean-variance trade-off is absent when agents have standard time-additive preferen-
ces, and it represents the most important element of our analysis, given our focus on the
propagation of uncertainty shocks.
Since there is a one-to-one mapping between utility, U it , and lifetime wealth, that is, the
value of a perpetual claim to consumption, W ic,t,
U it =
[
(1− δ)(Cit +W ic,t)
] 1
1−1/ψ , ∀i ∈ {h, f}, (2.12)
the optimal risk-sharing scheme can also be interpreted in terms of the mean-variance trade-
off of wealth. For this reason, in what follows we use the terms “wealth” and “continuation
utility” interchangeably.
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Endowments. We choose to endow each country with a stochastic supply of its most-
preferred good. Endowments are specified in the spirit of Colacito and Croce (2013a), with
the important difference of accounting also for time-varying risk:
∆ logXt = µx + z1,t−1 + eσx,t/2σεx,t − cit−1 (2.13)
∆ log Yt = µy + z2,t−1 + eσy,t/2σεy,t + cit−1,
where the process cit ≡ τ log (Xt/Yt) with τ ∈ (0, 1) introduces cointegration and guarantees
the existence of the equilibrium, and the components z1 and z2 are highly persistent AR(1)
processes,
zj,t = ρzj,t−1 + σzεj,t, ∀j ∈ {1, 2} . (2.14)
Throughout the paper, we refer to ε1,t and ε2,t as long-run shocks, due to their long-lasting
impact on the growth rates of the two endowments. Similarly, we call εx,t and εy,t short-run
shocks.
We focus on time-varying short-run risk, as captured by the following process:
σj,t = ρσσj,t−1 + σsrεσj,t,∀j ∈ {x, y} . (2.15)
Shocks are jointly log-normal:
ξt ≡
[
ε1,t ε2,t εx,t εy,t εσ1,t εσ2,t
]
∼ i.i.d.N(0,Σ),
and the matrix Σ is assumed to be block-diagonal to allow for cross-country correlation of
shocks of the same type.
Markets. At each date, trade occurs in a complete set of one-period-ahead claims to
state-contingent consumption. Financial and goods markets are assumed to be frictionless.
86
The budget constraints of the two agents can be written as
xht + pty
h
t +
∫
ζt+1
Aht+1
(
ζt+1
)
Qt+1(ζ
t+1) = Aht +Xt (2.16)
xft + pty
f
t +
∫
ζt+1
Aft+1
(
ζt+1
)
Qt+1(ζ
t+1) = Aft + ptYt,
where pt denotes the relative price of goods X and Y (the terms of trade), A
i
t
(
ζt
)
denotes
country i’s claims to time t consumption of good X, and Qt+1(ζ
t+1) gives the price of one
unit of time t+1 consumption of good X contingent on the realization of ζt+1 at time t+1.
In equilibrium, the market for international state-contingent claims clears, implying that
Aht +A
f
t = 0,∀t.
Prices. The stochastic discount factor in consumption aggregate units is
M it+1 = δ
(
Cit+1
Cit
)− 1
ψ
 U i1−γt+1
Et
[
U i1−γt+1
]

1/ψ−γ
1−γ
. (2.17)
Since markets are assumed to be complete, the log growth rate of the real exchange rate is
∆et = logM
f
t − logMht (2.18)
and the relative price of the two goods is pt =
(1−α)xht
αyht
.
Allocations. Under complete markets, we can compute efficient allocations by solving the
associated Pareto problem. The planner attaches date 0 nonnegative Pareto weights µh = µ
and µf = 1−µ to the consumers and chooses the sequence of allocations
{
xht , x
f
t , y
h
t , y
f
t
}+∞
t=0
to maximize
Λ = µ · Uh0 + (1− µ) · Uf0 ,
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subject to the following sequence of economy-wide feasibility constraints:
xht + x
f
t = Xt
yht + y
f
t = Yt, ∀t ≥ 0,
where the state-dependent notation is omitted for the sake of clarity. In characterizing
the equilibrium, we follow Anderson (2005) and formulate the problem using the ratio of
time-varying pseudo-Pareto weights, St = µt/(1− µt), as an additional state variable. This
technique enables us to take into account the nonseparability of the utility functions.
The first-order necessary conditions imply the following allocations:
xht = αXt
[
1 +
(1− α)(St − 1)
1− α+ αSt
]
, xft = (1− α)Xt
[
1− α(St − 1)
1− α+ αSt
]
(2.19)
yht = (1− α)Yt
[
1 +
α(St − 1)
α+ (1− α)St
]
, yft = αYt
[
1− (1− α)(St − 1)
α+ (1− α)St
]
,
where
St = St−1 · M
h
t
Mft
·
(
Cht /C
h
t−1
Cft /C
f
t−1
)
, ∀t ≥ 1 (2.20)
and S0 = 1, as we start the economy from an identical allocation of wealth and endowments.
This is consistent with the ergodic distribution of the model, which implies that on average
the two countries consume an identical share of world resources because of symmetry.
We make three remarks. First, St is a key driver of the share of world consumption allocated
to the home country, SWCt,
SWCt =
xht + pty
h
t
Xt + ptYt
=
St
1 + St
. (2.21)
The higher St is, the larger is the home country. Second, as in Colacito and Croce (2013a),
when the home country receives good news for the endowment of good X, there is a persis-
tent reduction in the domestic share of world consumption. This countercyclical adjustment
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is consistent with equation (2.20): as good news for the supply of good X relative to good
Y materializes, the home country experiences a drop in its marginal utility. Therefore,
it is optimal to reallocate resources to the foreign country. In the decentralized economy,
the home country optimally substitutes part of its current consumption with exports to its
foreign trading partner. Third, St introduces an endogenous time-varying volatility term
into consumption growth, since allocations are nonlinear functions of this component. In
section 2.4.3, we discuss the importance of this channel in the context of our explanation
of the volatility disconnect anomaly.
2.3.1. Calibration and Solution Method
We report our benchmark calibration in table 2.3.1. Panel A refers to parameters that
have already been employed in this class of models and are standard in the literature (see,
among others , Colacito and Croce (2011a), Colacito and Croce (2013a) and Bansal and
Shaliastovich (2013)).
We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 1.5, as in Colacito and Croce (2013a).
Because of the presence of volatility risk, we can obtain a volatile stochastic discount factor
with a risk aversion coefficient of 7, a value particularly conservative in this literature and
applicable also to countries other than the US (Choi et al. (2014)).The subjective discount
factor is chosen so as to keep the average annual risk-free rate close to 1% when possible.
The consumption home bias is set to 0.96, a number that falls in the middle of the range
observed for our countries. For example, in our sample the US home bias is 0.95, as imports
comprise an average of 5% of US consumption goods. (Erceg et al. (2008)). Balta and
Delgado (2009)document a stronger consumption home bias for the European countries
in our dataset and suggest a value of α = 0.97. Setting λ = 0.97 would improve our
quantitative results, as it would make our risk-sharing channel even more relevant. We
prefer to work with α = 0.96 in order to obtain conservative results.
Annualized average output growth is set to 2%, consistent with the empirical findings in
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Table 2.4: Calibration
Notes: All parameters are calibrated at quarterly frequency. In panel B, the entries for the data
are from the VAR specified in equations (2.5)–(2.6). Numbers in brackets denote the 95% credible
intervals. Data are from the OECD dataset and refer to G-17 countries. The sample spans the
post–Bretton Wood period, 1971:q1–2013:q4.
Description Parameter Value
Panel A: Standard Parameters
Relative Risk Aversion γ 7
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution ψ 1.50
Subjective Discount Factor δ4 0.98
Degree of Home Bias α 0.96
Mean of Endowment Growth µ · 4 2.00%
Short-Run Risk Volatility σ · √4 1.87%
Long-Run Risk Autocorrelation ρ4 0.953
Relative Long-Run Risk Volatility σz/σ 6.90%
Cross-correlation of Short-Run Shocks ρX 00.15
Cross-correlation of Long-Run Shocks ρz 00.92
Panel B: Time-Varying Short-Run Risk
Persistence of Short-Run Volatility ρσ 0.90
[0.89; 0.93]
Volatility of Short-Run Volatility σsr 0.15
[0.15; 0.16]
Cross-correlation of Short-Run Volatility ρσ,σ∗ 0.30
[0.13; 0.45]
Short-Run Volatility Correlation with ρσ,∆y -0.12
Short-Run Shocks [-0.15; -0.05]
table 2.1. Unconditional volatilities are calibrated to produce an unconditional output
volatility of 1.90%, as in the data. The long-run components are calibrated in the spirit of
the international long-run risk literature, as they are both highly persistent and correlated
across countries (Colacito and Croce (2011, 2013)). Since we set σz/σ = 0.07%, the implied
consumption growth rate is almost i.i.d., as in the data. Short-run output growth shocks, in
contrast, are as poorly cross-country correlated as output growth in our dataset (see table
2.1).
In table 2.3.1, panel B, we report the parameters that govern the volatility process of short-
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run shocks, that is, the novel and most important element of our investigation. These
parameters are calibrated to be consistent with our empirical results. Specifically, we pick
values typically in the middle of the Bayesian 95% credible intervals of the VAR system
specified in equations (2.5)–(2.6).
Consistent with our data, volatility shocks are as poorly correlated across countries as short-
run growth shocks. We allow for negative within-country correlation between volatility and
short-run growth shocks so that higher volatility is associated with economic slowdowns.
Conditional volatilities are as persistent as in the data.
Given these parameters, we use perturbation methods to solve our system of equations. We
compute an approximation of the third order of our policy functions using the dynare++
package. As documented in Colacito and Croce (2012), a third-order approximation is
required to capture endogenous time-varying volatility due to the adjustments of the pseudo-
Pareto weights. All variables included in our dynare++ code are expressed in log-units.
Both the calibration and the solution methods are standard in the literature. In what follows
we discuss only the performance of our model for the dynamics of conditional volatilities,
that is, the main objective of our investigation. For commonly targeted unconditional
moments, we refer the reader to table A.2.3 in the appendix. For the sake of completeness,
this table also shows the same moments for the case in which we abstract away from volatility
shocks, and for the setting with CRRA preferences.
2.4. Main Results
In this section, we present the main results of our theoretical analysis. We start by describing
the risk-sharing motives of both level and volatility shocks. To our knowledge, we are
the first to connect recursive risk sharing to evidence on consumption volatility dynamics
both within country and in the cross section of countries. We then assess the quantitative
performance of our model by means of simulations and show that a frictionless recursive
risk-sharing scheme can rationalize our empirical findings.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses
Panel (a) shows the percentage impulse response functions of output growth (∆y), consumption
growth volatility (σ(∆c)), consumption growth (∆c), change of net-export–output ratio (∆NX/Y ),
and stochastic discount factors (sdf) to a shock to the home endowment for both the home country
(solid line) and the foreign country (dashed line). Level shocks materialize only in the home country,
and only at time 1. Shocks are not orthogonalized; we consider a positive σ shock in the short-run,
and a positive σx shock for the long-run. In panel (b) we consider an endowment volatility shock
which is orthogonalized within and across countries, i.e., it affects only the home country and it does
not change the growth rate level. All parameters are calibrated to the quarterly values reported in
Table 2.3.1.
2.4.1. Risk-Sharing Motives
Risk sharing of level shocks. In figure 2.3, we report the response of the variables of
interest to a short-run level shock (left panels) and to a long-run level shock (right panels) to
the growth rate of the endowment of the home country. Note that on impact the short-run
shock is sizeably larger than the long-run shock (figure 2.3, first row of panels). However,
the long-run shock is highly persistent, and it ultimately affects the growth rate of the home
endowment for a large number of periods.
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Consistent with Colacito and Croce (2013a), the growth rates of consumption increase in
both countries in response to a positive short-run shock, whereas they move in opposite
directions in response to a positive long-run shock (figure 2.3, third row of panels). The
asymmetric response of consumption growth rates to a long-run endowment shock is the
result of the agents’ extreme sensitivity to persistent news to the growth rates of their
endowments.
When a shock of this nature materializes, the home country’s marginal utility drops sub-
stantially (figure 2.3, bottom-right panel). To restore the equality of the marginal utilities of
consumption across countries, an international redistribution of resources must take place.
Specifically, the home country increases its exports, while the foreign country increases its
imports (figure 2.3, fourth row of panels). Equivalently, the ratio of the pseudo-Pareto
weights St declines, as dictated by equation (2.20).
Since the long-run shock is a pure news shock, that is, a shock that results in a larger amount
of home endowment only in future time periods, the international redistribution of resources
takes place through a drop in home consumption and an increase in foreign consumption. As
pointed out in Colacito and Croce (2013a), this immediate response of the consumption level
simultaneously comes with an opposite swap of long-run consumption variance (as measured
by σt(Ut+1)). Specifically, the home country optimally reduces its current consumption
share, St/(1−St), in exchange for a reduction in σt(Ut+1) (see Figure 2.4, top-right panel).
Consistent with equation (2.11), the reduction of long-term uncertainty improves welfare.
The volatility frontiers. Given our interest in the volatility pass-through and in the
volatility disconnect anomaly, we pay particular attention to the response of the volatility
of consumption growth rates, σt(∆c
i
t+1), to the three sources of risk that are present in the
economy. Without loss of generality, we focus on the conditional volatility of the growth
rate of consumption of the home country.
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Figure 2.4: Variance Frontiers
The left panels report the the conditional volatility of the growth rate of consumption in the home
country (σt (∆ch,t+1)) as a function of the logarithm of the ratio of pseudo-Pareto weights (st).
In the right panels we replace the logarithm of the ratio of pseudo-Pareto weights with the as-
sociated conditional volatility of the normalized continuation utility in the home country (i.e.,
σt
(
Uh,t+1/(X
α
t Y
1−α
t )
)
). In the left panels, the left (right) axis reports the values for our benchmark
(alternative) calibration. In the right panels, the values for our benchmark (alternative) calibration
are reported on the left and bottom (top and right) axes. Across all cases, we keep both the exoge-
nous long-run components and the exogenous volatility processes fixed at their unconditional mean.
The consumption growth in the home country can be expressed in terms of the primitive
endowment processes and the share dynamics:
∆ct+1 = ∆c
aut
t+1 + f(St+1)− f(St), (2.22)
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where ∆cautt+1 := α∆Xt+1 + (1−α)∆Yt+1 is the consumption growth rate that would prevail
under financial autarky, and
f(S) := log
(
α
1− α
)2α−1
+ log
 S(
1 + α1−αS
)α (
1 + 1−αα S
)1−α

captures the effects of relative size, as measured by St
6. Note that under financial autarky
there is no dynamic redistribution of resources across countries, that is, the reallocation
effect is absent. Also, it can be easily shown that f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, f ′′′ > 0, and that
limS→∞ f ′ = 0. Equivalently, the f function is increasing and concave in size, S, and it is
relatively flatter (steeper) for larger (smaller) countries.
A first-order approximation of consumption growth at date t + 1 about date t’s ratio of
pseudo-Pareto weights yields
σ2t (∆ct+1) ≈ σ2t (∆cautt+1) +
[
f ′(St)
]2
σ2t (St+1 − St), (2.23)
+2 · covt(∆cautt+1, f ′(St) · (St+1 − St)).
The variance of consumption growth is thus driven by the variation in the fundamental en-
dowment processes, variation in size, and the covariance between the two. To help illustrate
the economic role of these channels, we consider two polar cases.
In the first case, assume that either there are no news shocks (i.e., σσ = σz = 0) or they are
not priced (i.e., agents have CRRA preferences). Let the risk aversion coefficient be strictly
greater than one, meaning that the risk-sharing motive is strong enough. The covariance
term in equation (2.23) is negative for S ∈ (0,∞) because the size of the home country
increases upon the arrival of a relative negative shock (see equation (2.20)). Furthermore,
this negative covariance is greater than [f ′(St)]2 ·σ2t (St+1−St) because the volatility of con-
sumption under complete markets, σt(∆ct+1), is smaller than the volatility of consumption
6This result is obtained from equations (2.9) and (2.19). See Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Colacito and
Croce (2013a) for the derivations.
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under portfolio autarky, σt(∆c
aut
t+1). This is a common prediction of frictionless risk-sharing
models (see, inter alia, Cole and Obstfeld (1991)).
As a result, with respect to only short-run shocks: (i) the reallocation channel reduces
consumption growth volatility; (ii) this effect is stronger for smaller countries, since f ′′ < 0;
and (iii) the consumption volatility frontier is upward sloping with respect to country size.
These findings are consistent with the model of Hassan (2013), in which small countries
feature a lower consumption volatility than large countries.
The second extreme case that we consider is the one in which there are only news shocks.
By definition, pure news shocks realized at time t+ 1 do not change the level of ∆cautt+1. As
a consequence, the covariance term in equation (2.23) is null. If news shocks are priced,
they promote an international reallocation of resources at time t + 1, implying that the
conditional volatility of St+1 is strictly larger than zero. Equivalently, the reallocation
channel increases the conditional volatility of consumption. Since f ′′ < 0, the intensity
of this channel is stronger for small countries. Thus, the volatility of consumption growth
inherits the properties of f ′(S) and the frontier is downward sloping in country size.
In our benchmark calibration with recursive preferences, news shocks are of first-order im-
portance for the international reallocation of resources, which explains why our equilibrium
consumption volatility frontier is downward sloping (figure 2.4, top-left panel). As a result,
if a country experiences either a positive short-run shock or a positive long-run shock, its
relative size decreases and the volatility of its consumption growth rate rises, whereas the
opposite holds for the other country (figure 2.3, second row).
Since the recursive risk-sharing mechanism of this economy is characterized by the agents’
willingness to trade off size for a smoother future consumption profile, σt(Ut+1), savings are
dynamically adjusted to achieve long-run consumption smoothing at the cost of increasing
short-run consumption volatility, σt(∆ct+1) (figure 2.4, top-right panel).
Consistent with our analysis of equation (2.23), this trade-off is absent when we use CRRA
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preferences, as news shocks are not priced and hence the consumption volatility frontier is
upward sloping (figure 2.4, top panels, solid lines). This trade-off also disappears when we
retain recursive preferences but remove long-run shocks. In this case, short-run level shocks
dominate and the consumption volatility frontier is again upward sloping (figure 2.4, bottom
panels), implying that long-run consumption smoothing coexists with smoother short-run
consumption profiles.
A second important insight from figures 2.3 and 2.4 is that the absolute change in volatility
for the country that is affected by a positive level shock (i.e., negative adjustment in its
pseudo-Pareto weight) is larger than the absolute change in the volatility for the other
country. Equivalently, the short-run consumption volatility frontier is convex, due to the
convexity of f ′ (recall that f ′′′ > 0). As a result, the variation of the share of world
consumption produces greater variability in the consumption aggregate of smaller countries,
an important feature that allows us to explain our evidence on the volatility pass-through.
Risk sharing of vol shocks. Figure 2.3 shows the response of our main set of variables
of interest to a volatility shock in the home country. For comparability, we report the
responses from both our benchmark model and a model with standard time-additive CRRA
preferences.
We first point out that the responses of consumption, net exports, and stochastic discount
factors in the model with EZ preferences are the mirror image of those obtained for a positive
long-run endowment shock, since a positive volatility shock is a negative news shock.
Second, we note that the relative response of the volatilities of consumption growth rates in
the two countries differs across the two preference specifications. With CRRA preferences,
volatility news shocks are not directly priced and hence marginal utilities do not move.
There is no reallocation of resources across countries, and as a result the increase in volatility
of the domestic endowment is almost entirely absorbed by domestic consumption. According
to our definition of volatility pass-through, in this situation our index takes on a value close
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Figure 2.5: Response to an Adverse Volatility Shock to Good X.
The left panel reports the change in the conditional volatilities of consumption growth in the home
country after an adverse shock to the volatility of the good X. The right panel reports the change
in the cross-country difference of conditional volatility of consumption growth for the same shock.
In each panel, the dashed (solid) line refers to the case of EZ (CRRA) preferences. Across all cases,
we keep all other exogenous state variables fixed at their unconditional mean.
to zero.
In the specification with EZ preferences, the risk-sharing motive that we described in the
previous section partially offsets the increased amount of volatility in the economy. As
depicted in the left panel of figure 2.5, upon the arrival of an adverse volatility shock, the
short-run consumption volatility frontier of the home country shifts upward by a lesser
extent than under CRRA preferences. Since our agents are averse to conditional variance,
their trade is arranged to reduce the time variation of their own conditional volatilities.
Furthermore, these countries tend to keep their volatilities aligned to each other. As shown
in the right panel of figure 2.5, the cross-country difference of the conditional volatilities
increases by a smaller amount under EZ preferences than in the CRRA setting. We address
this finding in further detail in our discussion of our volatility pass-through results below.
98
2.4.2. Volatility Comovements and Pass-through
Unconditional comovements. We use simulations to quantify the ability of the mo-
del to reproduce our empirical findings for the dynamics of volatility. We find it useful
to consider first a setting with standard CRRA preferences, as in this case shocks do not
produce any sizeable endogenous reallocation of volatility from one country to the other.
Equivalently, the pseudo-Pareto weights are almost constant (Colacito and Croce (2013a)),
similarly to the autarky scenario in Cole and Obstfeld (1991). In this situation, the cor-
relation between consumption and output volatility within each country is almost perfect,
as the volatility of consumption moves one-to-one with the volatility of the output growth
rate.
Table 2.5: Comovements and Pass-Through
Notes: In panel A, we report correlations between the conditional volatility (σt) of consumption
and output growth within and across countries. Conditional volatilities are obtained by estimating
equation (2.1) country by country. The data refer to G-17 countries and are described in section
2.2.1. Panel B reports estimated pass-through coefficients (see equation (2.4)) with respect to both
domestic (US) and foreign volatility shocks for both the G7 and bottom-10 G17 countries. SWC
denotes the share of world consumption, S/(1+S), keeping the US as home country. For each country,
we compute the moments of interest over the post–Bretton Wood period, 1971:Q1–2013:Q4. For
each moment, we report first and fourth cross-country quintiles. The entries from the model are
obtained from 100 repetitions of small samples. Our benchmark quarterly calibration is reported in
table 2.3.1.
Panel A: Unconditional Moments
Avg. Quintiles Bench- No TVV CRRA
[1st; 4th] mark (σσ = 0) (γ = 7)
corr(σt(∆ct+1), σt(∆yt+1) 0.65 [0.26; 0.80] 0.88 – 0.98
corr(σt(∆ct+1), σt(∆c
∗
t+1)) 0.45 [0.35; 0.66] 0.35 -0.93 0.50
Panel B: Pass-through and size
SWC US vol shock Foreign vol shock
US/G7 Countries:
Data [0.44; 0.51] [0.43; 0.54] [0.51; 0.63]
Model (EZ) 0.50 0.53 0.53
Model (CRRA) 0.50 0.30 0.30
US/Bottom-10 G17 Countries:
Data [0.72; 0.77] [0.45; 0.57] [0.66; 0.78]
Model (EZ) 0.72 0.39 0.70
Model (CRRA) 0.72 0.38 0.37
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The international correlation of the consumption volatilities is 50%, a number slightly higher
than that observed in the data. Recall that the exogenous international correlation of the
output volatility shocks is set to 30%. Since the pseudo-Pareto weights are almost fixed
under CRRA, the log-consumption bundles in each country are a constant weighted average
of the two goods, and hence their volatilities are more correlated than those of the two
underlying endowment processes.
In contrast to the CRRA case, our model with recursive preferences is able to produce a
less-than-perfect contemporaneous correlation between output and consumption volatility.
This result is driven by the fact that level shocks are an important endogenous driver of
consumption volatility independently of our exogenous output volatility shocks. As shown
in table 5, without volatility shocks, the cross-country correlation of the consumption pro-
files would be almost perfectly negative. This channel counterbalances the tendency for
consumption profiles to be more correlated than output. At the equilibrium, our model
produces a final correlation of 35%, a figure that is well within the confidence region of our
cross section of countries.
Pass-through. Overall, unconditional comovements do not allow us to discriminate be-
tween the CRRA and EZ settings, as both models produce results that lie within the
empirical ranges. This conclusion changes when we focus on conditional responses and, in
particular, on our pass-through index. When we compare countries of similar size, that is,
the US versus the remaining G7 countries, only the model with EZ preferences generates
a pass-through of 50%, as in the data. This result is particularly relevant because it is
obtained with a simultaneous response of the current account that replicates that observed
in the data, as shown in figure 2.2.2. Under CRRA preferences, however, the pass-through
is very limited, as volatility news shocks are not an independent determinant of risk-sharing
motives.
Furthermore, when we alter the relative consumption share in the model and set the home
country consumption to be about three times larger than that of the foreign country, as in
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the comparison between the US and the bottom-10 G17 countries, our model can replicate
the asymmetry documented in the data. Specifically, our model predicts that when a
volatility shock hits a big country, the pass-through is limited. Vice versa, small countries
can better share shocks to their endowment volatility as documented by their higher pass-
through. This result follows directly from the convexity of the short-run volatility frontier
depicted in the top-left panel of figure 2.4 for the case of EZ preferences.
In the CRRA case, however, the relative country size does not play any major role in
determining the extent of volatility pass-through, a result that is at odds with the data. In
the next subsection, we show that a model with CRRA preferences fails also to explain the
volatility disconnect in our international data set.
2.4.3. Risk Sharing and the Volatility Disconnect Anomaly
In table 2.4.3, we compare our empirical findings on the disconnect between exchange rates
and consumption differentials to our simulation results. In the top panel, we show that our
benchmark model is able to replicate the slightly negative correlation between consumption
growth differentials and exchange rate movements observed in the data over both at a
quarterly and an annual horizon. As in the model with constant volatility (Colacito and
Croce (2013a), news shocks are sufficient to break the perfect correlation of the consumption
differentials and the exchange rate. Consistent with the observation in Backus and Smith
(1993a), under CRRA preferences this correlation is counterfactually high.
Most importantly, with CRRA preferences also the correlation between the conditional
variance of consumption differentials and exchange rate movements is one (bottom portion
of table 2.4.3, rightmost column). This outcome is at odds with the findings of our empirical
investigation and can be explained by looking at the right panels of figure 2.6: regardless
of whether a volatility shock, a short-run shock, or a long-run shock hits the economy, the
two sets of volatilities are always characterized by a perfect degree of comovement.
In our benchmark model, the behavior of the volatilities instead depends on the nature of
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Table 2.6: Volatility Disconnect Anomaly and Risk Sharing
Notes: This table reports key moments for real consumption growth differentials
(∆cd = ∆c−∆c∗) and exchange rate growth (∆e). Foreign variables are marked by ‘∗’; cumulative
growth rates are denoted by ‘̂’. Conditional log-volatilities are denoted by σt. The empirical
moments are obtained by estimating equation (2.1) country by country, as detailed in section 2.2.2.
The data refer to G-17 countries and are described in section 2.2.1. For each country, we compute
the moments of interest over the post–Bretton Wood period, 1971:Q1–2013:Q4, as detailed in
section 2.2.1. For each moment, we report (i) its GDP-weighted average across countries; and (ii)
its first and fourth cross-country quintiles. The entries from the model are obtained from 100
repetitions of small samples. Our benchmark quarterly calibration is reported in table 2.3.1.
G-17 Data Model
Aver. Quintiles Bench- No TVV CRRA
[1st; 4th] mark (σσ = 0) (γ = 7)
Levels Disconnect
corr(∆cdt+1,∆et+1) -0.13 [ -0.19; -0.04 ] -0.25 -0.27 1.00
corr(∆ĉdt+4,∆êt+4) -0.14 [ -0.29; -0.05 ] -0.21 -0.24 1.00
Volatility Disconnect
corr(σt(∆cdt+1), σt(∆et+1)) 0.20 [ -0.01; 0.42 ] 0.56 -0.75 1.00
corr(σt(∆ĉdt+4), σt(∆êt+4)) 0.26 [ -0.02; 0.52 ] 0.47 -0.75 1.00
the shock hitting the economy (figure 2.6, left panels). Specifically, a volatility shock in
the home country is still characterized by a positive comovement between exchange rates
and differential of consumption growth rates. This is because the two countries share the
risk associated with an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, as explained in the previous
section.
We note that short-run shocks are irrelevant in this context, as they result in a negligible
response of the two volatilities, since investors’ marginal utilities are not particularly sen-
sitive to this type of shock (figure 2.6, middle-left panel). In contrast, a long-run shock to
the home country generates a significant negative comovement between the two volatilities
and lowers their unconditional correlation (figure 2.6, bottom-left panel). Over an annual
horizon, this channel enables our model to produce a correlation well within our empirical
range (table 2.4.3, bottom two lines).
To explain the origin of this negative comovement, it is useful to decompose the variance
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions and Volatility Disconnect
This figure shows the percentage response of the volatility of consumption growth differentials (das-
hed line) and exchange rate growth rate volatility (thick line) to a volatility shock in the home
country (top panels), a short-run shock in the home country (middle panels), and a long-run shock
in the home country (bottom panels). The left (right) panels report the response functions for our
benchmark model with EZ (CRRA) preferences.
of the consumption differential growth rate into its subcomponents:
V art(∆ct+1 −∆c∗t+1) = V art(∆ct+1) + V art(∆c∗t+1) (2.24)
−2 ·
√
V art(∆ct+1) · V art(∆c∗t+1) · corr(∆ct+1,∆ct+1).
At the equilibrium, the conditional correlation of consumption growth rates is almost time
invariant.7 As a result, the dynamics of the variance of consumption differentials is mostly
7This correlation is driven by the positive comovement between the short-run shock of a country and
the adjustment in the share of consumption of the other country. In equilibrium, this correlation increases
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Figure 2.7: Conditional Volatilities Disconnect
The left panel plots the conditional volatility of the difference between the growth rate of consump-
tion in the home and foreign countries, σt
(
∆ct+1 −∆c∗t+1
)
. The right panel depicts the conditional
volatility of the growth rate of the exchange rate, σt (∆et+1). Both volatilities are plotted against
the logarithm of the ratio of the pseudo-Pareto weights, St. Across all cases, both the exogenous
long-run components and the exogenous volatility processes are fixed at their unconditional mean.
In each panel, the solid line refers to the conditional volatility obtained at the equilibrium, whereas
the dashed line refers to the conditional volatility obtained by holding the correlations fixed at their
unconditional mean in equations (2.24)–(2.25).
determined by the sum of the variances of the consumption growth rates across countries,
as depicted in the left panel of figure 2.7.
Because of the convexity of the short-run volatility frontier (Figure 2.4, top-left panel,
dashed line), the sum of the variances of the growth rates of consumption is increasing
in wealth inequality, that is, it is U-shaped with respect to the log-ratio of the Pareto
weights (figure 2.7, left panel). As a result, starting from an equal distribution of wealth,
σt(∆ct+1 − ∆c∗t+1) increases upon the arrival of a long-run shock (figure 2.6, bottom-left
panel).
Given our assumption of complete markets, the variance of the exchange rate growth can
modestly in wealth inequality.
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be decomposed as follows:
V art (∆et+1) = V art(∆mt+1 −∆m∗t+1) = V art(∆mt+1) + V art(∆m∗t+1)
−2
√
V art(∆mt+1) · V art(∆m∗t+1) · corrt(∆mt+1,∆mt+1). (2.25)
In a model with long-run growth news, most of the volatility of the stochastic discount
rates is driven by the continuation utilities. As shown in the top-right panel of figure 2.4,
the utility variance frontier is linear, meaning that the drop in the conditional volatility of
the utility of one country is almost entirely offset by the increase in volatility of the other
country. As a result, V art(∆mt+1) + V art(∆m
∗
t+1) is close to being time invariant and
the conditional volatility of the exchange rate is mostly explained by the endogenous time
variation in the correlation of the stochastic discount factors (figure 2.7, right panel).
An example can help clarify the dynamics of this adjustment. When a country receives
good news for the long run, its utility increases immediately, reflecting the total discounted
impact of the news. The other country benefits from the international redistribution of
resources, which determines an increase in its share of consumption. Given the persistent
nature of the consumption shares, the other country also experiences an increase in the
present value of its consumption and, thus, its utility. As a consequence, the extent of
comovement of the continuation utilities (and of the stochastic discount factors in general)
increases.
This effect is more pronounced when wealth inequality is more extreme, because the conca-
vity of the utility function enhances risk-sharing opportunities. Given the higher correlation
of the stochastic discount factors associated with wealth inequality, the exchange rate vola-
tility has an inverse U-shape with respect to the log-ratio of the Pareto weights (see the right
panel of figure 2.7). Equivalently, starting from an equal distribution of wealth, the impulse
response of the exchange rate volatility is negative, in sharp contrast to the response of the
volatility of the consumption differentials.
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We conclude our analysis by noting that without volatility shocks (e.g., the case considered
in Colacito and Croce (2013a)), the volatility disconnect generated by our model would
be counterfactually large. This is because of the dominance of the endogenous response of
volatilities to long-run shocks, which results in a negative correlation. We regard the ability
of our benchmark model to match the correlation between the volatilities of consumption
growth differentials and exchange rate fluctuations as an important finding that further
highlights the relevance of volatility shocks in enhancing our understanding of the dynamics
of international asset pricing and quantities.
2.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a measure of bilateral volatility pass-through and we use it
to document the sizeable extent of international propagation of output volatility shocks.
Furthermore, we provide novel empirical evidence regarding the disconnect between the
volatility of consumption differentials and the volatility of exchange rates. We show that
these findings constitute a puzzle from the standpoint of a frictionless model with CRRA
preferences. We then develop a frictionless general equilibrium model featuring long-run
growth news shocks, volatility shocks, and two countries populated by agents with recursive
preferences and demonstrate that our model can replicate these empirical findings.
Future developments should focus on extending this setting to international real business
cycle models in an effort to better understand the role of international investment flows
and international frictions in the origination and international propagation of volatility
shocks. The investigation of the roles of trading frictions, portfolio composition, and market
incompleteness are other promising directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 3 : Volatility, Intermediaries, and Exchange Rates
(with Xiang Fang)
3.1. Introduction
Exchange rates are puzzling. They are disconnected from economic fundamentals, especi-
ally relative consumption growth rate, which is in sharp contrast to implications of most
international macro models (Backus and Smith, 1993b). High-interest-rate currencies do
not tend to depreciate as the uncovered interest parity suggests, and sometimes they even
appreciate (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980, Fama, 1984). As a result, excess returns of cur-
rency investment can be predicted by interest rate differentials. Finally, it is hard to obtain
correct exchange rate volatility in standard international macro models (Chari et al., 2002).
In the foreign exchange (FX) market, more than 85% of turnovers have financial institutions
involved, according to the BIS triennial survey. Even after excluding the amount of high-
frequency dealer trading, financial institutions still play as the major participant in the
FX market. Furthermore, in 21 OECD countries 1, the BIS reporting banks account for
about half of the countries‘ total external claims, and more than 40% of total external
liabilities on average. As emphasized by the recent margin-based asset pricing literature (for
example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011), a large number
of financial institutions take leverage, thus being subject to funding shocks. These shocks
are tightly linked to the portfolio volatility faced by institutions, as Adrian and Shin (2014)
shows that the Value-at-risk (VaR) rule is a good description of intermediaries’ balance
sheet adjustments. This paper studies the exchange rate behavior in an open economy
model featuring levered intermediaries as marginal investors with fluctuating VaR leverage
constraint. Our model can resolve the three exchange rate puzzles: generating the violation
of uncovered interest rate parity, disconnect between exchange rate and consumption growth
differential, and closer exchange rate volatility to data.
1Details will be shown in section 2.
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Throughout the paper, we refer to “US” as the home country, and “UK” as the foreign
country. Both US and UK have a continuum of homogeneous households and intermediaries.
Households in both countries only have access to a risk-free money market account in local
intermediaries. Local intermediaries combine money market deposits and their own net
wealth to invest in a local risky asset, namely “stock”, and a single international bond. The
international bond is denominated in US dollars (US composite good) 2. Both intermediaries
face a value-at-risk induced leverage constraint, such that the size of the balance sheet
(stock and international bond position) cannot exceed a fraction of their market value
(Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Consequently, intermediaries in each country value their net
worth and deposits differently, depending on how tight the constraints are. The constraint
tightness varies with intermediary balance sheet volatility. For given amount of net worth,
intermediaries are allowed to take less leverage if they face with higher portfolio volatility.
Different tightness of constraints creates a wedge between the marginal value of net worth
for intermediaries in the two countries, thus driving exchange rates fluctuations.
Suppose the two countries start from their initial state with no international bond positions.
When there is a positive volatility shock in the US economy, local stock market volatility
increases, and US intermediaries take less leverage. Intermediaries are impeded from in-
vesting in the risky asset regardless of the desirable investment opportunities, thus their
valuation of one dollar invested in the US stock increases. US intermediaries take short
international bond positions to finance its purchase of home stock. Due to the imperfect
risk sharing across intermediaries in the two countries, the marginal value of one dollar for
US intermediaries is higher than that of one British pound for UK intermediaries, thus the
US dollar is expected to depreciate in the next period.
We show that the calibrated model can resolve the three exchange rate puzzles. In our
model, the balance sheet condition, and intermediary book leverage, enter into the pricing
kernel. Expected exchange rate change and interest rate differential are linked through
2The denomination of international bond does not change the result qualitatively.
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the balance sheet channel: when US volatility gets larger, balance sheet constraint gets
tighter in the US, so that its interest rate gets lower but US composite good is expected to
depreciate. The usual consumption-based Euler equation is broken down, so that exchange
rates are not necessarily linked to consumption growth rate differential. The extra shocks
make exchange rates more volatile than in the standard international macro models.
We examine the empirical implications of our model. First, the growth rate of US total
outstanding financial commercial paper has predictive power over the exchange rate of
various currencies vis-a-vis the dollar. The larger amount of commercial paper predicts
a lower exchange rate growth in the next period. The predictability is preserved after
controlling for several credit demand indicators. This finding is in line with Adrian et al.
(2015). We also provide further evidence to link exchange rate to foreign exchange market
volatility, as a proxy of financial market volatility in the model. Since US intermediaries are
more globalized than intermediaries in other countries, exchange rate volatility affects US
intermediaries the most. We find that average annual realized volatility of major currencies
in the world has predictive power on exchange rate change for various major currencies vis-a-
vis US dollar. The higher global foreign exchange realized volatility predicts an appreciation
of foreign currencies and a depreciation of the dollar. Thirdly, we run the classic Fama
regression of bilateral currency returns on interest rate differential after controlling for US
outstanding financial commercial paper. We find the UIP coefficient becomes insignificant
after controlling for commercial paper, indicating our mechanism potentially helps resolve
the forward premium puzzle empirically.
Related Literature
There are two main strands of literature related to this paper: exchange rate literature and
financial market frictions literature.
In the recent three decades, many studies have attempted to resolve these exchange rate
puzzles. Following the consumption-based asset pricing literature, Verdelhan (2010b) pro-
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vides a habit-based model of exchange rates consistent with the anomalies above. Bansal
and Shaliastovich (2013) explains bond market and foreign exchange market altogether in
a long run risk setting with stochastic volatility. Colacito and Croce (2011b), Colacito
and Croce (2013b) use a long-run risk framework to account for various international asset
pricing anomalies, including the comovement of global stock returns, exchange rate vo-
latility, disconnect between consumption growth and exchange rate change, and forward
premium puzzle. Farhi and Gabaix (2016) gives a rare disaster explanation of exchange
rate anomalies. There are also various attempts to explain these puzzles with incomplete
financial market, including Corsetti et al. (2008) for the Backus Smith puzzle, Favilukis
et al. (2015) for the forward premium puzzle, etc. However, Lustig and Verdelhan (2016)
shows that standard international macro models with only financial market incompleteness
cannot resolve the three puzzles simultaneously.
Bai and R´ıos-Rull (2015) matches both business cycle moments and Backus-Smith correla-
tion with a model of demand shock and search friction. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2010)
resolves the forward premium puzzle with infrequent portfolio decisions. Burnside et al.
(2011) explains the forward premium puzzle with investor overconfidence.
The second strand of literature considers the role of financial market frictions in macro
dynamics and asset prices, in both closed and open economies. The seminal work of Ber-
nanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) build insightful yet tractable
frameworks to study the macroeconomic effect of financial frictions. Mendoza (2010) shows
that real shocks can be amplified by financial frictions, leading to sudden stops and finan-
cial crisis. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) emphasizes the importance of financial shocks in
understanding both the macro economy and firms’ capital structure. Gertler and Karadi
(2011) provide models suitable for analyzing the effect of unconventional policies. Li (2013)
studies asset prices in this framework. As for the asset pricing literature, Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) are examples of margin-based asset pricing
models. Financial frictions have also been shown to be important in open economies. De-
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dola et al. (2013) builds an open economy version of Gertler and Karadi (2011) and studies
the transmission of financial shocks. Kim (2015) further extends it into a two-good model
to explain Backus-Smith puzzle. Our paper also explains the forward premium puzzle and
exchange rate volatility puzzle.
Our paper is closely related to Gabaix and Maggiori (2015b). They provide a simple, flex-
ible, and rich framework with imperfect intermediation in international financial market.
Exchange rates are determined jointly by real import export choice and imperfect interme-
diation. Our paper is different from theirs (GM hereafter) in several aspects. First of all,
we highlight the link between stochastic volatility and intermediary balance sheet condition
fluctuations through VaR. Second, the direction of capital flows in GM is independent of the
intermediation and financial market imperfectness only alters the quantity of flows. The role
of costly intermediation is to impede consumption risk sharing. In our model, idiosyncratic
volatility shocks creates international capital flows, which can be viewed as sharing risks
associated with intermediation. Interest rates and exchange rates are jointly determined by
idiosyncratic balance sheet conditions in respective countries. Third, our paper resolves the
exchange rate puzzles in a quantitative manner. Lastly, we provide supportive evidence on
the mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 lays out some institutional features
of the foreign exchange market to show the relevance of financial institutions in exchange
rate determination. Section 3.3 presents the model and section 3.4 shows how this model
can qualitatively resolve the three exchange rate puzzles. In section 3.5 we report the
quantitative performance of the model. Empirical implications of the model are tested in
section 3.6 and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. The Relevance of Financial Institutions
The goal of this section is to sketch the basic structure of the foreign exchange market and
show the relevance of financial institutions as the marginal pricer in the foreign exchange
111
market. 3
The foreign exchange market is the largest financial market in the world, with daily trading
volume exceeding five trillion dollars in 2013, according to the BIS triennial survey. The
foreign exchange market is a two-tier market, including the inter-dealer market and dealer-
customer market. Most of the inter-dealer transactions are making the market at very high
frequencies. According to Bjønnes and Rime (2005), the half-life of inventory for dealers is
between 1 to 30 minutes and dealers usually end the day with small amount of inventory.
These high frequency transactions are not our considerations. However, according to Sager
and Taylor (2006), dealers also take speculative positions in propriety trading, with horizons
from one day to three months. These longer horizon speculation should be included in our
model.
The second tier is the dealer-customer market, in which transactions take place between
dealers and customers. Main categories of customers include financial customers, corporate
customers4, and retail customers5. Financial customers can be divided into two groups: real
money investors and levered investors. Real money investors include mutual funds, pensions
funds, endowments, and so on, which do not take much leverage and adjust less frequently
on their portfolios. Levered investors include non-dealer commercial banks, hedge funds and
commodity trading advisors, and so on. They take high leverages and actively adjust their
portfolios. Apart from these financial customers, dealers also take speculative positions in
propriety trading, with horizons from one day to three months (Sager and Taylor, 2006).
Levered investors account for a substantial portion of turnovers in the FX market. Table 3.7
shows the fraction of FX turnovers by different entities from 1998 to 2016, reported by the
BIS triennial survey. Turnovers associated with nondealer financial institutions account for
3We describe the common features of the market across time. Admittedly, there has been tremendous
changes in many aspects of the foreign exchange market in the recent three decades, including the use of
electronic trading systems, the increase of foreign exchange transactions between financial institutions, etc.
For more institution details of the foreign exchange market, see Osler (2008) and King et al. (2011).
4Corporate customers trade for real purposes, such as production, investment, and dividend payout. The
size of corporate transactions is small relative to financial transactions.
5Retail customers, accounting for a very small fraction, are not studied in this paper.
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51% in 2016. Starting from 2013, the BIS triennial survey makes a detailed split of nondealer
financial institutions into nonreporting banks (24%, 22%6), institutional investors (11%,
16%), hedge funds and PTFs (11%, 8%), official sector (1%, 1%), and other institutions
(6%, 4%). Among these institutions, nonreporting banks, hedge funds and PTFs, and part
of institutional investors take leverage. Meanwhile, nonfinancial transactions account for
no more than 20% of all turnovers, and it has been decreasing in the recent decades. These
facts motivate us to focus on the behavior of levered institutions to study exchange rates.
Speculative positions are constrained for reasons such as regulation, risk management and
avoidance of excess risk taking for each trader. Banks in different countries are subject
to Basel regulatory capital adequacy framework. FX market participants also face market
discipline in balance sheet management, usually in the form of value-at-risk (VaR) constraint
(Sager and Taylor, 2006). Usually, position limits are imposed on traders to avoid individual
excess risk taking (Osler, 2008). These practices shed light on the role of balance sheet
conditions in exchange rate determination.
Aggregate banking data also show the important role of banks in holding cross border
claims and liabilities. Figure 3.1 plots the time series weighted average of the ratio of ban-
king claims (liabilities) over total claims (liabilities) from 1977 to 2014. The sample includes
22 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. Each country’s total external claims (lia-
bilities) are obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), while each country’s cross border
banking claims (liabilities) are from BIS locational statistics 7. We use a country’s total
claims (liabilities) share as weight. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, banks account for
about half of external claims and 40 percent of external liabilities. This number declined
substantially in late 1990s, to 40 percent (claims) and 30 percent (liabilities) at the trough,
possibly due to the global stock market boom. This number rebounced back quickly in the
6Numbers in 2013 and 2016, respectively.
7BIS Locational statistics is residence based, including all activities by banks operating in the country.
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2000s, until the global financial crisis in 2007.
In this section, we provide two pieces of evidence to support the preeminent role financial
institutions (banks) play in the international financial market: (1) a substantial portion of
turnovers in the FX market are by financial institutions facing balance sheet constraint;
(2) BIS reporting banks hold about half of countries’ external claims and liabilities. These
facts motivate us to focus on the behaviors of financial institutions to study exchange rates.
3.3. Model
There are two countries in the economy, US and UK, each endowed with a unit measure
of households and a Lucas tree. Fruits from the two trees differ. In both countries, each
household sends out a manager to operate the intermediary it owns. Households deposit
in local intermediaries. Intermediaries combine deposits and their own net worth to invest
in risky assets, including the local Lucas tree and an international bond. Intermediation is
imperfect, since the intermediaries in each bank face a leverage constraint, whose tightness
is determined by the portfolio volatility faced by the bank through value-at-risk constraint.
Every period, a fixed fraction of intermediaries exit the market and rebate back their net
worth to their owners, while the same measure of new intermediaries is set up with some
initial funds to keep the measure of intermediaries stationary. The structure of the economy
is similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
We describe the behavior of households and intermediaries in detail in the following sub-
sections.
3.3.1. Households
Households in US and UK are endowed with a Lucas tree with different fruits, X for US
and Y for UK. They follow cointegrated processes:
logXt+1 − logXt = µ+ τ(logYt − logXt) + σX,t+1X,t+1
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logYt+1 − logYt = µ− τ(logYt − logXt) + σY,t+1Y,t+1 (3.1)
Volatilities are stochastic, following:
σ2X,t+1 = (1− ρσ)σ¯2 + ρσσ2Xt + ηX,t+1, σ2Y,t+1 = (1− ρσ)σ¯2 + ρσσ2Y t + ηY,t+1 (3.2)
The two goods aggregate into a composite consumption for agents in both countries. The
aggregator takes the form of constant elasticity of substitution:
C = [(1− α)C
σ−1
σ
X + αC
σ−1
σ
Y ]
σ
σ−1 , C∗ = [(1− α)C∗
σ−1
σ
Y + αC
∗σ−1
σ
X ]
σ
σ−1
CX , CY are consumption of X and Y for US households, while variables with an asterisk
refer to the UK counterpart. Households in US and UK put different weights on X and
Y with consumption home bias, captured by α, typically smaller than 0.5. σ is the price
elasticity of substitution between X and Y. The composite good of US households is in
dollars (as numeraire), while the composite good of UK households is in pounds. The price
of pounds over dollars is defined to be the real exchange rate Qt. An increase in Q means
an appreciation of the UK pound and a depreciation of the US dollar.
In every period, given composite consumption of C,C∗ and prices PX , PY , households choose
how much X and Y to consume. US households solve the intratemporal optimization pro-
blem:
min
CX ,CY
PXCX + PY CY
s.t. : C = [(1− α)C
σ−1
σ
X + αC
σ−1
σ
Y ]
σ
σ−1
The allocation between X and Y are solved as:
CX =
C(PXPY
α
1−α)
−σ
PY + PX(
PX
PY
α
1−α)
−σ , CY =
C
PY + PX(
PX
PY
α
1−α)
−σ (3.3)
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Similarly, for UK households:
C∗X =
C∗(PXPY
α
1−α)
−σQ
PY + PX(
PX
PY
α
1−α)
−σ , C
∗
Y =
C∗Q
PY + PX(
PX
PY
α
1−α)
−σ (3.4)
The prices UK households face in UK pound are PXQ ,
PY
Q .
All households have identical Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preference over their
composite goods with risk aversion γ. A fraction αl of the Lucas tree goes to the households
as labor income, while the remaining are capitalized in the equity market and paid out as
dividends. Households do not hold equities directly. Empirical evidence supports the stock
market limited participation hypothesis Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). 8 Moreover, we can
view this assumption as an extreme case of infinitely large efficiency loss for households
to trade risky assets. Intermediaries have comparative advantage in investment expertise
and risk capacity, which is indeed the role of financial intermediaries in our economy. This
assumption can relaxed to a less extreme situation in which households pay a cost to trade
the risky assets, despite the additional complexity of the model.
Households solve a standard intertemporal optimization problem:
max
Ct,Dt+1
E
∞∑
t=0
C1−γt − 1
1− γ
s.t. : Ct +Dt = αlPXtXt +Rt−1Dt−1 + Πt
Dt is the deposit by households into intermediaries at time t, while Dt−1Rt−1 is the repay-
ment from intermediaries of principal and interest. Πt is the net lump-sum payout from the
intermediaries that exit the market, which will be specified later. Euler equations hold for
households in both countries:
Etβ(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γRt = 1, Etβ(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γR∗t = 1 (3.5)
8Alternatively, we can assume that households hold a fixed amount of risky asset without trading (Chien
et al., 2012).
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3.3.2. Intermediaries
Each intermediary is owned by a household, and faces a portfolio choice problem on how
much deposit to take, how many home stock shares and international bonds to purchase.
We exclude the holding of foreign stocks by intermediaries. In most countries’ portfolios,
domestic stocks account for a much larger share than their market cap share (home equity
bias, French and Poterba, 1991). Technically, by making this assumption, we avoid indeter-
minacy of asset holdings at the deterministic steady state when assets are perfect substitutes
(Devereux and Sutherland, 2011).
Intermediation is imperfect with a leverage constraint on intermediaries in both countries.
Vt ≥ θt(Ztst + dIt), V ∗t ≥ θ∗t (Z∗t s∗t + d∗It) (3.6)
Vt, V
∗
t are the market value of an intermediary in US and UK. Zt, Z
∗
t are the prices of
the Lucas trees in both countries, st, s
∗
t are the holding shares, and dIt is the holding of
the international bond by US intermediaries. The international bond is denominated in
US composite goods (dollars). 9 When dIt < 0, US intermediaries are effectively borro-
wing from UK intermediaries to purchase US stocks. θt and θ
∗
t measures the tightness of
leverage constraint faced by intermediaries, which are linked to the portfolio volatility of
intermediaries. We interpret them as “value-at-risk” (VaR) constraints, expressed as:
θt =
√
a2 + c× vartRPt+1, θ∗t =
√
a2 + c× vartRP∗t+1
RPt+1 is the portfolio return of US intermediaries, while the UK counterpart is R
P∗
t+1, given
as follows:
RPt+1 =
ZtSt
Ztst + dIt
RS,t+1 +
dIt
Ztst + dIt
RIt ≡ ωtRS,t+1 + (1− ωt)RIt
9The denomination of the international bond does not alter the intuition of the mechanism, but changes
the risk sharing scheme between two countries.
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RP∗t+1 =
Z∗t s∗t
Z∗t s∗t + d∗It
R∗S,t+1 +
d∗It
Z∗t s∗t + d∗It
QtRIt
Qt+1
≡ ω∗tR∗S,t+1 + (1− ω∗t )
QtRIt
Qt+1
ωt, ω
∗
t are the portfolio weight allocated to local equities by US and UK intermediaries.
RS,t+1 and R
∗
S,t+1 are returns on investing in local equities, RIt is the return on the inter-
national bond in dollars. Only UK intermediaries face exchange rate risk.
The constraint captures the feature of VaR, which is microfounded with optimal contracting
framework by Adrian and Shin (2014). Creditors require higher equity value of the inter-
mediaries if their portfolio volatility is higher, in which case they are more likely to default.
This market discipline is captured by c× vartRPt+1. a captures leverage restrictions caused
by time-invariant frictions. Furthermore, borrowing and lending between intermediaries
across border are settled before repaying the households so that they are prone to default.
Therefore, the VaR constraint is imposed on the sum of local risky assets and internatio-
nal position, even if it is a short position. We can easily extend the constraint to include
different risk weight for local risky assets and international position.
In every period, each intermediary has probability 1−p to exit the market, so that interme-
diaries will not accumulate enough net worth to grow out of the leverage constraint. Upon
exit, intermediaries rebate all their net worth to the households, and the managers return to
their households. In the meantime, these households each will send out new managers and
establish new intermediaries with some startup funds to initiate their operation. Each new
intermediary is endowed with ξ fraction of the average net worth of current incumbents.
The value function of a representative intermediary can be written recursively:
V (st, dt, dIt) = max
st+1,dt+1,dI,t+1
Etβ(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ [(1− p)Nt+1 + pV (st+1, dt+1, dI,t+1)]
s.t. : nt+1 = Zt+1st+1 + dI,t+1 − dt+1
Vt ≥ θt(Ztst + dIt)
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V (st, dt, dIt) is the value of the intermediary at the end of period t, with the holding of
domestic tree, international bond and deposit as state variables. β(Ct+1Ct )
−γ is the stochastic
discount factor of households. If the intermediary exits, it pays out its net worth nt+1. If
not, it continues to operate and choose the holding of assets and liabilities, with value
function Vt+1(st+1, dt+1, dI,t+1). The first constraint is the balance sheet identity, with left-
hand side the intermediary’s net worth and right-hand side the intermediary’s assets net
of liabilities. The second constraint is the leverage constraint as discussed before. The
dynamics of net worth for a single intermediary is given by:
nt+1 = RS,t+1Ztst +RItdIt −Rtdt
where RS,t+1 =
Zt+1+(1−αl)PXtXt
Zt
is the return to holding domestic equities. Following
Gertler and Karadi (2011), we guess the value function is linear in all three state variables,
which will be verified later. Suppose it has the following form:
Vt = νStZtst + νItdIt − νtdt
Assigning λt and ψt to be the Lagrangian multipliers to the two restrictions, we can obtain
the first order conditions:
1− p+ pνSt + λt − ψtθt = 0
1− p+ pνIt + λt − ψtθt = 0
1− p+ pνt + λt = 0
From these three first order conditions, we have our first key result:
νSt = νIt ≥ νt (3.7)
When the leverage constraint does not bind, all three of them are equal. This is the case
where the marginal benefit of investing in both risky assets is the same as the marginal cost
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of taking deposits. When the leverage constraint binds, the marginal benefit of investing in
home stock and international bond are still identical, both larger than the marginal cost of
taking deposits. The key determinant of whether the leverage constraint binds or not is the
net worth of the intermediaries. If they have ample net worth, they will exhaust investment
opportunities before they hit the constraint. In the remaining part of the paper, I will use
the notation νSt whenever νIt shows up.
We plug back the value function into the Bellman equation, and derive expressions for these
time-varying coefficients on the state variables:
νSt = Etβ(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ(1− p+ pθt+1φt+1)RS,t+1 = Etβ(Ct+1
Ct
)−γ(1− p+ pθtφt)RIt (3.8)
νt = Etβ(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ(1− p+ pθt+1φt+1)Rt (3.9)
φt is the aggregate book leverage of US intermediaries,
10 defined to be:
φt ≡ ZtSt +DIt
Nt
UK intermediaries face the same problem. The only difference is with the international
bond. US intermediaries do not face exchange rate risk in trading international bond, while
UK intermediaries do. The pricing equation of the international bond for UK intermediaries
is:
ν∗St = Etβ(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ(1− p+ pθ∗t φ∗t )RIt
Qt+1
Qt
(3.10)
10More precisely, φt is the ratio of US intermediaries’ risky position over net worth. In our simulated
economy, the properties of φt barely change if we define φt =
ZtSt+DItI(DIt≥0)
Nt
, where I is an indicator
function.
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3.3.3. Aggregation
We already specify the problem as well as the optimality conditions of any single interme-
diary. The linearity of the model simplifies aggregation. Since we have a representative
intermediary, each intermediary has the same optimality conditions and makes the same
choice. We can directly replace individual variables nt, st, dt, dIt and their foreign counter-
parts n∗t , s∗t , d∗t , d∗It with the aggregate variables Nt, St, Dt, DIt, N
∗
t , S
∗
t , D
∗
t , D
∗
It in the flow
of funds constraints, leverage constraints, and optimality conditions.
The net worth dynamics in aggregate is different from the one for a single intermediary,
due to the entry and exit. The aggregate dynamics is given by:
Nt+1 = (1− p+ ξ)(RS,t+1ZtSt −RtDt +RItDIt) (3.11)
N∗t+1 = (1− p+ ξ)(R∗S,t+1Z∗t S∗t −R∗tD∗t +RItD∗It
Qt
Qt+1
) (3.12)
3.3.4. Equilibrium
Lastly, we have market clearing conditions for good markets and asset markets.
CXt + C
∗
Xt = Xt, CY t + C
∗
Y t = Yt, St = S
∗
t = 1, DIt +D
∗
ItQt = 0 (3.13)
A competitive equilibrium consists of a sequence of allocations{Ct, C∗t , Dt, D∗t , Nt, N∗t , St, S∗t , DIt,
D∗It, φt, φ
∗
t }, a sequence of prices {Rt, R∗t , PXt, PY t, Zt, Z∗t , Qt, RIt, RPt , R∗Pt }, a sequence of
volatility {θt, θ∗t , vartRPt+1, vartR∗Pt+1}, and a sequence of intermediary valuation {νSt, νt, ν∗St, ν∗t }
such that:
(i) Households in both countries solve their optimization problem;
(ii) Intermediaries in both countries solve their constrained optimization problem;
(iii) Good markets (X and Y) clear;
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(iv) Asset markets (deposits, stocks, and international bond) clear.
3.3.5. Asset Prices
In this model, intermediaries play the central role in pricing all the assets. The asset pricing
equations can be written as:
EtΩt,t+1RS,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1RIt = νSt (3.14)
EtΩt,t+1Rt = νt (3.15)
where:
Ωt,t+1 = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ(1− p+ pθt+1φt+1)
The stochastic discount factor that prices equities and the international bond
Ωt,t+1
νSt
is
different from the one that prices deposits
Ωt,t+1
νt
. The difference depends on the wedge
between the marginal benefit of investment and the marginal cost of taking deposits, which
essentially relies on the tightness of the leverage constraint.
The stochastic discount factor has three components: consumption growth, the product of
leverage φt and VaR θt, and the marginal value of net worth or the marginal cost of taking
deposits.
One dollar to the intermediary will be distributed with probability 1−p, and will remain in
the intermediary with probability p. When leverage constraint binds, equation (6) becomes:
Vt = θtφtNt
The dollar remaining in the intermediary generates market value of θtφt. In other words, θtφt
measures the conversion rate of one unit of net worth to market value of the intermediary.
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3.4. Exchange Rate Puzzles
In this section, we review the three exchange rate puzzles in the literature, and analyze how
our model helps resolve these puzzles.
3.4.1. Backus-Smith Puzzle
Denote the US stochastic discount factor (SDF) to be Mt,t+1, and the UK SDF M
∗
t,t+1.
Consider the return of US risk-free bond Rt, the following two equations hold:
EtMt,t+1Rt = EtM
∗
t,t+1Rt
Qt
Qt+1
= 1
Qt is the price of UK goods in terms of US goods, consistent with the notation in section
3.3. If the financial market is complete, then the equation holds state by state. Therefore:
∆qt+1 = m
∗
t,t+1 −mt,t+1
Lower-case letters are natural logarithms of variables. If we assume a constant relative risk
aversion utility function, following the convention of business cycle analysis, then we obtain:
∆qt+1 = γ(∆ct+1 −∆c∗t+1)
Exchange rate change is proportional to consumption growth differential. Even when the
financial market is incomplete, such as in the models of Heathcote and Perri (2002) and
Chari et al. (2002), the correlation between ∆qt+1 and ∆ct+1−∆c∗t+1 is still close to 1. This
is inconsistent with the weak correlation between US and a number of developed economies
(For example, the correlation is -0.21 between US and UK nominal exchange rate change
and nominal consumption growth rate differential). This puzzle is named after Backus and
Smith (1993b).
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In our model, we have augmented Euler equations for intermediaries in both countries:
Etβ(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1− p+ pθt+1φt+1)
νSt
= Etβ(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
(1− p+ pθ∗t+1φ∗t+1)
ν∗St
Qt+1
Qt
Following the logic in standard international macro models, in which the correlation between
exchange rate change and relative log stochastic discount factors are close to 1, we have:
corr(∆qt+1,−γ(∆ct+1 −∆c∗t+1) + log(
1− p+ pθt+1φt+1
1− p+ pθ∗t+1φ∗t+1
) + log
νSt
ν∗St
) ≈ 1
Exchange rate change is correlated to consumption growth differential plus two extra terms:
one capturing the relative financial conditions and leverage, the other measuring the relative
marginal value of the investment. The latter two terms dominate so that consumption
growth differential seems to be disconnected with exchange rate change.
The response of consumption and exchange rate to endowment and volatility shocks also
helps us understand the disconnect.11 Upon an endowment shock in the US, US con-
sumption increases relatively, while the US dollar depreciates. When the US experiences
a positive volatility shock, US consumption increases relatively as well, but the US dollar
appreciates. The two forces at play offset with each other and generate the disconnect
phenomenon.
3.4.2. Forward Premium Puzzle
3.4.3. Forward Premium Puzzle
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity suggests that when US has a higher interest rate than UK,
we would expect the US dollar to depreciate in the next period, so that investing in US
and UK deliver the same payoffs in expectation. However, this parity condition is rejected
by data. We regress a US investor’s currency excess return of UK pounds on interest rate
differential between UK and US Treasury bills, and obtain a regression coefficient of 1.4,
11In Section 3.5, we will discuss the impulse response functions to both endowment and volatility shocks
in detail. IRFs are shown in Figure 3.1.
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being significantly different from 0. For many other countries, the coefficients are all larger
than 1. This result shows that the currency with the higher interest rate tends to further
appreciate. This puzzle is also called the “forward premium puzzle”.
In our model, volatility shocks mainly explain the puzzle through altering intermediaries’
balance sheet condition. When the US experiences a positive volatility shock, the US
interest rate is lower. If we log-normally approximate household Euler equation, we have:
logRt ≈ − log β + γEt(logCt+1 − logCt)− 1
2
γ(γ − 1)vart(logCt+1 − logCt)
There are two forces that drive down US interest rate upon a positive US volatility shock.
First of all, the variance term 12γ(γ − 1)vart(logCt+1 − logCt) is larger and interest rate
falls. Secondly, the increased volatility tightens the constraint of US intermediaries. US
households consume more than usual, thus lowering the expected consumption growth
γEt(logCt+1 − logCt). The second force also makes UK households to consume less, and
increases UK interest rate. The interest rate spread between UK and US widens.
As for exchange rates, increased US volatility mainly tightens US intermediaries’ constraint,
since each country’s intermediaries mainly hold stocks in their own country. The wedge
between investing and borrowing becomes larger. Expected exchange rate change in the
next period will make investing in home tree and borrowing from abroad equivalent. When
US intermediaries have a larger wedge, the US dollar is expected to depreciate.
We can also understand the forward premium puzzle from the intermediaries’ perspective.
From the Euler equations for international bond for both intermediaries:
Et∆qt+1 ≈ Et[(log Ω∗t+1 − log ν∗St)− (log Ωt+1 − log νSt)]
If we ignore the higher than first order moments, the expected exchange rate can be reduced
to:
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Et∆qt+1 ≈ rt − r∗t + (νSt − νt)− (ν∗St − ν∗t ) +
1
2
vartlogΩ
∗
t+1 −
1
2
vartlogΩt+1
when the US experiences a positive volatility shock, rt < r
∗
t . Since US intermediaries are
more constrained in taking leverage, the wedge is larger for US, νSt − νt > ν∗St − ν∗t . If the
wedges do not exist, we have uncovered interest rate parity. However, in our model, the
wedge dominates interest rate difference in driving exchange rates.
There is abundant literature about the relationship between stochastic volatility and forward
premium puzzle. Bekaert (1996) and Bansal (1997) show that in a complete market setting
with affine linear stochastic discount factors, stochastic volatility is necessary to violate
UIP. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) also attributes time variation in currency premia to
volatility fluctuations. Our model is different from theirs. The channel volatility affects
exchange rates in our model is through affecting the behavior of intermediaries, inducing
time-varying leverage constraint. Time-varying consumption risk also exists, but is very
weak, as is well known since Mehra and Prescott (1985). Therefore, we are proposing a new
mechanism to link volatility to exchange rates, in complementary with the vast existing
literature.
3.4.4. Exchange Rate Volatility Puzzle
Most international macro models with incomplete financial market cannot generate volatile
exchange rates as in the data. Our model also falls into the category. We will show in
the quantitative section that exchange rate volatility in our model is close to data for two
reasons. First, the leverage constraint of intermediaries amplify the fundamental volatilities
into financial market volatility. Second, volatility shocks make the tightness of leverage
constraint time-varying, to generate even more volatile exchange rates.
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3.4.5. Forward Premium Puzzle and Carry Trade
In the exchange rates literature, there are two similar but distinct literature: forward pre-
mium puzzle and carry trade. Forward premium puzzle indicates that the regression slope
coefficient of currency return on interest rate differential is positive and even greater than 1,
while carry trade refers to the persistent interest rate differential across countries without
offsetting exchange rate movement. This paper focuses on the former puzzle, with all fluc-
tuations of interest rates and exchange rates in our model being conditional. In our model,
two countries are symmetric except for the currency denomination of international bond.
On the other hand, explanations of carry trade requires explicitly modelling of cross-country
heterogeneity that accounts for heterogenous exposure to some global risk factor, as shown
in Lustig et al. (2011b), Hassan and Mano (2017), etc.
3.5. Quantitative Results
3.5.1. Calibration
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency. Benchmark parameter values are reported
in Table 3.2. Three parameters commonly used in macro models are chosen ad hoc. Time
discount factor, labor income share, and risk aversion are set to be 0.995, 0.67, and 2,
respectively. Following Colacito and Croce (2013b), we have the degree of consumption
home bias α to be as small as 0.03, and we impose a weak cointegration relationship between
the two endowment processes with the error correction parameter τ to be 0.0005. The
elasticity of substitution between the two goods is 0.9, following estimates of various studies,
including Stockman and Tesar (1995) and Heathcote and Perri (2002).
We set up a growth economy to capture the effect of low-frequency component on asset
prices, following the convention of macro asset pricing literature, but we assume the average
growth rate to be 0 in order to match the low interest rate level. The tension between
consumption growth and risk-free rate is a long-standing puzzle (risk-free rate puzzle, Weil,
1989). This paper does not attempt to provide any new insight on the resolution of the
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risk-free rate puzzle. Volatility and cross-country correlation of endowment match the data
counterpart in the US (US-UK for correlation) from 1973 to 2015.
The stochastic volatility processes are the main driving forces of our model. Volatility is
a persistent variable, so we calibrate its persistence to be 0.98. The mean of endowment
growth volatility is calibrated to the data counterpart from 1973 to 2015, and the volatility
of volatility shock is assumed to be half of the mean of endowment growth volatility. The
two parameters determining the relationship between VaR and volatility, a, c are to match
the mean and volatility of intermediary leverage. We follow the definition by Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) of the “financial sector” of all institutions supplying short-
term debt. 12Quarterly assets and liabilities data for each type of financial institution are
from Flow of Funds, published by the Federal Reserve Board. Payout rate 1− p and initial
funds for new intermediaries ξ are set to be 0.87 and 0.03, to make the constraint binding in
most cases and keep the net payout rate at 10% of net worth of the existing intermediaries.
We make two normalizations in the benchmark case. We assume the fluctuations of both
shocks are independent across countries, and volatility shocks and endowment shocks are
orthogonal to each other. With zero correlated endowment process, our model produces
cross-country correlation of output and consumption growth similar to the data, due to the
correlation of goods price. In our model, it is the idiosyncratic volatility that moves the
relative tightness of leverage constraints, which in turn leads to cross-border borrowing and
lending. Fluctuations in the common component of volatility do not affect the incentive for
intermediaries to borrow or lend internationally, so they are abstracted from the model.
3.5.2. Impulse Response Functions
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 report the impulse responses of different US and UK variables to a
one-standard-deviation US positive endowment shock and volatility shock.
12These institutions include US-Chartered Depository Institutions, Foreign Banking Offices in US, Banks
in US-Affiliated Areas, Credit Unions, Money Market Mutual Funds, Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities,
Finance Companies, Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts, Security Brokers and Dealers, Holding Com-
panies and Funding Corporations.
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When US has a one standard deviation positive endowment shock, the dividend payment of
the Lucas tree increases for US investors and consumption growth increases in the US. The
price of the US tree increases and the net worth of US intermediaries are strengthened. As
a result, US intermediaries can borrow more, which further pushes up the price of the tree.
The amplification mechanism explains the relative larger asset price change with respect to
the change in the dividend. The marginal value of investing in the tree and the marginal
cost of borrowing both decline, as does the wedge between the two. This can be reflected
in the return on the international bond. In this scenario US intermediaries are lending to
the UK intermediaries. The shock in the US is transmitted to UK with higher consumption
growth rate in UK as well as a higher price of UK goods. The price of the UK tree also
increases, so that all intermediary variables in UK move in the same direction as in the
US. The synchronization of the intermediary balance sheet has been studied in Dedola
et al. (2013). Due to more supply of the US good X, the price of X decreases and the US
dollar depreciates. The leverage of intermediaries decreases, because the strengthening of
net worth dominates the expansion of balance sheet in determining leverage. Interest rate
changes in the US and UK in this case are intuitively ambiguous. The higher endowment
creates more supply of deposit, while the loosening of leverage constraint generates more
demand. The direction of interest rate movement depends on which force dominates. Under
our parameterization, the US interest rate increases, and the UK interest rate decreases.
The more interesting channel in our model can be seen in the impulse responses to a one
standard deviation volatility shock. The volatility shock is amplified through the same
feedback loop between net worth, borrowing and asset price illustrated previously. The
greater volatility in the financial market will tighten intermediaries’ leverage constraint,
which forces them to sell part of their asset to satisfy the constraint. The same feedback
loop makes the price of the US tree decline further. Since the US intermediaries borrow
less, US households’ consumption increases, and US interest rate decreases. The marginal
benefit of investing in the Lucas tree as well as the marginal cost of borrowing both increase,
and so does their difference, reflected in the increase of international bond return. US
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intermediaries are willing to borrow from UK intermediaries so that some of resources are
transferred from UK to US. The price of the UK tree also decreases and all variables of UK
intermediaries move in the same direction as US intermediaries. The US dollar is expected
to depreciate.
3.5.3. Quantitative Results
Table 3.3 presents the quantitative results of the model.
Panel A lists country-specific moments in the model, as well as US data counterparts of these
moments. Output volatility, leverage mean, leverage standard deviation, and risk-free rate
in the US are targets for calibrating the mean and volatility of the two exogenous processes.
Financial sector dividend yield is the moment used to calibrate the exit probability or
payout ratio. The quarterly risk-free deposit rate is about 0.4% in the model, higher than
0.23% in the data from 1973 to 2015. However, if we exclude the period after the financial
crisis, in which the real interest rate is known to be negative, the average interest rate will
be as high as about 0.5%. Therefore, we target the interest rate to be 0.4%. Quarterly
stock return in the model is 1.6%, close to 1.4% in the data. The model does not generate
enough volatility in stock return. The standard deviation of stock return in the model is
only 1.6%, about 20% of 8.5% in the data.
Panel B shows the correlation and autocorrelation moments. Though the correlation bet-
ween two endowment shocks is zero, the correlations between output growth and consump-
tion growth across the two countries are close to their data counterpart. This is because of
the correlation of their prices. In our model, consumption growth is more correlated than
output growth, being inconsistent with the data (Backus et al., 1992).
Panel C shows that our model can resolve the three exchange rate puzzles quantitatively.
Exchange rate volatility is 3.8% per quarter, close to 5.2% in the data, being higher than
most international macro models. Consumption growth differential is disconnected with
exchange rate change, due to the augmented Euler equation shown in section 3.4.1. Finally,
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the UIP coefficient is larger than 1. Though there is a bit of overshooting in UIP coefficient,
the model can explain why low-interest-rate currencies tend to further depreciate instead
of appreciating.
3.6. Empirical Implications
Our model sheds light on the determination of exchange rate by the fluctuating balance
sheet constraint originated from time-varying financial market volatility. We implement
two empirical tests on our implications. First, we show that the year-over-year growth rate
of US aggregate financial commercial paper has predictive power in explaining bilateral
exchange rates between the dollar and major foreign currencies. Aggregate US financial
commercial paper serves as a measure of the constraint in the US. Further, we control for
different indicators of credit demand and find the predictive power remains. Second, we
find that global realized exchange rate volatility in the past 12 months also has predictive
power in bilateral exchange rates. Third, we find that after controlling for outstanding US
financial commercial paper, the Fama regression coefficient turns insignificant.
3.6.1. Data
3.6.1.1. Exchange Rates
We have 12 countries in our sample, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK. We cal-
culate the log difference in nominal exchange rates in each currency with respect to US for
both monthly and quarterly frequency, from 1991 to 2015.
3.6.1.2. Measuring Financial Conditions
Commercial papers are one of the major forms of external funding used by financial in-
stitutions in the US, as illustrated by Adrian and Shin (2010). We measure US financial
conditions by both (one-sided log detrended) level and growth rate of US outstanding com-
mercial paper for financial business (commercial paper for short), published by Flow of
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Funds. Our data span from January 1991 to December 2015 at monthly frequency. The
measurement is in line with Adrian et al. (2015). Further, we control for several variables
that represent investment opportunities, including investment-capital ratio, stock dividend
yield, stock market return, and output growth. The control variables are from National
Income and Product Accounts and CRSP.
3.6.2. Predictive Regression with US Commercial Paper
In Table 3.4, we report results for univariate predictive regression of bilateral exchange
rates on year-over-year US financial commercial paper growth.13 Standard errors are cal-
culated using Hansen and Hodrick (1980). US financial commercial paper as a measure of
US balance sheet constraint, contains predictive information of bilateral exchange rates of
US against all major currencies at monthly, quarterly and annual frequencies. Higher com-
mercial paper (looser constraint) predicts a depreciation of foreign currencies in the next
period, which is consistent with our model prediction. For robustness, we control for four
variables that are regarded as indicators of credit demand, including investment-capital ra-
tio, dividend yield, stock market return, and GDP growth in the US, to eliminate concerns
that aggregate commercial paper growth is caused by higher demand of credit. Table 3.5
shows the results for monthly predictive regressions.14
3.6.3. Predictive Regression with Global Foreign Exchange Volatility
Our model attributes the balance sheet condition fluctuations to time-varying financial
market volatility. A natural candidate of volatility measure is exchange rate volatility 15.
As US intermediaries are larger, more open and active in the FX market, as reported by BIS,
they are more exposed to exchange rate risk. Global exchange rate volatility is calculated
13If we use monthly, quarter-over-quarter growth rate or one-sided detrended US financial commercial
paper, the result is qualitatively identical. These results are available upon request.
14For sake of space, we do not report the regression with controls for quarterly and annual regressions.
Results are robust, and available upon request.
15Our model implies stock market volatility should be an ideal measure. In practice, banks and levered
institutions mainly hold assets such as long term bonds, various derivatives, and mortgages, etc, instead of
stocks. The “stock” or “Lucas tree” in our model is only a shortcut of local risky security. Therefore we
turn to exchange rate volatility.
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as the simple average of realized volatility for each currency pair with US dollar in the
past 12 month. 16 Table 3.6 reports results for predictive regressions of bilateral exchange
rate and global exchange rate volatility at monthly, quarterly, and annual frequencies. An
increase in global FX volatility predicts an appreciation of foreign currencies in the next
period. The empirical finding is consistent with our model implications.
3.6.4. UIP Revisit
Finally, we rerun the Fama regression after controlling for commercial paper in the US.
Table 7 shows the regression results. Panel A shows the results for standard Fama regression
for the time period 1992 to 2015 at quarterly frequency in country pairs. For almost all
countries, the coefficient is greater than 1. Results are substantially different in panel B after
controlling for commercial papers. The coefficient turns insignificant for all countries except
Japan. Australia, Canada, Denmark, and UK’s coefficients become negative. Italy and
Sweden even have a significantly negative coefficient. The contrast implies that commercial
paper contains the information that explains both interest rate and exchange rate dynamics.
While the amount of commercial paper is tightly associated with intermediary lending and
financial constraint tightness, these results provide empirical support for our explanations
of the forward premium puzzle.
3.7. Conclusion
This paper builds a two-country endowment economy model with financial intermediaries
to study the effect of financial intermediary behaviors on exchange rate dynamics. Inter-
mediaries are subject to fluctuating leverage constraints induced by time-varying financial
market volatility. We show that the fluctuations in balance sheet conditions can potentially
resolve three exchange rate puzzles: the Backus-Smith puzzle, the forward premium puzzle,
and the volatility puzzle. We also find empirical evidence consistent with our model.
16If we take the first principal component, we get similar results.
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Table 3.1: Foreign Exchange Turnovers by Counterparties
Units are in percentage point. Data source: BIS triennial survey for specific years.
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Reporting dealers 63 59 53 43 38.9 39
Nonfinancial customers 20 13 13 17 13.4 9
Other financial institutions 17 28 33 40 47.7 53
Table 3.2: Calibration
Variable Notation Value Target
Discount factor β 0.995 Standard
Home bias α 0.03 Colacito-Croce 2013
Nontradable share αl 0.67 Standard
Elasticity σ 0.9 Heathcote-Perri 2002
Risk aversion γ 2 Standard
Mean X µx 0 Risk Free Rate
Mean volatility σ¯ 0.006 Output volatility
Volatility persistence ρσ 0.98 Standard
Error Correction τ 0.0005 Colacito-Croce 2013
X,Y correlation ρXY 0 Output corrleation
Volatility correlation ρηX ,ηY 0 Normalized
Exit rate p 0.87 Payout rate
Initial intermediary fund ξ 0.03 Payout rate
VaR constant a 0.36 Mean of leverage
VaR slope c 150 Volatility of leverage
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Table 3.3: Quantitative Results
Panel A: Country specific moments
Home Foreign Data(US)
Output growth std 0.0046 0.0057 0.0052
Consumption growth std 0.0042 0.0061 0.0051
Leverage mean 9.35 9.28 9.24
Leverage std 1.46 2.85 1.60
Risk free rate 0.005 0.005 0.0023
Equity return 0.016 0.016 0.014
Equity return std 0.016 0.023 0.085
Panel B: (Auto)correlation moments
Output growth 0.37 0.34
Consumption growth 0.48 0.30
Panel C: Exchange rate moments
Model Data(US/UK)
FX rate change sd 0.038 0.052
UIP coefficient 3.64 1.40
Backus Smith correlation 0.11 -0.21
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Table 3.4: Exchange Rates and US Financial Commercial Paper
We report results for the predictive regression of bilateral exchange rate on US aggregate financial
commercial paper year-over-year growth rate at monthly, quarterly and annual frequency. Data
covers from 1991 to 2015. The t-statistics are reported in the parenthese, based on heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. * significant at 10% confidence level, ** significant
at 5% confidence level.
AUD BEF CAD CHF DEU FRF GBP ITY JPN NZD NOK SWE
Monthly -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(-3.25) (-1.54) (-1.05) (-1.50) (-1.27) (-1.56) (-2.91) (-1.84) (-1.50) (-1.56) (-1.30) (-1.00)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Quarterly -0.13** -0.06* -0.05* -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.14** -0.09** -0.07** -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
(-3.10) (-1.64) (-1.70) (-1.58) (-1.33) (-1.64) (-3.05) (-2.30) (-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.28) (-1.15)
R2 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Annual -0.36** -0.14 -0.16** -0.13 -0.09 -0.14 -0.44** -0.24** -0.21** -0.14 -0.10 -0.05
(-2.97) (-1.24) (-2.02) (-1.17) (-0.82) (-1.23) (-3.62) (-2.46) (-2.55) (-1.22) (-0.62) (-0.68)
R2 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00
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Table 3.5: Exchange Rates and US Financial Commercial Paper with Controls
We report results for the predictive regression of bilateral exchange rate on US aggregate financial
commercial paper year-over-year growth rate at monthly frequency. We add additional controls of
investment capital ratio, dividend yield, US stock return and US GDP growth into the predictive
regression. Control variables data are from Amit Goyal’s website. For the sake of space, we only
include the results for monthly regressions. Data covers 1991 to 2015. The t-statistics are reported
in the parenthese, based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *
significant at 10% confidence level, ** significant at 5% confidence level.
AUD BEF CAD CHF DEU FRF GBP ITY JPN NZD NOK SWE
CP -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(-3.20) (-1.48) (-1.16) (-1.46) (-1.20) (-1.51) (-3.01) (-1.81) (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.34) (-1.22)
I/K -0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.08**
(-0.55) (-1.25) (0.53) (-1.13) (-1.24) (-1.22) (0.20) (-0.74) (-1.24) (-1.27) (-0.47) (1.98)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
CP -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.04** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-3.29) (-1.38) (-1.42) (-1.37) (-1.61) (-1.41) (-2.95) (-2.06) (-1.43) (-1.40) (-1.24) (-1.46)
DP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(-0.17) (0.25) (-1.02) (0.22) (-0.74) (0.25) (0.13) (-0.68) (0.09) (0.25) (0.18) (-1.06)
R2 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CP -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(-3.21) (-1.41) (-1.07) (-1.39) (-1.14) (-1.44) (-2.94) (-1.80) (-1.40) (-1.43) (-1.28) (-1.16)
Ret -0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.07*
(-0.49) (-1.36) (0.42) (-1.24) (-1.38) (-1.32) (0.02) (-0.77) (-1.20) (-1.37) (-0.52) (1.72)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
CP -0.06** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06** -0.04** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03* -0.02
(-3.32) (-1.59) (-1.29) (-1.52) (-1.00) (-1.58) (-3.25) (-2.18) (-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.90) (-1.61)
∆GDP 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.15
(0.45) (0.24) (0.42) (0.16) (-0.32) (0.17) (0.49) (0.71) (0.08) (0.18) (1.20) (1.35)
R2 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
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Table 3.6: Exchange Rates and Global Realized FX Volatility
We report results for the predictive regression of bilateral exchange rate on global FX volatility.
Data covers from 1980 to 2015. We use daily exchange rate data to calculate the realized volatility
of exchange rate change in the past 12 months in each currency pair reported in the table, and
take the simple average as measure of global FX volatility. Predictive horizons include 1 month, 1
quarter and 1 year ahead.The t-statistics are reported in the parenthese, based on heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. * significant at 10% confidence level, ** significant
at 5% confidence level.
AUD BEF CAD CHF DEU FRF GBP ITY JPN NZD NOK SWE
Monthly 0.02** 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.02*
(1.99) (1.90) (1.17) (2.11) (2.00) (1.95) (1.04) (2.16) (2.19) (1.93) (2.34) (1.90)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Quarterly 0.06** 0.04* 0.03 0.05** 0.05* 0.05* 0.02 0.05** 0.04* 0.07** 0.05** 0.05**
(2.11) (1.82) (1.61) (2.19) (1.94) (1.90) (1.04) (2.12) (1.72) (2.26) (2.30) (2.01)
R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
Annual 0.25** 0.18* 0.13** 0.19** 0.17 0.17* 0.11** 0.18* 0.17** 0.32** 0.22** 0.21**
(4.25) (1.69) (3.37) (2.54) (1.62) (1.71) (1.97) (1.76) (2.21) (5.97) (3.53) (3.76)
R2 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.14 0.09
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive US Endowment Shock
This figure reports the impulse responses to a positive one-standard-deviation US endowment shock.
Variables include interest rate (R), equity price (Z), equity return (RS), consumption growth (dc),
marginal value of investment for intermediaries (νs), marginal cost of taking deposit for intermedi-
aries (ν) and leverage (φ). Impulse responses of both US and UK variables are shown in the same
figure. Also, the responses of exchange rate (Q) and US position on international bond (DI , being
positive means US is borrowing from UK) are reported.
5 10 15 20
#10-4
-5
0
5
R      
5 10 15 20
#10-3
-5
0
5
10
Z      
5 10 15 20
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
RS    
5 10 15 20
#10-3
-5
0
5
"c
5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
8S  
5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
8     
5 10 15 20
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
?   
5 10 15 20
#10-3
-3
-2
-1
0
DI    
5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Q      
Home
Foreign
139
Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive US Volatility Shock
This table reports the impulse responses to a positive one-standard-deviation US volatility shock.
Variables include interest rate (R), equity price (Z), equity return (RS), consumption growth (dc),
marginal value of investment for intermediaries (νS), marginal cost of taking deposit for intermedi-
aries (ν) and leverage (φ). Impulse responses of both US and UK variables are shown in the same
figure. Also, the responses of exchange rate (Q) and US position on international bond (DI , being
positive means US is borrowing from UK) are reported.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1.1. Data
The appendix details the data source.
The government debt data are from Dallas Fed, Flow of Funds, and George Hall. Dallas
Fed reports the monthly level of par and market values of gross, non-marketable and net
debt from 1942 to 2014. Flow of Funds database reports debt held by the Federal Reserve
System and rest of the world. George Hall kindly provides debt data from 1926 to 1941.
The stock return and predictors are from Amit Goyal’s website. The stock return is the
return on S&P 500 index from CRSP. The risk-free rate is the 3-month T-bill. The price-
dividend ratio (pd) is the difference between the log of prices and the log of dividends. The
dividend yield (dy) is the difference between the log of dividends and the log of lagged prices.
The price-earning ratio (pe) is the difference between log of prices and log of earnings. The
dividend-earning ratio (d/e) is the difference between log of dividends and log of earnings.
Stock return volatility (svar) is the sum of squared daily returns on S&P 500. The book-to-
market ratio (bm) is the ratio of book value to market value for the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. Net equity expansion (ntis) is the ratio of twelve-month moving sums of net issues
by NYSE-listed stocks divided by the total market capitalization of NYSE stocks. Treasury
bill rate (tbl) is the 3-month treasury bill rate. Long-term yield (lty) is the long-term
government bond yield. Long-term return (ltr) is the long-term government bond return.
Term spread (tms) is the difference between the long-term yield on government bonds and
the T-bill. Default yield spread (dfy) is the difference between BAA- and AAA- rated
corporate bond yields. Inflation (infl) is the CPI inflation. Investment-capital ratio (ik)
is the ratio of aggregate (private nonresidential fixed) investment to aggregate capital for
the whole economy. Consumption-wealth ratio (cay) is the error correction term calculated
from the co-integration of consumption, income, and wealth. Two predictors are constructed
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separately. GDP gap (gap) is the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP over
potential GDP. Potential GDP is from CBO. Government investment-capital ratio (gik) is
the ratio of aggregate government investment to aggregate government capital.
Investment-grade and high-yield corporate bond return indices are from Barclay’s. Gilchrist
and Zakrajˆsek (2012) spread is from Simon Gilchrist’s website. Moody’s Aaa, Aa, A,
Baa bond yields are from Bloomberg. 30-year treasury bond yield is from CRSP. General
collateral repo rate (Repo) combines two series. It is the banker’s acceptance rate from Fred
before 1991 and 3-month general collateral repo rate from Bloomberg after 1991. Certificate
of Deposits rate (CD) and AA commercial paper rate are from Fred. 1-month and 3-month
nominal risk-free rates are from CRSP. Expected inflation in Livingston survey is from
Philly Fed. The average return on government debt is from George Hall.
The data on macroeconomic and fiscal variables are from NIPA. In constructing the fiscal
uncertainty measure, I use a large panel of quarterly macroeconomic series from FRED-QD
database (McCracken and Ng, 2016). I include all the series that are available from 1948
in Group 1: NIPA, Group 2: Industrial Production, Group 3: Employment and Unem-
ployment, Group 5: Inventories, Orders, and Sales, Group 6: Prices, Group 7: Earnings
and Productivity, and Group 9: Money and Credit. I exclude other groups about finan-
cial markets. These result in 132 macroeconomics series. ID shows the series number in
the database. TC denotes the data transformation: (1) no transformation; (2) ∆xt; (3)
∆2xt; (4)log(xt);(5)∆log(xt);(6)∆
2log(xt). (7)∆(xt/xt−1)− 1). The transformation follows
McCracken and Ng (2016). I augment the database with 37 fiscal-policy-related series from
NIPA Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.9.5, and 3.10.5. These variables cover the major components of
government receipts, consumption, investment, and transfer in the federal and state and
local level. I take the ratio between the fiscal variables and nominal GDP and take the log
difference.
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Fiscal Policy Variables Federal State and Local
Current receipts 3.2 3.3
Current tax receipts 3.2 3.3
Personal current taxes 3.2 3.3
Taxes on production and imports 3.2 3.3
Taxes on corporate income 3.2 3.3
Contributions for government social insurance 3.2
Current transfer receipts 3.2
Capital transfer receipts 3.2 3.3
Current expenditures 3.2 3.3
Consumption expenditures 3.2 3.3
Compensation of general government employees 3.10.5 3.10.5
Consumption of general government fixed capital 3.10.5 3.10.5
Durable goods 3.10.5
Nondurable goods 3.10.5
Services 3.10.5
Current transfer payments 3.2 3.3
Interest payments 3.2 3.3
Subsidies 3.2
Gross investment 3.9.5 3.9.5
Structures 3.9.5
Equipment 3.9.5
Intellectual property products 3.9.5
National defense consumption expenditures and gross investment 3.9.5
Nondefense consumption expenditures and gross investment 3.9.5
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ID TCFRED MNEMONIC DESCRIPTION
1. NIPA
1 5 GDPC96 Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal
2 5 PCECC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
3 5 PCDG Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods
4 5 PCESV Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
5 5 PCND Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods
6 5 GPDIC96 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 3 decimal
7 5 FPI Fixed Private Investment
8 5 Y033RC1Q027SBEA Gross Private Domestic Investment: Fixed Investment: Nonresidential: Equipment
9 5 PNFI Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment
10 5 PRFI Private Residential Fixed Investment
11 1 A014RE1Q156NBEAShares of gross domestic product: Gross private domestic investment: Change in private inventories
16 5 EXPGSC96 Real Exports of Goods and Services, 3 Decimal
17 5 IMPGSC96 Real Imports of Goods and Services, 3 Decimal
18 5 DPIC96 Real Disposable Personal Income
19 5 OUTNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Output
20 5 OUTBS Business Sector: Real Output
1942 B020RE1Q156NBEAShares of gross domestic product: Exports of goods and services
1952 B021RE1Q156NBEAShares of gross domestic product: Imports of goods and services
2. Industrial Production
22 5 INDPRO Industrial Production Index
23 5 IPFINAL Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group)
24 5 IPCONGD Industrial Production: Consumer Goods
25 5 IPMAT Industrial Production: Materials
26 5 IPDMAT Industrial Production: Durable Materials
28 5 IPDCONGD Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods
29 5 IPB51110SQ Industrial Production: Durable Goods: Automotive products
30 5 IPNCONGD Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods
31 5 IPBUSEQ Industrial Production: Business Equipment
34 1 CUMFNS Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing (SIC)
1985 IPMANSICS Industrial Production: Manufacturing (SIC)
2011 NAPMPI ISM Manufacturing: Production Index
2051 NAPM ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index
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ID TCFRED MNEMONICDESCRIPTION
3. Employment and Unemployment
35 5 PAYEMS All Employees: Total Nonfarm Payrolls
36 5 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries
37 5 MANEMP All Employees: Manufacturing
38 5 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries
39 5 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries
40 5 DMANEMP All Employees: Durable goods
41 5 NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable goods
42 5 USCONS All Employees: Construction
43 5 USEHS All Employees: Education and Health Services
44 5 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities
45 5 USINFO All Employees: Information Services
46 5 USPBS All Employees: Professional and Business Services
47 5 USLAH All Employees: Leisure and Hospitality
48 5 USSERV All Employees: Other Services
49 5 USMINE All Employees: Mining and logging
50 5 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation and Utilities
51 5 USGOVT All Employees: Government
52 5 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade
53 5 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade
54 5 CES9091000001 All Employees: Government: Federal
57 5 CE16OV Civilian Employment
58 2 CIVPART Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate
59 2 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
60 2 LNS13008397 Of Total Unemployed, Percent Unemployed Less than 5 Weeks
61 2 LNS13025703 Of Total Unemployed, Percent Unemployed 27 Weeks and over
62 2 LNS14000012 Unemployment Rate: 16 to 19 years
63 2 LNS14000025 Unemployment Rate: 20 years and over, Men
64 2 LNS14000026 Unemployment Rate: 20 years and over, Women
65 5 UEMPLT5 Number of Civilians Unemployed for Less Than 5 Weeks
66 5 UEMP5TO14 Number of Civilians Unemployed for 5 to 14 Weeks
67 5 UEMP15T26 Number of Civilians Unemployed for 15 to 26 Weeks
68 5 UEMP27OV Number of Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over
74 5 HOABS Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
76 5 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
77 1 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing
2022 UEMPMEAN Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment
2032 CES0600000007 Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Goods-Producing
2041 NAPMEI ISM Manufacturing: Employment Index
5: Inventories, Orders, and Sales
94 1 NAPMSDI ISM Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries Index
2061 NAPMNOI ISM Manufacturing: New Orders Index
2071 NAPMII ISM Manufacturing: Inventories Index
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ID TCFRED MNEMONIC DESCRIPTION
6. Prices
96 6 PCECTPI Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index
98 6 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index
99 6 GPDICTPI Gross Private Domestic Investment: Chain-type Price Index
1006 IPDBS Business Sector: Implicit Price Deflator
1016 DGDSRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Goods (chain-type price index)
1026 DDURRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Durable goods (chain-type price index)
1036 DSERRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Services (chain-type price index)
1046 DNDGRG3Q086SBEAPCE: Nondurable goods (chain-type price index)
1056 DHCERG3Q086SBEA PCE: Services: Household consumption expenditures (chain-type price index)
1066 DMOTRG3Q086SBEAPCE: Durable goods: Motor vehicles and parts (chain-type price index)
1076 DFDHRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Durable goods: Furnishings and durable household equipment (chain-type price index)
1086 DREQRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Durable goods: Recreational goods and vehicles (chain-type price index)
1096 DODGRG3Q086SBEAPCE: Durable goods: Other durable goods (chain-type price index)
1106 DFXARG3Q086SBEA PCE: Nondurable goods: Food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption
(chain-type price index)
1116 DCLORG3Q086SBEA PCE: Nondurable goods: Clothing and footwear (chain-type price index)
1126 DGOERG3Q086SBEA PCE: Nondurable goods: Gasoline and other energy goods (chain-type price index)
1136 DONGRG3Q086SBEAPCE: Nondurable goods: Other nondurable goods (chain-type price index)
1146 DHUTRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Services: Housing and utilities (chain-type price index)
1156 DHLCRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Services: Health care (chain-type price index)
1166 DTRSRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Transportation services (chain-type price index)
1176 DRCARG3Q086SBEA PCE: Recreation services (chain-type price index)
1186 DFSARG3Q086SBEA PCE: Services: Food services and accommodations (chain-type price index)
1196 DIFSRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Financial services and insurance (chain-type price index)
1206 DOTSRG3Q086SBEA PCE: Other services (chain-type price index)
1216 CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
1236 PPIFGS Producer Price Index by Commodity for Finished Goods
1246 PPIACO Producer Price Index for All Commodities
1256 PPIFCG Producer Price Index by Commodity for Finished Consumer Goods
1266 PPIFCF Producer Price Index by Commodity for Finished Consumer Foods
1276 PPIIDC Producer Price Index by Commodity Industrial Commodities
1286 PPIITM Producer Price Index by Commodity Intermediate Materials: Supplies and Components
1291 NAPMPRI ISM Manufacturing: Prices Index
1315 WPU0561 Producer Price Index by Commodity for Fuels and Related Products and Power:
Crude Petroleum (Domestic Production)
2146 PPICRM Producer Price Index by Commodity for Crude Materials for Further Processing
2156 PPICMM Producer Price Index by Commodity Metals and metal products: Primary nonferrous metals
2166 CPIAPPSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Apparel
2176 CPITRNSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Transportation
2186 CPIMEDSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Medical Care
2206 CUUR0000SAD Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Durables
2226 CPIULFSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food
2236 CUUR0000SA0L2 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items less shelter
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ID TCFRED MNEMONICDESCRIPTION
7. Earnings and Productivity
1345 CES2000000008 Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Construction
1355 CES3000000008 Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing
1375 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
1385 RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
1405 OPHNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Output Per Hour of All Persons
1415 OPHPBS Business Sector: Real Output Per Hour of All Persons
1425 ULCBS Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
1445 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
1455 UNLPNBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Nonlabor Payments
2256 CES0600000008 Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Goods-Producing
9. Money and Credit
1625 AMBSLREAL Real St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base
1675 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks
1685 CONSUMER Consumer Loans at All Commercial Banks
1695 NONREVSL Total Nonrevolving Credit Owned and Securitized, Outstanding
1705 REALLN Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks
1725 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Owned and Securitized, Outstanding
2266 DTCOLNVHFNM Consumer Motor Vehicle Loans Owned by Finance Companies, Outstanding
2276 DTCTHFNM Total Consumer Loans and Leases Owned and Securitized by Finance Companies, Outstanding
2286 INVEST Securities in Bank Credit at All Commercial Banks
A.1.2. Time-varying Fiscal Uncertainty in a Pareto Problem
I show that higher debt-to-GDP causes higher uncertainty in future tax policy in a simple
setting where a benevolent government wants to smooth tax.
A.1.2.1. Taxation
Potential GDP is At without tax distortion. Assume tax rate τt leads to distortion Atf(τt)
and results in actually GDP Yt = At(1 − f(τt)). The distortion function has the property
that 0 < f < 1, f ′ > 0, f ′′ > 0 . The total tax receipt is Tt = At(1− f(τt))τt. Laffer curve,
which plots tax rate τt against tax receipt Tt, is concave, and has two roots at 0 and 1.
Under zero tax rate,there is no tax receipt and no distortion f(τt) = 0. Under 100% tax
rate, there is 100% distortion f(τt) = 1 and tax receipt is also zero. The slope
dTt
dτt
= At(1− f(τt)′τt − τt)
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is positive until tax rate reaches the peak dTtdτt |τ=τ¯ = 0, τ¯ ∈ (0, 1), and then become negative.
This can also be seen from the second derivative.
dT 2t
dτ2t
= −At(f(τt)′′τt + f(τt)′ + 1) < 0
I follow the common assumption that the tax rate is always below τ¯ , since otherwise the
high tax is pure distortion.
A.1.2.2. Pareto Problem
Discount rate r is fixed and given. The benevolent government wants to maximize the out-
put. It has to finance the exogenous spending need either through taxation or government,
given the initial debt level B0.
maxτtE0Σ
∞
t=1(1 + r)
−tAt(1− f(τt))
s.t.
B0 = E0Σ
∞
t=1[(1 + r)
−t(Tt −Gt)]
The first order condition f(τt)
′ − λ(1 − f(τt)′τt) = 0 leads to the classic tax smoothing
results that the government wants to keep the tax rate constant.
Given A, G at the steady state , the optimal steady state tax rateτss will solve
A(1− f(τ))τ = T = rB0 +G
A.1.2.3. Government Debt and Fiscal Uncertainty
We first consider a spending shock. If spending increases in period 1, G1 = (1 + )G. The
optimal tax rateτ will solve
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A(1− f(τ))τ = T = rB0 +G+ r
1 + r
G
Tax smoothing occurs. Tax receipt increases by a fraction r1+r of the increase of spending.
Fiscal uncertainty is measured by the conditional volatility of tax rate, which depends on
the impulse response of τt to spending shock .
∂τt
∂
=
∂τt
∂Tt
∂Tt
∂
The sensitivity of tax receipt on spending is fixed ∂Tt∂ . However, in order to collect the same
amount of tax receipt, the tax rate change depends on the Laffer curve.
∂τt
∂
=
∂τt
∂Tt
∂Tt
∂
Specifically, when initial debt is high, the initial tax rate is closer to the Laffer curve peak.
Therefore, the government need to move tax rate a lot more to collect enough tax receipt
than the case when debt is low.
∂
∂B0
∂τt
∂Tt
|τt=τss =
∂2τt
∂T 2t
∂τss
∂B0
> 0
We have similar effect when GDP shock hits the economy. If potential GDP decreases in
period 1, A1 = (1− )A. The optimal tax rateτ will solve
A(1− f(τ))τ = T = 1 + r
1 + r − r(rB0 +G)
In recession, the tax rate has to increase. Following the same logic, the response to a GDP
shock increases with B0.
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∂∂B0
∂τt
∂Tt
|τt=τss =
∂2τt
∂T 2t
∂τss
∂B0
> 0
Therefore, high debt B0 increases the sensitivity of tax rate to fundamental shocks. This
generates fiscal uncertainty even though the government is optimally making fiscal policy.
A.2. Appendix for Chapter 2
A.2.1. Volatility Estimation
We use an auxiliary mixture sampler to estimate the model specified in (2.1) and extract latent
volatility components, following Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998). Specifically, we rewrite the ob-
servation equation,
log((zt − µ− ρzt−1)2) = σt + log(η2t ). (A.1)
The distribution of log(η2t ) can be well approximated by a mixture of Gaussian distributions:
p(log(η2t )) = Σ
n
i=1piiϕ(ηt;µ,ηi, σ
2
η,i), (A.2)
where ϕ is the probability density function of a Gaussian distribution with mean µη,i and standard
deviation ση,i. In the Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedure, st ∈ [1, T ] is drawn to indicate
one Gaussian distribution to sample log(η2t ). Conditioning on st, the model is in Gaussian linear
state-space form, and a standard forward-filtering, backward-sampling scheme can be applied. The
algorithm thus takes the form:
1. Initialize µ, ρ, µσ, ν, σω, st
2. Sample σt from p(σt|z, µ, ρ, µσ, ν, σω, st, z)
3. Sample st from p(st = i) ∝ piiϕ(log((zt − µ− ρzt−1)2);σt + µη,i, σ2η,i)
4. Sample µ, ρ, µσ, ν, σω from p(µ, ρ, µσ, ν, σω|σt, z)
5. Repeat 2–4 until convergence
In our empirical implementation the priors are very loose: µ ∼ N(0.005, 2), ρ ∼ N(0.3, 100), µσ ∼
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N(−10, 20), ν ∼ N(0.9, 0.5), and σω ∼ IG(2, 0.5). We sample 20,000 times and discard the first
5,000. The posterior mean of σt is the volatility used in the empirical analysis.
A.2.2. Robustness of Empirical Results
In this section, we verify that our key empirical evidence on the volatility risk sharing is quite robust
to three modifications of our benchmark analysis. First of all, we show that our VAR results are
not specific to the US by substituting the US with a global aggregate. Specifically, we replace US
variables with cross-sectional averages of the corresponding variables across G17 countries (‘Global
Benchmark’ case).
Second, we assess our VAR results by looking at the US against the remaining G7 countries, assuming
that they all share the same parameters in equation (2.1) (‘US/Pooled G7’ case). Third, we run our
benchmark empirical estimation adopting a 2-lag VAR specification.
As shown in table A.2.2, our main empirical results are quite robust to all the specifications. Relative
consumption and output generally decline and consumption volatility increases due to volatility
shocks, and the effects on consumption are smaller than on output. The relative magnitudes of
the effects are quite stable across the specifications. For example, the measures of the volatility
pass-through are in 0.5-0.6 range, consistent with our benchmark estimates.
In table A.2.2, we provide further robustness checks for our main results. For parsimony, we report
the estimates of the volatility pass-through based on the relative volatility shock, the US volatility
shock, and the difference between the Foreign and US volatility shock. The confidence interval for
the latter allows us to assess a statistical significance of the size effect in volatility pass through.
In Panel A, we show that our results remain unchanged when we let the volatility processes be the
‘least primitive’ processes in the context of the Cholesky decomposition, by replacing equations (2.3)
and (2.6) with
Y˜i,t =

∆yi −∆yUS
∆ci −∆cUS
∆(NX/Y )i −∆(NX/Y )US
σt(∆yi)− σt(∆yUS)
σt(∆ci)− σt(∆cUS)

, (A.3)
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Table A1: Robustness of Pass-Through Results
Notes: Panel A shows the estimates of the contemporaneous responses (Σ˜1j) of the VAR specified
in equations (2.2)–(2.3) with respect to a shock to relative output volatility. Responses of output
growth, consumption growth, and the net-exports-to-output ratio are annualized, in percentages.
Volatility pass-through is defined as in equation (2.4). “Global Benchmark” is defined as the average
of the corresponding series across all countries. In “Pooled G7” specification, we estimate macroe-
conomic volatility assuming that the volatility parameters are the same across G7 countries except
the US. “VAR(2)” is the 2-lag VAR with US/G7 countries. Panel B reports pass-through measures
based on the estimates of the VAR in equations (2.5)–(2.6) with respect to volatility shocks affecting
either the benchmark or the remaining countries. We report 95% credible intervals in brackets. Our
quarterly data range from 1971:q1 to 2013:q4.
Panel A: Contemporaneous adjustments to relative volatility shocks
σ(∆y) ∆y σ(∆c) ∆c ∆(NX/Y ) Pass-through
Global Benchmark/G7 Countries:
0.14 -0.27 0.07 -0.10 -0.16 0.54
[0.14; 0.15] [-0.51; -0.03] [0.06; 0.07] [-0.28;0.08] [-0.36; 0.03] [0.49; 0.58]
US/Pooled G7:
0.19 -0.52 0.09 -0.26 -0.26 0.53
[0.19; 0.20] [-0.83; -0.23] [0.08; 0.10] [-0.50;-0.02] [-0.49; -0.03] [0.49; 0.56]
VAR(2) Model:
0.21 -0.41 0.09 -0.11 -0.29 0.59
[0.20; 0.21] [-0.71; -0.11] [0.08; 0.09] [-0.34; 0.13] [-0.53; -0.06] [0.55; 0.62]
Panel B: Pass-through and size
Origin of Vol. Shock:
U.S. Foreign Country
Global Benchmark/G7 Countries: 0.59 0.53
[0.45; 0.72] [0.48; 0.58]
US/Pooled G7: 0.47 0.64
[0.43; 0.52] [0.58; 0.70]
VAR(2) Model: 0.55 0.63
[0.50; 0.60] [0.58; 0.68]
and
Y ′i,t =
[
∆yi ∆yUS σt(∆yi) σt(∆yUS) σt(∆ci) σt(∆cUS)
]
, (A.4)
respectively. We have tested other orders as well, with similar results. We omit them for the sake
of brevity.
In Panel B, we augment our benchmark VAR specifications by introducing a global volatility com-
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ponent as follows:
Y˜i,t =

σt(∆yglobal)
σt(∆yi)− σt(∆yUS)
∆yi −∆yUS
σt(∆ci)− σt(∆cUS)
∆ci −∆cUS
∆(NX/Y )i −∆(NX/Y )US

, (A.5)
Y ′i,t =
[
σt(∆yglobal) σt(∆yi) σt(∆yUS) ∆yi ∆yUS σt(∆ci) σt(∆cUS)
]
. (A.6)
We consider both an average measure computed across our 17 countries, and a measure based on
the first principle component (henceforth “PC”) of country volatilities from our cross-section.
Since our VAR specifications impose that the parameters of interest must be the same across coun-
tries, this estimation procedure implicitly assumes that all countries have the same exposure to
the global volatility component. In Panel C, we relax this assumption by reporting our results
when we relax this assumption by using the idiosyncratic, rather than total, output volatilities in
equations (2.3) and (2.6)
Y˜i,t =

σ̂t(∆yi)− σ̂t(∆yUS)
∆yi −∆yUS
σt(∆ci)− σt(∆cUS)
∆ci −∆cUS
∆(NX/Y )i −∆(NX/Y )US

, (A.7)
and
Y ′i,t =
[
σ̂t(∆yi) σ̂t(∆yUS) ∆yi ∆yUS σt(∆ci) σt(∆cUS),
]
(A.8)
where the idiosyncratic volatility for country i, σ̂t(∆yi) is the residual of the following regression:
σt(∆yi) = σ
i + βiσσt(∆yglobal) + σ̂t(∆yi). (A.9)
All of these specifications confirm our two main findings: (i) among large countries, the pass-through
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Table A2: Robustness of Pass-Through Results (II)
Notes: The second column refers to pass-through measures obtained from variations of the VAR
specified in equations (2.2)–(2.3) with respect to a shock to relative output volatility. The rightmost
two columns report pass-through measures based on the modified estimates of the VAR in equations
(2.5)–(2.6) with respect to volatility shocks affecting either the US or the remaining countries. The
last column reports the difference in pass-through with respect to the US. In Panel A, variables
are sorted as in equations (A.3)–(A.4). In Panel B, we add a global vol measure to our VAR,
as specified in equations (A.5)–(A.6). We consider both a cross-country average of volatility and
a measure obtained through a principal components approach (PC). In Panel C, we focus on the
VAR specified in equations (A.7)–(A.8) with country-specific volatility processes estimated as in
equations (A.9). We report 95% credible intervals in brackets. Our quarterly data range from
1971:q1 to 2013:q4.
Relative Vol Shock: Origin of Vol Shock:
US Foreign-US (Diff.)
Panel A: Different Cholesky Order
US/G7 0.52 0.49 0.08
[0.47; 0.56] [0.43; 0.54] [0.00; 0.16]
US/Bottom-10 G17 0.61 0.50 0.22
[0.56; 0.66] [0.44; 0.57] [0.13; 0.31]
Panel B: Controlling for Global Vol
US/G7 (Average) 0.52 0.51 0.03
[0.48; 0.57] [0.45; 0.57] [-0.06; 0.12]
US/Bottom-10 G17 (Average) 0.61 0.52 0.18
[0.57; 0.66] [0.45; 0.59] [0.08; 0.27]
US/G7 (PC) 0.53 0.53 0.00
[0.49; 0.57] [0.48; 0.59] [-0.08; 0.09]
US/Bottom-10 G17 (PC) 0.63 0.58 0.10
[0.59; 0.68] [0.52; 0.65] [0.00; 0.19]
Panel C: Heterogenous Exposure to Global Vol
US/G7 (Average) 0.56 0.55 0.02
[0.51; 0.60] [0.50; 0.61] [-0.08; 0.11]
US/Bottom-10 G17 (Average) 0.66 0.59 0.14
[0.61; 0.70] [0.52; 0.65] [0.05; 0.24]
US/G7 (PC) 0.54 0.53 0.02
[0.49; 0.58] [0.47; 0.59] [-0.07; 0.11]
US/Bottom-10 G17 (PC) 0.63 0.59 0.08
[0.58; 0.68] [0.52; 0.65] [0.00; 0.18]
is about 0.50; and (ii) the pass-through is economically and statistically larger for smaller countries.
A.2.3. Standard Moments from the Model
In table A.2.3, we focus on unconditional moments typically targeted in the international finance
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Table A3: Standard Unconditional Moments
Notes: This table reports key moments for real consumption (C), output (Y ), the exchange rate
(E), the risk-free rates (Rf ), the net-export-to-output ratio (NX/Y ), and the stochastic discount
factor (M). Small letters refer to log-units; changes are denoted by ‘∆’; foreign variables are
marked by ‘∗’. We denote expectation, standard deviation, correlation, and first order
auto-correlation by E, σ, corr, and ACF1, respectively. The data refer to G-17 countries and are
described in section 2.2.1. For each country, we compute the moments of interest over the
post–Bretton Wood period, 1971:Q1–2013:Q4, as detailed in section 2.2.1. For each moment, we
report (i) its GDP-weighted average across countries; and (ii) its first and fourth cross-country
quintiles. The entries from the model are obtained from 100 repetitions of small samples. Our
benchmark quarterly calibration is reported in table 2.3.1.
G-17 Data Model
Avg. Quintiles Bench- No TVV CRRA
[ 1st; 4th ] mark (σσ = 0) (γ = 7)
corr(∆c,∆c∗) 0.25 [0.13; 0.33] 0.38 0.37 0.74
σ(∆c)(%) 1.67 [1.34; 2.47] 1.85 1.82 1.64
σ(∆c)/σ(∆y) 0.88 [0.57; 0.82] 0.93 0.94 0.83
ACF1(∆c) 0.17 [-0.16; 0.31] 0.06 0.07 0.08
σ(M)/E(M)(%) – – 47.86 47.85 11.49
σ(∆e)(%) 10.50 [10.2; 11.4] 12.80 12.65 8.31
E(rf )(%) 1.35 [1.44; 2.41] 2.17 2.19 14.91
σ(rf )(%) 1.79 [1.61; 2.27] 0.33 0.33 3.47
corr(rf , rf∗) 0.51 [0.37; 0.56] 0.91 0.92 0.98
σ(∆(NX/Y ))/σ(∆y) 0.70 [0.67; 0.97] 0.32 0.32 0.16
literature. Our benchmark calibration conforms well with our data, both with and without volatility
shocks. The adoption of CRRA preferences generates well-known puzzles: (i) the market price of
risk is excessively low; (ii) the risk-free rate is too high; and (iii) international trade is modest. In
our model the net exports are not as volatile as in our G17 dataset, but they are twice as volatile
compared to the CRRA case.
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